| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This allows us to make direct use of c2i_ASN1_OBJECT_cbs().
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Requested by jsing
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X509v3_{addr,asid}_is_canonical() check that the ipAddrBlocks and
autonomousSysIds extension conform to RFC 3779. These checks are not
cheap. Certs containing non-conformant extensions should not be
considered valid, so mark them with EXFLAG_INVALID while caching the
extension information in x509v3_cache_extensions(). This way the
expensive check while walking the chains during X509_verify_cert() is
replaced with a cheap check of the extension flags. This avoids a lot
of superfluous work when validating numerous certs with similar chains
against the same roots as is done in rpki-client.
Issue noticed and fix suggested by claudio
ok claudio inoguchi jsing
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Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID is set on X509_get_purpose() failure.
ok inoguchi jsing
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If either of the two initial BN_CTX_get() fails, we will call
BN_RECP_CTX_free() on the uninitialized recp, which won't end
well, so hoist the BN_RECP_CTX_init() call a few lines up.
From Pauli, OpenSSL ad249412
ok inoguchi jsing
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The handshake state machine does not handle key updates since that's a
post-handshake handshake message. This is code under #ifdef TLS13_DEBUG
and if it is ever to be reused in tls13_handshake_msg.c, that will have
to be revisited.
ok inoguchi jsing
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Use a temporary variable to store the number of bytes to be copied
(size_t) and also use it as the memcpy(3) length. Previously we
copied "size" bytes instead of just the necessary number.
OK claudio@ tb@
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'flags' should have ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA bit to free 'data'
by ASN1_OBJECT_free as c2i_ASN1_OBJECT_cbs does.
ok jsing@ tb@
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DSA private keys with ill-chosen g could cause an infinite
loop on deserializing. Add a few sanity checks that ensure
that g is according to the FIPS 186-4: check 1 < g < p and
g^q == 1 (mod p). This is enough to ascertain that g is a
generator of a multiplicative group of order q once we know
that q is prime (which is checked a bit later).
Issue reported with reproducers by Hanno Boeck.
Additional variants and analysis by David Benjamin.
ok beck jsing
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If a private key encoded with EC parameters happens to have
order 1 and is used for ECDSA signatures, this causes an
infinite loop since a random integer x in the interval [0,1)
will be 0, so do ... while (x == 0); will loop indefinitely.
Found and reported with a reproducer by Hanno Boeck.
Helpful comments and analysis from David Benjamin.
ok beck jsing
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jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those
untouched.
ok jmc@
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p is allocated by asprintf() in one of the *_from_tm() functions, so
it needs to be freed as in the other error path below.
CID 346194
ok jsing
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d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY() can handle the allocation of priv_key internally,
no need to do this up front and reach it through the dangerous reuse
mechanism. There's also no point in freeing a variable we know to be
NULL.
ok jsing
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It is possible to call pmeth->cleanup() with an EVP_PKEY_CTX whose data
is NULL. If pmeth->init() in int_ctx_new() fails, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() is
called with such a context. This in turn calls pmeth->cleanup(), and thus
these cleanup functions must be careful not to use NULL data. Most of
them are, but one of GOST's functions and HMAC's aren't.
Reported for HMAC by Masaru Masada
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/issues/129
ok bcook jsing
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Instead of using malloc() and setting most struct members to 0,
simply use calloc().
ok bcook jsing
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ok jmc@ schwarze@
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we no longer have, focus on what our implementation now does, but
keep short warnings in how far other implementations might be more
fragile. Some improvements to wordings and clarity while here.
OK tb@
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Instead of bounding only bounding the group order, also bound the
cofactor using Hasse's theorem. This could probably be made a lot
tighter since all curves of cryptographic interest have small
cofactors, but for now this is good enough.
A timeout found by oss-fuzz creates a "group" with insane parameters
over a 40-bit field: the order is 14464, and the cofactor has 4196223
bits (which is obviously impossible by Hasse's theorem). These led to
running an expensive loop in ec_GFp_simple_mul_ct() millions of times.
Fixes oss-fuzz #46056
Diagnosed and fix joint with jsing
ok inoguchi jsing (previous version)
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The cofactor we tried to calculate should only be zeroed if we failed
to compute it.
ok inoguchi jsing
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OK tb@
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An IA5STRING is a Pascal string that can have embedded NULs and is
not NUL terminated (except that for legacy reasons it happens to be).
Instead of taking the strlen(), use the already known ASN.1 length and
use strndup() instead of strdup() to generate NUL terminated strings
after some existing code has checked that there are no embedded NULs.
In v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex() use %.*s to print the bytes. This is not
optimal and might be switched to using strvis() later.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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Now that {dtls1,ssl3}_read_bytes() have been refactored, do a clean up
pass - this cleans up various parts of the code and reduces differences
between these two functions.
ok = 1; *(&(ok)) tb@
ok inoguchi@
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The code that handles each record type already has appropriate length
checks. Furthermore, the handling of application data here is likely
incorrect and bypasses the normal state checks at the end of this function.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Along the way, rather than having yet another piece of code that parses
OID arcs, reuse oid_parse_arc(). Always allocate a new ASN1_OBJECT rather
than doing a crazy dance with ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC and trying to free
parts of an ASN1_OBJECT if one is passed in.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This takes a CBS, gets the ASN.1 identifier and length, ensures the
resulting identifier is a valid primitive, then returns the tag number and
the content as a CBS.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok tb@, deraadt@, kettenis@
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should not be used. It will be revisited after release.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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arm_arch.h and armcap.c are shared between armv7 and aarch64 which
results in an inscrutable #ifdef maze. Move copies of these files
into arch/{arm,aarch64}/ with appropriate names and some trivial
minor adjustments.
ok deraadt inoguchi kettenis
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The asn1test depends on asn1_mac.h which had a date with the bitbucket a
few years back (and the test "isn't meant to run particularly, it's just
to test type checking"). methtest.c tests an API that was never present
in OpenSSL's git history. r160test.c is nothing but a licence.
"nuke away" jsing
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The current OBJ_txt2obj() implementation converts the text to ASN.1
object content octets, builds a full DER encoding from it, then feeds
the entire thing back through the DER to ASN.1 object conversion. Rather
than doing this crazy dance, provide an t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() function
that converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, then creates a new
ASN1_OBJECT and attaches the content octets to it.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rewrite the ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion code using CBB/CBS,
while also addressing some of the bizarre behaviour (such as allowing
mixed separators and treating '..' as a zero value).
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rewrite the code that handles unexpected handshake messages in the legacy
DTLS stack. Parse the DTLS message header up front, then process it based
on the message type. Overall the code should be more strict and we should
reject various invalid messages that would have previously been accepted.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rewrite the code that handles unexpected handshake messages in the legacy
TLS stack. Parse the TLS message header up front, then process it based on
the message type. Overall the code should be more strict and we should
reject various invalid messages that would have previously been accepted.
I also reviewed steve's experimental code and fixed the bug that it
contained.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This function populates the passed *out argument, hence it should not be
marked const.
ok tb@
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Rework ASN1_STRING_set() so that we always clear and free an existing
allocation, prior to storing the new data. This fixes a number of issues,
including a failure to zero data if the existing allocation was too small.
This also fixes other bugs such as leaving the allocation uninitialised
if NULL is passed for data. Require -1 where strlen() is expected and
improve length and overflow checks.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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gcc 4 on sparc64 issues a few 'warning: value computed is not used'.
There are two cases: sk_set_cmp_function() returns the old comparison
function of the stack which we don't care about. The one warning about
an sk_delete() is about a return value that we know already and which
we will free a few lines down.
ok inoguchi miod
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ok tb@
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A bug in the implementation of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm can lead to
an infinite loop. This loop can be hit in various ways, in particular on
decompressing an elliptic curve public key via EC_POINT_oct2point() - to
do this, one must solve y^2 = x^3 + ax + b for y, given x.
If a certificate uses explicit encoding for elliptic curve parameters,
this operation needs to be done during certificate verification, leading
to a DoS. In particular, everything dealing with untrusted certificates
is affected, notably TLS servers explicitly configured to request
client certificates (httpd, smtpd, various VPN implementations, ...).
Ordinary TLS servers do not consume untrusted certificates.
The problem is that we cannot assume that x^3 + ax + b is actually a
square on untrusted input and neither can we assume that the modulus
p is a prime. Ensuring that p is a prime is too expensive (it would
likely itself lead to a DoS). To avoid the infinite loop, fix the logic
to be more resilient and explicitly limit the number of iterations that
can be done. The bug is such that the infinite loop can also be hit for
primes = 3 (mod 4) but fortunately that case is optimized earlier.
It's also worth noting that there is a size bound on the field size
enforced via OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS (= 661), which help mitigate
further DoS vectors in presence of this fix.
Reported by Tavis Ormandy and David Benjamin, Google
Patch based on the fixes by David Benjamin and Tomas Mraz, OpenSSL
ok beck inoguchi
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Some things issue and expect that we support a non-standard extension of
accepting any email address from a host by prefixing an email name
constraint with @. This used to be the case with the old code as well.
Pointed out and based on a diff by Alex Wilson.
ok jsing
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Instead of having the caller allocate and pass in a new
x509_constraints_name struct, handle allocation inside
x509_constraints_validate(). Also make the error optional.
All this is done to simplify the call sites and to make it
more obvious that there are no leaks.
ok jsing
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