| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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OK tb@
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No functional changes.
OK tb@
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OK tb@ jsing@ beck@
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Currently, the plaintext content from opened TLS records is handled via
the rbuf code in the TLSv1.3 record layer. Factor this out and provide a
separate struct tls_content, which knows how to track and manipulate the
content.
This makes the TLSv1.3 code cleaner, however it will also soon also be used
to untangle parts of the legacy record layer.
ok beck@ tb@
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in Openssl 1.1.1 for when to call the session callbacks. I believe it
to also generates a lot less eye bleed, confirmed by tb@
ok jsing@ tb@
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Rather than manually checking multiple bytes, actually parse the DTLS
handshake message header, then check the values against what we parsed.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The callers know the actual length and can initialise a CBS correctly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rather than pulling out the epoch and then six bytes of sequence number,
pull out SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE for the sequence number, then pull the epoch
off the start of the sequence number.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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(subordinate code paths are include guarded)
OK tb@
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* mention that the *optionp input string will be modified
* clarify that the array of tokens is expected to be NULL-terminated
OK millert@ tb@, and the first half of STANDARDS also OK jmc@
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ok beck@
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Found by tlsfuzzer.
ok beck@
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Found by tlsfuzzer.
ok beck@
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The message_size variable is not actually the handshake message size,
rather the number of bytes contained within the handshake message, hence
we have to subtract the length of the handshake message header.
ok beck@
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when we succeed with a chain, and ensure we do not call the callback
twice when the caller doesn't expect it. A refactor of the end of
the legacy verify code in x509_vfy is probably overdue, but this
should be done based on a piece that works. the important bit here
is this allows the perl regression tests in tree to pass.
Changes the previously committed regress tests to test the success
case callbacks to be known to pass.
ok bluhm@ tb@
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OK @tb
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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The conversion tool didn't handle 'static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END'
OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK beck@ tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK jsing@
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Feedback from tb@
OK tb@
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OK tb@
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here or we break the handshake with BAD_MESSAGE
ok tb@
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OK tb@
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OK jsing@
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OK jsing@
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OK tb@ jsing@
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Identifiers
These extensions are defined in RFC 3779 and used in the RPKI (RFC 6482, RFC 8360).
Imported from OpenSSL 1.1.1j (aaf2fcb575cdf6491b98ab4829abf78a3dec8402b8b81efc8f23c00d443981bf)
This changeset is a no-op, as there are 10+ issues and at least 2 security issues.
Work will continue in-tree.
OK tb@, discussed with beck@
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succeeding unconditionally. Makes muststaple work with tls1.3 in nc
ok tb@
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ok tb@
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message, even if it has received a "status_request" extension in the client
hello message and has sent a "status_request" extention in the server hello
message. Genua found a site that is this broken. This makes it work.
ok jsing@
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to the list. While here remove some of the headers from inet_net_ntop(3)
for balance.
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leaving only the basic description in the RETURN VALUES section;
tb@ pointed out LibreSSL does not currently provide all those guarantees,
and he also OK'ed this diff
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ok tb@
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fix a stale comment.
Found by mortimer with clang 13's -Wunused-but-set-variable.
ok beck
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In normal TLS, it is possible for record fragments to be sent that contain
one byte of alert or handshake message payload. In this case we have to
read and collate multiple message fragments before we can decide what to
do with the record.
However, in the case of DTLS, one record is effectively one packet and
while it is possible to send handshake messages across multiple
records/packets, the minimum payload is the DTLS handshake message header
(plus one byte of data if the handshake message has a payload) - without
this, there is insufficient information available to be able to reassemble
the handshake message. Likewise, splitting an alert across multiple DTLS
records simply does not work, as we have no way of knowing if we're
collating the same alert or two different alerts that we lost half of each
from (unfortunately, these details are not really specified in the DTLS
RFC).
This means that for DTLS we can expect to receive a full alert message
(a whole two bytes) or a handshake record with at least the handshake
message header (12 bytes). If we receive messages with less than these
lengths we discard them and carry on (which is what the DTLS code already
does).
Remove all of the pointless fragment handling code from DTLS, while also
fixing an issue where one case used rr->data instead of the handshake
fragment.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@ (as part of a larger diff)
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The info and msg callbacks result in duplication - both for code that
refers to the function pointers and for the call sites. Avoid this by
providing typedefs for the function pointers and pulling the calling
sequences into their own functions.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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There is little to gain by mallocing and freeing the AEAD nonce for each
record - move to an AEAD nonce allocated for the record layer, which
matches what we do for TLSv1.3.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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in particular, this includes new text by Matt Caswell
from OpenSSL commit 721eb8f6 Nov 28 12:03:00 2019 +0000
and corrects a wrong argument type that i introduced into the SYNOPSIS;
requested by tb@
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If a servername callback returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING, this
results in a fatal error in TLSv1.3 since alert levels are implicit
in the alert type and neither close_notify nor user_canceled make
sense in this context. OpenSSL chose to ignore this, so we need to
follow suit.
Found via a broken servername callback in p5-IO-Socket-SSL which
returns a Boolean instead of SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*. This happened to
have worked before TLSv1.3 since warning alerts are often ignored.
This "fixes" sni.t and sni-verify.t in p5-IO-Socket-SSL.
ok beck jsing
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