| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=280b1f1ad12131defcd986676a8fc9717aaa601b
ok guenther miod
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https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=17160033765480453be0a41335fa6b833691c049
ok bcook
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Adam Langley close to three years ago, which were commited in
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=e7928282d0148af5f28fa3437a625a2006af0214
ok jsing@
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behaviour that allows a PEM block to be fed through the base64 decoder.
Reported by Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov on tech@
ok deraadt@ tedu@
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and UI_add_verify_string() return -1 (and maybe -2?) on failure and
>=0 on success, instead of always zero on success
problem reported by Mark Patruck (mark (at) wrapped.cx)
ok miod@
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ok guenther@ jsing@
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ok bcook@
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the details are under embargo. The original plan was to wait for the
embargo to lift, but we've been waiting for quite some time, and there's no
indication of when or even if it will end. No sense in dragging this out
any longer.
The SRP code has never been enabled in OpenBSD, though I understand it is
in use by some other people. However, in light of this and other issues,
we're officially saying SRP is outside the scope of libressl. (For now.)
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for the key (expressed in RSA key bits, which makes *no sense* for ECDH) as
their second argument, not zero.
(jsing@ notes that the RSA callback is only invoked for 'export' ciphers,
which have been removed from LibreSSL, and for the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
option, which is makes the application non-compliant. More fuel for the
tedu fire...)
jasper@ noted the breakage and bisected it down to the diff that broke this
ok jsing@ miod@
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Remove unnecessary NULL check.
ok miod@
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up and return failure, be sure the cleanup work does NOT free objects which
are still being referenced by other objects.
ok guenther@
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within libcrypto are safe, but until we can change this function prototype to
use size_t instead of int, better be safe than sorry.
tweaks and ok guenther@
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value is happily dereferenced without checking it for being non-NULL).
ok beck@
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EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY method handlers, rather than generating a random odd key and
not even checking it against the weak keys list.
ok beck@
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it is not one of the weak and semi-weak keys.
Even though the probability of generating a weak key with incorrect parity is
abysmally small, there is no reason to be correct (although, if you're in a
need for fresh DES keys nowadays, you should seriously consider switching to
a stronger symmetric cipher algorithm).
ok beck@
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when BIO_new_{file,fp}() fails.
inspired by a diff from logan@ ok miod@
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NULL before an intrinsic strdup.
ok miod@
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ok bcook@
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ok deraadt@
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1.78; reported by Ilja Van Sprundel.
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leaks.
From miod@
OK from miod@ and guenther@
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locked throughout.
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From BoringSSL.
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ok tedu
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Requested by miod@
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M_ASN1_D2I_begin macro.
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asn1_mac.h macros. This still needs a lot of improvement, but immediately
becomes readable.
ok miod@ (sight unseen!)
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ok deraadt@
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of lines and much more readable.
ok miod@
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horrific macros from asn1_mac.h.
This is a classic example of using macros to obfuscate code, in an attempt
to reduce the line count. The end result is so ridiculously convoluted that
it is completely unreadable and it takes hours to deconstruct the macros
and figure out what is actually going on behind the scenes.
ok miod@
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intrinsics. This is the easy ones, a few left to check one at
a time.
ok miod@ deraadt@
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OK from beck@ and miod@
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ok jsing@
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() to be called.
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appropriate function. Checking for privkey != NULL is not enough since
privkey points to a member of ndsa if ndsa != NULL.
dsa_priv_encode(): possible double free in error path.
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to reinitialize all of it, especially if it is used with the same MD algorithm.
However, when the MD algorithm changes, it needs to perform more cleanups.
Make that code more closer to what EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() does by:
- only freeing md_data if EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE is not set
- performing an explicit_bzero of md_data before freeing it
- making sure we call EVP_PKEY_CTX_free on the pctx if the allocation for the
new md_data fails.
ok tedu@
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