| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Rename some variables and consistently goto error.
ok tb@
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Rather than recycling an existing ASN1_STRING and changing its type, free
it and allocate a replacement. This simplifies the code and potentially
avoids bugs resulting from reuse.
ok tb@
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Per X.690, some ASN.1 types must be primitive encoded, some must be
constructed and some may be either. Add this data to our types table
and check the encoding against this information when decoding.
ok tb@
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This avoids asn1_c2i_primitive() from needing knowledge about the internals
of ASN1_INTEGER and ASN1_ENUMERATED.
ok tb@
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OPENSSL_cleanup() cleans up and deallocates memory in use by the library.
There are a couple of use cases for this, primarily related to memory
leak testing. This will not be called automatically in LibreSSL, which
means that OpenSSL's OPENSSL_NO_INIT_ATEXIT is implied. If code wants to
clean up then they need to explicitly call this themselves.
ok tb@
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CBIGNUM_it is supposed to be the "clear bignum" or "secure" bignum - that
is one which zeros its memory after use and ensures that the constant time
flags are set... in LibreSSL we always do both of these things for BIGNUMs,
so just use BIGNUM_it instead.
ok tb@
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CID 24797
ok jsing
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EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() will unconditionally fail if the pkey's ameth
has no copy_params(). Obviously this is indistinguishable from actual
failure...
ok jsing
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DSA_size() and ECDSA_size() have a very special hack. They fudge up an
ASN1_INTEGER with a size which is typically > 100 bytes, backed by a
buffer of size 4. This was "fine", however, since they set buf[0] = 0xff,
where the craziness that was i2c_ASN1_INTEGER() only looks at the first
octet (one may then ask why a buffer of size 4 was necessary...).
This changed with the rewrite of i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(), which doesn't
respect this particular hack and rightly assumes that it is fed an
actual ASN1_INTEGER...
Instead, create an appropriate signature and use i2d to determine its
size.
Fixes an out-of-bounds read flagged by ASAN and oss-fuzz.
ok jsing
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sk_num() can return a negative value, in which case the upper bound is
SIZE_MAX, which results in a very long for loop.
CID 153997
ok jsing
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Switch from X509_get_pubkey() to X509_get0_pubkey() to avoid an unnecessary
EVP_PKEY_free(). Check the return values of X509_get0_pubkey() and
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(). If the former returns NULL, the latter will
dereference NULL.
CID 25020
ok jsing
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Otherwise EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() leaks, as spotted by the ASAN CI.
ok jsing
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If rbio and wbio are the same, SSL_free() only frees one BIO, so the
BIO_up_ref() before SSL_set_bio() leads to a leak.
ok jsing
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CID 356353
ok jsing
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Needed for an upcoming change.
ok tb@
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Needed for an upcoming change.
ok tb@
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c99 6.11.5:
"The placement of a storage-class specifier other than at the beginning
of the declaration specifiers in a declaration is an obsolescent
feature."
ok miod@ tb@
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ASN1_INTEGER_set() fails.
ok jsing
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When an ASN1_INTEGER is created it has NULL data until a value is set -
previously, an ASN1_INTEGER in this state encoded to an ASN.1 INTEGER with
a value of 0, rather than being treated as an error. While code should
really set values, the historical behaviour has not required this.
Found the hard way by sthen@ with acme-client.
ok tb@
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inline use was removed in 1998
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If SSL_do_handshake() is called before SSL_provide_quic_data() has been
called, the QUIC read buffer will not have been initialised. In this case
we want to return TLS13_IO_WANT_POLLIN so that the QUIC stack will provide
handshake data.
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While these will not be used by LibreSSL, they are used by some QUIC
implementations (such as ngtcp2).
ok tb@
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While more work is still required, this is sufficient to get ngtcp2 to
compile with QUIC and for curl to be able to make HTTP/3 requests.
ok tb@
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ok tb@
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This provides SSL_QUIC_METHOD (aka ssl_quic_method_st), which allows for
QUIC callback hooks to be passed to an SSL_CTX or SSL. This is largely
ported/adapted from BoringSSL.
It is worth noting that this struct is not opaque and the original
interface exposed by BoringSSL differs to the one they now use. The
original interface was copied by quictls and it appears that this API
will not be updated to match BoringSSL.
To make things even more challenging, at least one consumer does not use
named initialisers, making code completely dependent on the order in
which the function pointers are defined as struct members. In order to
try to support both variants, the set_read_secret/set_write_secret
functions are included, however they have to go at the end.
ok tb@
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ok tb@
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ok tb@
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LibreSSL will not return these values, however software is starting to
check for these as return values from SSL_get_error().
ok tb@
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EVP_chacha20_poly1305() is an EVP_CIPHER implementation of the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. This is potentially used to provide encryption for
the QUIC transport layer.
Where possible, this should be avoided in favour of the significantly saner
EVP_AEAD interface.
ok tb@
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The length checks for EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305() seal/open were incorrect
and are no longer necessary (not to mention that the comment failed to
match the code). Remove these since the underlying ChaCha implementation
will now handle the same sized inputs at these functions can.
Issue flagged by and ok tb@
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We can avoid this unnecessary limitation by calling chacha_encrypt_bytes()
multiple times internally. In the case of ChaCha(), the caller still needs
to ensure that the same IV is not used for more than 2^70 bytes.
ok tb@
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This gives us cleaner and safer code, although it is worth noting that we
now generate the encoding even when called with NULL as the output pointer
(and then discard it, returning just the length).
Resolves oss-fuzz #49963.
ok tb@
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In asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(), asn1_ex_i2c() returning -1 is used to indicate
that the object is optional and should be skipped, while -2 is used to
indicate that indefinite length encoding should be used. Any other negative
value was treated as success, resulting in the out pointer being walked
backwards. Avoid this by treating any negative value (aside from -1 and -2)
as a failure, propagating it up the stack.
Additionally, check the return value of the second asn1_ex_i2c() call to
ensure that it matches the value returned by the first call. This makes
sure that the length of the encoded object is correct, plus it detects the
case where a failure occurs during the second call.
Discussed with tb@ (who also flagged the negative value issue).
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In bio.h r1.54, the signature of BIO_callback_ctrl() was changed from
bio_info_cb to BIO_info_cb. Adjust manual to reflect this change.
At the moment, bio_info_cb and BIO_info_cb are still distinct types with
our BIO_info_cb matching OpenSSL's definition. Historically, bio_info_cb
had a different type, but that leads to issues with casting function
pointers. The ecosystem has moved on to embrace the new type and several
ports confuse the two types because OpenSSL decided to "solve" the issues
with "typedef BIO_info_cb bio_info_cb; /* backward compatibilty */". We
will align with this in the next bump.
ok jsing
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While each attribute must contain at least one extension, it is not
required that a CSR have attributes at all. Instead of signalling an
error by returning NULL if no extensions are found, return an empty
stack of extensions.
Via OpenSSL 1f02ca2d
ok jsing
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This implements SSL_get_shared_{curve,group}() in a bug-compatible
fashion with OpenSSL.
This is your average OpenSSL-style overloaded parameter API where n >= 0
means "return the n-th shared group's NID" (as if anyone possibly ever
cared about the case n > 0) and n == -1 means "return the number of
shared groups". There is also an undocumented case n == -2 for Suite B
profile support which falls back to n == 0 in case Suite B profile
support is disabled, so n == -2 is the same as n == 0 in LibreSSL.
The API also returns 0 for error, which is indistinguishable from a
count of 0 shared groups but coincides with NID_undef. Contrary to claims
in the documentation, the API doesn't actually return -1 for clients,
rather it returns 0.
Obviously this entire exercise is pretty useless, but since somebody
exposed it because they could and someone else used it because they could
we need to provide it.
ok jsing
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This splits tls1_get_supported_group() into a few helper functions to
be able to count shared groups and to return the n-th shared group since
someone thought it is a great idea to expose that in a single API and
some others thought it is useful to add this info to log noise.
This is all made a bit more complicated thanks to the security level
having its tentacles everywhere and because a user-provided security
callback can influence the list of groups shared by the peers.
ok jsing
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These are wrappers of SSL_ctrl() using the SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_GROUP
control. Do not provide SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE since that is only
mentioned in Net::SSLeay docs according to codesearch.debian.net.
ok jsing
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ok jsing
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