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* Provide TLSv1.3 cipher suite aliases to match the names used in RFC 8446.jsing2020-04-191-2/+25
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Fix wrapping/indentation.jsing2020-04-181-4/+3
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* Expose the peer ephemeral public key used for TLSv1.3 key exchange.jsing2020-04-185-36/+79
| | | | | | | | | SSL_get_server_tmp_key() provides the peer ephemeral public key used for key exchange. In the case of TLSv1.3 this is essentially the peer public key from the key share used for TLSv1.3 key exchange, hence make it availaable via SSL_get_server_tmp_key(). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Tweak previous active cipher suite code.jsing2020-04-181-6/+5
| | | | | | | Use a boolean value rather than using a counter, as suggested by tb@ during the previous review. ok tb@
* Allow more key share groups for TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-181-21/+12
| | | | | | | | The key share code previously only allowed for key shares to be generated using one of the groups in our default list (X25519, secp256r1, secp384r1). Relax this and allow key shares using any of the groups in our NID list. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if there are active cipher suites.jsing2020-04-171-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Revise the previous so that we only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if the cipher rule string resulted in at least one active cipher suite. This more closely matches OpenSSL behaviour. Noted and fix tested by schwarze@ ok beck@ tb@
* Update key share regress to match previous change.jsing2020-04-171-4/+4
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* Generate client key share using our preferred group.jsing2020-04-174-25/+37
| | | | | | | | Generate a client key share using our preferred group, rather than always using X25519. This means that the key share group can be controlled via SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups() and SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups_list(). ok beck@
* Remove AUTHORS section. This follows what is done in strstr.3claudio2020-04-161-4/+2
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* Replace the simple memmem() implementation with a version that is O(n)claudio2020-04-161-47/+167
| | | | | based on code from musl and now similar to our strstr(). OK tb@ millert@
* Resync our strstr.c with the musl version. Removes some debug code andclaudio2020-04-161-11/+3
| | | | | optimizes one statement in two-way string compare. OK tb@ millert@
* Update in several respects:schwarze2020-04-141-13/+11
| | | | | | | | * mention TLSv1.3 * remove DSS, DES(56), RC4(64), and IDEA(128), which are no longer supported * remove ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old and STREEBOG512 which don't exist in LibreSSL * correct the instruction for printing the complete list OK jsing@
* add the missing sentence "LibreSSL no longer provides any suchschwarze2020-04-141-2/+3
| | | | | cipher suites" to the DES entry and use the same wording for DSS; OK jsing@
* Delete the three sentences listing the ciphers currently includedschwarze2020-04-141-15/+2
| | | | | | | | | in LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. That's going to change repeatedly and the extra maintenance effort for keeping it up to date is a waste because people can trivially run "openssl ciphers -v LOW" to look it up. Besides, updating it will usually be forgotten; the LOW entry was already wrong. Suggested by jsing@.
* Document the TLSv1.3 control word, update the description of theschwarze2020-04-111-4/+30
| | | | | | | TLSv1 control word, and explain how TLSv1.3 cipher suites can be configured in LibreSSL and in OpenSSL. While here, also mention how users can inspect the DEFAULT list of cipher suites. Stimulus, feedback and OK from jsing@.
* sync cert.pem with Mozilla's root ca list, ok beck@sthen2020-04-101-276/+343
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* When printing the serialNumber, fall back to the colon separated hextb2020-04-101-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | bytes in case ASN1_INTEGER_get() failed. This happens more often since asn1/a_int.c -r1.34. Matches OpenSSL behavior. Issue in openssl x509 -text output reported by sthen ok jsing sthen
* Revise test to handle the fact that TLSv1.3 cipher suites are now beingjsing2020-04-091-2/+4
| | | | included in the output from `openssl ciphers`.
* Include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless cipher string references TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-091-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL has always taken the approach of enabling almost everything by default. As a result, if you wanted to run a secure TLS client/server you had to specify your own "secure" cipher string, rather than being able to trust the defaults as being sensible and secure. The problem is that with the introduction of TLSv1.3, most of these "secure" cipher strings result in the new TLSv1.3 cipher suites being excluded. The "work around" for this issue in OpenSSL was to add a new TLSv1.3 API (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(), SSL_set_ciphersuites()) and have separate knobs for the pre-TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.3 cipher suites. This of course means that every application now needs to call two APIs, but it does mean that applications that only call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()/SSL_set_cipher_list() cannot remove TLSv1.3 cipher suites and prevent TLSv1.3 from working. We've taken a different approach and have allowed TLSv1.3 cipher suites to be manipulated via the existing SSL_set_cipher_list() API. However, in order to avoid problems with hardcoded cipher strings, change this behaviour so that we always include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless the cipher string has a specific reference to the TLSv1.3 protocol or a TLSv1.3 cipher suite. This means that: $ openssl ciphers -v TLSv1.2:!TLSv1.3 still gives TLSv1.2 only cipher suites and: $ openssl ciphers -v AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 only lists a single TLSv1.3 cipher, however: $ openssl ciphers -v ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 now includes both TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and all TLSv1.3 cipher suites (which also matches OpenSSL's openssl(1) behaviour). Issue encountered by kn@ with mumble. ok tb@
* Test both SSLv3 (aka pre-TLSv1.2) and TLSv1.2 cipher suites with TLS.jsing2020-04-091-1/+1
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* Tidy line wrapping and remove an extra blank line.jsing2020-04-091-4/+3
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* ssl_aes_is_accelerated() returns a boolean - treat it as such, rather thanjsing2020-04-091-2/+2
| | | | explicitly comparing against a value.
* Ensure legacy session ID is persistent during client TLS session.jsing2020-04-081-9/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | Generate an unpredictable 32-byte legacy session ID during client initialisation, rather than when the ClientHello message is being created. Otherwise in the case of a HelloRetryRequest the legacy session ID values will differ between the first and second ClientHello messages, which is not permitted by the RFC. Fixes an issue talking TLSv1.3 to smtp.mail.yahoo.com. ok beck@
* Re-enable the client test now that it passes again.jsing2020-04-061-2/+2
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* Minor code improvements.jsing2020-04-061-3/+3
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* Add tests that cover TLSv1.2 and disable those that trigger TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-061-3/+32
| | | | This allows the test to pass again.
* Zero the client random field in the TLSv1.2 golden value.jsing2020-04-061-5/+5
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* Improve comparision with test data.jsing2020-04-061-7/+9
| | | | | | First check the client random against the zeroed value, then zero the client random in the client hello, before comparing with the golden value. This makes failures more obvious and the test code more readable.
* Dump the test data when the lengths differ in order to aid debugging.jsing2020-04-061-0/+3
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* Use errx() if we fail to build the client hello.jsing2020-04-061-1/+1
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* Send a zero-length session identifier if TLSv1.3 is not enabled.jsing2020-04-061-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | If the maximum version is less than TLSv1.3, send a zero-length session identifier (matching the behaviour of the legacy TLS stack), rather than a 32 byte random identifier. The 32 byte random identifier is only needed for "compatibility" mode in TLSv1.3. ok beck@
* "eventually" came and went back in 2004.libressl-v3.1.0martijn2020-03-301-3/+1
| | | | OK schwarze@
* Void functions obviously do not return values; no need to elaborate.schwarze2020-03-305-31/+10
| | | | Patch from Martin Vahlensieck <academicsolutions dot ch>.
* Void functions obviously do not return values; no need to elaborate.schwarze2020-03-295-28/+10
| | | | Patch from Martin Vahlensieck <academicsolutions dot ch>.
* Be concise: do not say that void functions return no values, that's obvious.schwarze2020-03-283-22/+6
| | | | Useless text reported by Martin Vahlensieck (academicsolutions.ch) on tech@.
* Fix ASN1 print functionsinoguchi2020-03-241-6/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | Check and print out boolean type properly. Based on OpenSSL commit ad72d9fdf7709ddb97a58d7d45d755e6e0504b96. Reduced unneeded parentheses from if condition. Check return value from i2s_ASN1_INTEGER. Based on OpenSSL commit 5e3553c2de9a365479324b8ba8b998f0cce3e527. Added if condition expression and return 0 if NULL is returned. ok tb@
* Add a test program for getopt(3) that is adequate for manual testingschwarze2020-03-234-2/+174
| | | | | | | | and a compact test suite for getopt(3) intended automated regression testing, both written from scratch. The suite is intended to provide full coverage, except that it doesn't test manual changes of optind and optreset and except that it so far avoids the situation where we have a known bug.
* Consistently spell 'unsigned' as 'unsigned int', as style(9) seemstb2020-03-167-44/+45
| | | | | | | | | to prefer that. No binary change except in d1_srtp.c where the generated assembly differs only in line numbers (due to a wrapped long line) and in s3_cbc.c where there is no change in the generated assembly. ok inoguchi jsing
* Adapt to tls13_record_layer.c r1.30 (the sequence number shouldn't wrap).tb2020-03-161-2/+2
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* The RFC is clear (section 5.3) that sequence number should never wrap.tb2020-03-161-5/+12
| | | | | | | | | We currently throw an error on overflow, but still wrap. Check up front if we would need to wrap and only increment if that case is excluded. This simplifies the increment loop and makes the returns in this function less magic. ok jsing
* Increment a few more sequence numbers where the carry is close totb2020-03-131-1/+41
| | | | crossing a byte boundary.
* Remove dtls1_enc().jsing2020-03-135-222/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Like much of the original DTLS code, dtls1_enc() is effectively a renamed copy of tls1_enc(). Since then tls1_enc() has been modified, however the non-AEAD code remains largely the same. As such, remove dtls1_enc() and instead call tls1_enc() from the DTLS code. The tls1_enc() AEAD code does not currently work correctly with DTLS, however this is a non-issue since we do not support AEAD cipher suites with DTLS currently. ok tb@
* Add regress for TLSv1.3 sequence number handling.jsing2020-03-133-1/+135
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* Correct TLSv1.3 sequence number increment and wrapping check.jsing2020-03-131-3/+3
| | | | Fix proposed by tb@
* Add missing $OpenBSD$ tag.jsing2020-03-131-0/+1
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* Add regress for CBB_add_space().jsing2020-03-131-1/+41
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* Ensure that CBB_add_space() always provides zeroed memory.jsing2020-03-131-1/+2
| | | | ok tb@
* Use calloc() rather than malloc() when allocating initial CBB buffer.jsing2020-03-121-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | CBB uses recallocarray() to expand buffers, however was still using malloc() for the initial buffer, which could result in memory being leaked in incorrect use cases. While here also use calloc() to allocate internal structs. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use calloc() rather than malloc() when allocating buffers.jsing2020-03-121-3/+3
| | | | | | This reduces the chance of accidently leaking stack memory. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Stop overloading the record type for padding length.jsing2020-03-125-13/+10
| | | | | | | | Currently the CBC related code stuffs the padding length in the upper bits of the type field... stop doing that and add a padding_length field to the record struct instead. ok inoguchi@ tb@