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* Remove the minimum record length checks from dtls1_read_bytes()jsing2022-03-261-32/+1
| | | | | | | | The code that handles each record type already has appropriate length checks. Furthermore, the handling of application data here is likely incorrect and bypasses the normal state checks at the end of this function. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Convert c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() and d2i_ASN1_OBJECT to CBS.jsing2022-03-261-81/+92
| | | | | | | | | Along the way, rather than having yet another piece of code that parses OID arcs, reuse oid_parse_arc(). Always allocate a new ASN1_OBJECT rather than doing a crazy dance with ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC and trying to free parts of an ASN1_OBJECT if one is passed in. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Provide asn1_get_primitive()jsing2022-03-262-2/+35
| | | | | | | | This takes a CBS, gets the ASN.1 identifier and length, ensures the resulting identifier is a valid primitive, then returns the tag number and the content as a CBS. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* use the new CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0 sysctl to determine CPU features on arm64robert2022-03-251-5/+55
| | | | ok tb@, deraadt@, kettenis@
* Crank major after symbol removal.tb2022-03-241-2/+2
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* Hide the tls_signer from public visibility. It's not ready yet andtb2022-03-243-29/+24
| | | | | | should not be used. It will be revisited after release. ok beck inoguchi jsing
* Start disentangling armv7 and aarch64 codetb2022-03-238-6/+154
| | | | | | | | | arm_arch.h and armcap.c are shared between armv7 and aarch64 which results in an inscrutable #ifdef maze. Move copies of these files into arch/{arm,aarch64}/ with appropriate names and some trivial minor adjustments. ok deraadt inoguchi kettenis
* Move/group i2d_ASN1_OBJECT() and d2i_ASN1_OBJECT().jsing2022-03-201-53/+53
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* Remove three useless tests filestb2022-03-193-185/+0
| | | | | | | | | The asn1test depends on asn1_mac.h which had a date with the bitbucket a few years back (and the test "isn't meant to run particularly, it's just to test type checking"). methtest.c tests an API that was never present in OpenSSL's git history. r160test.c is nothing but a licence. "nuke away" jsing
* Provide t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() and use it for OBJ_txt2obj()jsing2022-03-193-32/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | The current OBJ_txt2obj() implementation converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, builds a full DER encoding from it, then feeds the entire thing back through the DER to ASN.1 object conversion. Rather than doing this crazy dance, provide an t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() function that converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, then creates a new ASN1_OBJECT and attaches the content octets to it. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rewrite ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion.jsing2022-03-191-121/+167
| | | | | | | | Rewrite the ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion code using CBB/CBS, while also addressing some of the bizarre behaviour (such as allowing mixed separators and treating '..' as a zero value). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Simplify SSL_do_handshake().jsing2022-03-181-7/+5
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rewrite legacy DTLS unexpected handshake message handling.jsing2022-03-181-83/+139
| | | | | | | | | Rewrite the code that handles unexpected handshake messages in the legacy DTLS stack. Parse the DTLS message header up front, then process it based on the message type. Overall the code should be more strict and we should reject various invalid messages that would have previously been accepted. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rewrite legacy TLS unexpected handshake message handling.jsing2022-03-171-78/+114
| | | | | | | | | | | | Rewrite the code that handles unexpected handshake messages in the legacy TLS stack. Parse the TLS message header up front, then process it based on the message type. Overall the code should be more strict and we should reject various invalid messages that would have previously been accepted. I also reviewed steve's experimental code and fixed the bug that it contained. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up and simplify ssl3_renegotiate{,_check}()jsing2022-03-171-22/+15
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove const from tls1_transcript_hash_value()jsing2022-03-172-5/+5
| | | | | | | This function populates the passed *out argument, hence it should not be marked const. ok tb@
* Rework ASN1_STRING_set()jsing2022-03-171-14/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | Rework ASN1_STRING_set() so that we always clear and free an existing allocation, prior to storing the new data. This fixes a number of issues, including a failure to zero data if the existing allocation was too small. This also fixes other bugs such as leaving the allocation uninitialised if NULL is passed for data. Require -1 where strlen() is expected and improve length and overflow checks. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Make gcc 4 happier about x509_addr.ctb2022-03-161-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | gcc 4 on sparc64 issues a few 'warning: value computed is not used'. There are two cases: sk_set_cmp_function() returns the old comparison function of the stack which we don't care about. The one warning about an sk_delete() is about a return value that we know already and which we will free a few lines down. ok inoguchi miod
* LibreSSL 3.5.2bcook2022-03-151-3/+3
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* Initialise *out_name at the start of i2t_ASN1_OBJECT_name().jsing2022-03-151-1/+3
| | | | ok tb@
* Fix infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()tb2022-03-151-14/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A bug in the implementation of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm can lead to an infinite loop. This loop can be hit in various ways, in particular on decompressing an elliptic curve public key via EC_POINT_oct2point() - to do this, one must solve y^2 = x^3 + ax + b for y, given x. If a certificate uses explicit encoding for elliptic curve parameters, this operation needs to be done during certificate verification, leading to a DoS. In particular, everything dealing with untrusted certificates is affected, notably TLS servers explicitly configured to request client certificates (httpd, smtpd, various VPN implementations, ...). Ordinary TLS servers do not consume untrusted certificates. The problem is that we cannot assume that x^3 + ax + b is actually a square on untrusted input and neither can we assume that the modulus p is a prime. Ensuring that p is a prime is too expensive (it would likely itself lead to a DoS). To avoid the infinite loop, fix the logic to be more resilient and explicitly limit the number of iterations that can be done. The bug is such that the infinite loop can also be hit for primes = 3 (mod 4) but fortunately that case is optimized earlier. It's also worth noting that there is a size bound on the field size enforced via OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS (= 661), which help mitigate further DoS vectors in presence of this fix. Reported by Tavis Ormandy and David Benjamin, Google Patch based on the fixes by David Benjamin and Tomas Mraz, OpenSSL ok beck inoguchi
* Allow constraints of the form @domain.comtb2022-03-141-10/+17
| | | | | | | | | | Some things issue and expect that we support a non-standard extension of accepting any email address from a host by prefixing an email name constraint with @. This used to be the case with the old code as well. Pointed out and based on a diff by Alex Wilson. ok jsing
* Rework ownership handling in x509_constraints_validate()tb2022-03-143-39/+49
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of having the caller allocate and pass in a new x509_constraints_name struct, handle allocation inside x509_constraints_validate(). Also make the error optional. All this is done to simplify the call sites and to make it more obvious that there are no leaks. ok jsing
* Factor out unexpected handshake message handling code in the legacy stack.jsing2022-03-142-229/+256
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TLS record layer has to be able to handle unexpected handshake messages that result when it has been asked to read application data. The way that this is currently done in the legacy stack is a layering violation - the record layer knows about DTLS/TLS handshake messages, parsing them and then deciding what action to take. This is further complicated by the need to handle handshake message fragments. For now, factor this code out with minimal changes - since it is a layering violation we have to retain separate code for DTLS and TLS. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out ASN1_STRING clearing code.jsing2022-03-141-4/+15
| | | | | | | This fixes a bug in ASN1_STRING_set0() where it does not respect the ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF flag and potentially frees memory that we do not own. ok inguchi@ tb@
* First pass clean up of ASN1_STRING code.jsing2022-03-141-74/+87
| | | | | | | Use consistent variable names (astr/src) rather than 'a', 'bs', 'str', 'v' or 'x', add some whitespace and remove some unneeded parentheses. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Relax the check of x509_constraints_dirname()libressl-v3.5.1tb2022-03-131-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | The dirname constraint must be a prefix in DER format, so relax the check from requiring equal-length strings to allow shorter names also. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Add x509_constraints_validate() to x509_internal.htb2022-03-131-1/+3
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Check name constraints using the proper APItb2022-03-131-4/+21
| | | | | | | | The previous versions were too strict and disallowed leading dots. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* style tweaktb2022-03-131-2/+2
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* Add missing error check after strdup()tb2022-03-131-2/+5
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Remove free_cont from asn1_d2i_ex_primitive()/asn1_ex_c2i().jsing2022-03-132-50/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | The constructed ASN.1 handling in asn1_d2i_ex_primitive() and asn1_ex_c2i() currently has code to potentially avoid a malloc/memcpy - this is a less common code path and it introduces a bunch of complexity for minimal gain. In particular, we're manually adding a trailing NUL when ASN1_STRING_set() would already do that for us, plus we currently manually free() the data on an ASN1_STRING, rather than using freezero(). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out change cipher spec handing code in the legacy stack.jsing2022-03-123-65/+73
| | | | | | | | Factor out the code that handles the processing of a change cipher spec message that has been read in the legacy stack, deduplicating code in the DTLS stack. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* unsusual -> unusualjsg2022-03-101-3/+3
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* bump for LibreSSL 3.5.1bcook2022-03-071-3/+3
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* Fix typo in commentbket2022-03-051-2/+2
| | | | OK tb@
* Pull a len == 0 check up before malloc(len) to avoid implementationtb2022-03-031-5/+5
| | | | | | defined behavior. ok deraadt inoguchi
* Do not write out terminating NUL in i2a_ASN1_OBJECT()tb2022-03-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | The conversion to CBB made us write out an extra NUL since we no longer use the return value of i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() (which returns strlen(data)) but rather the size of the CBB (which includes a terminal NUL) to write out data. Issue found by anton via an openssl-ruby test failure. ok jsing
* Unwrap a linetb2022-03-021-3/+2
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* whitespacetb2022-03-021-2/+2
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* Rewrite ASN1_OBJECT content to ascii/text conversion.jsing2022-03-023-101/+186
| | | | | | | | | | Rewrite the ASN1_OBJECT content to ascii/text conversion code using CBB and CBS. Currently there is a strange split with i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() calling OBJ_obj2txt() which implements the conversion, while OBJ_txt2obj() calls back into the misnamed a2d_ASN1_OBJECT() function. Move the conversion code into asn1/a_object.c and have OBJ_txt2obj() call that instead. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove unused ivbits argument from chacha_keysetup to match otherdtucker2022-02-282-4/+4
| | | | instances in the tree. ok deraadt@
* Currently malloc caches a number of free'ed regions up to 128kotto2022-02-261-33/+160
| | | | | | | | | | in size. This cache is indexed by size (in # of pages), so it is very quick to check. Some programs allocate and deallocate larger allocations in a frantic way. Accomodate those programs by also keeping a cache of regions between 128k and 2M, in a cache of variable sized regions. Tested by many in snaps; ok deraadt@
* Get rid of SHA1 for comparing CRL's - use SHA512 just like we do for certs.beck2022-02-243-9/+7
| | | | ok tb@
* Remove accidentally committed debug code.tb2022-02-241-3/+1
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* Minor tweakstb2022-02-241-7/+8
| | | | i is a silly name for BN_num_bits(dsa->q); move a comment for readability.
* Add sanity checks on p and q in old_dsa_priv_decode()tb2022-02-241-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dsa_do_verify() has checks on dsa->p and dsa->q that ensure that p isn't overly long and that q has one of the three allowed lengths specified in FIPS 186-3, namely 160, 224, or 256. Do these checks on deserialization of DSA keys without parameters. This means that we will now reject keys we would previously deserialize. Such keys are useless in that signatures generated by them would be rejected by both LibreSSL and OpenSSL. This avoids a timeout flagged in oss-fuzz #26899 due to a ridiculous DSA key whose q has size 65KiB. The timeout comes from additional checks on DSA keys added by miod in dsa_ameth.c r1.18, especially checking such a humungous number for primality is expensive. ok jsing
* Factor out alert handing code in the legacy stack.libressl-v3.5.0jsing2022-02-213-85/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull out the code that processes incoming alerts - a chunk of the complexity is due to the fact that in TLSv1.2 and earlier, alerts can be fragmented across multiple records or multiple alerts can be delivered in a single record. In DTLS there is no way that we can reassemble fragmented alerts (although the RFC is silent on this), however we could have multiple alerts in the same record. This change means that we will handle this situation more appropriately and if we encounter a fragmented alert we will now treat this as a decode error (instead of silently ignoring it). ok beck@ tb@
* mutibyte -> multibytejsg2022-02-211-3/+3
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* Fix a buffer overread in OAEP padding removaltb2022-02-201-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | This only occurs on very small payloads and tightly allocated buffers that don't usually occur in practice. This is OpenSSL f61c6804 ok inoguchi jsing
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