| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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from millert@; originally from djm@; OK deraadt@ florian@ bluhm@
this is errata/7.1/026_resolv.patch.sig
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The ASN.1 template for GENERAL_NAME and its corresponding C structure
disagree on the type of the x400Address member. This results in an ASN.1
string to be considered as an ASN.1 type, which allows an attacker to read
(essentially) arbitrary memory. Fix this by forcing comparison as strings.
While the underlying type confusion has been present since time immemorial,
this particular bug came with the EdiPartyName fix (6.8/008_asn1.patch.sig).
Reported by David Benjamin, fix suggested by jsing.
Release date for this was set to be January 31. Unilaterally pushed back to
February 7 by OpenSSL by way of announcement of many completely unrelated
embargoed issues, some of which they had been sitting on since July 2020.
from tb@; OK beck@ jsing@
this is errata/7.1/022_x509.patch.sig
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Due to a confusion of two CBS, the API would incorrectly advance the
*der_in pointer, resulting in a DER parse failure.
Issue reported by Aram Sargsyan
ok jsing
This is patches/7.1/004_asn1.patch.sig
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'flags' should have ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA bit to free 'data'
by ASN1_OBJECT_free as c2i_ASN1_OBJECT_cbs does.
ok jsing@ tb@
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DSA private keys with ill-chosen g could cause an infinite
loop on deserializing. Add a few sanity checks that ensure
that g is according to the FIPS 186-4: check 1 < g < p and
g^q == 1 (mod p). This is enough to ascertain that g is a
generator of a multiplicative group of order q once we know
that q is prime (which is checked a bit later).
Issue reported with reproducers by Hanno Boeck.
Additional variants and analysis by David Benjamin.
ok beck jsing
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If a private key encoded with EC parameters happens to have
order 1 and is used for ECDSA signatures, this causes an
infinite loop since a random integer x in the interval [0,1)
will be 0, so do ... while (x == 0); will loop indefinitely.
Found and reported with a reproducer by Hanno Boeck.
Helpful comments and analysis from David Benjamin.
ok beck jsing
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a race in which one thread is currently initializing the mutex which is
not an atomic operation whereas another thread tries to use it too
early.
With and ok schwarze@
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jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those
untouched.
ok jmc@
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p is allocated by asprintf() in one of the *_from_tm() functions, so
it needs to be freed as in the other error path below.
CID 346194
ok jsing
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d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY() can handle the allocation of priv_key internally,
no need to do this up front and reach it through the dangerous reuse
mechanism. There's also no point in freeing a variable we know to be
NULL.
ok jsing
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CID 351293
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pkey_ctx->data.
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It is possible to call pmeth->cleanup() with an EVP_PKEY_CTX whose data
is NULL. If pmeth->init() in int_ctx_new() fails, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() is
called with such a context. This in turn calls pmeth->cleanup(), and thus
these cleanup functions must be careful not to use NULL data. Most of
them are, but one of GOST's functions and HMAC's aren't.
Reported for HMAC by Masaru Masada
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/issues/129
ok bcook jsing
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Instead of using malloc() and setting most struct members to 0,
simply use calloc().
ok bcook jsing
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ok jmc@ schwarze@
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we no longer have, focus on what our implementation now does, but
keep short warnings in how far other implementations might be more
fragile. Some improvements to wordings and clarity while here.
OK tb@
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Instead of bounding only bounding the group order, also bound the
cofactor using Hasse's theorem. This could probably be made a lot
tighter since all curves of cryptographic interest have small
cofactors, but for now this is good enough.
A timeout found by oss-fuzz creates a "group" with insane parameters
over a 40-bit field: the order is 14464, and the cofactor has 4196223
bits (which is obviously impossible by Hasse's theorem). These led to
running an expensive loop in ec_GFp_simple_mul_ct() millions of times.
Fixes oss-fuzz #46056
Diagnosed and fix joint with jsing
ok inoguchi jsing (previous version)
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The cofactor we tried to calculate should only be zeroed if we failed
to compute it.
ok inoguchi jsing
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ok tb@
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ok tb@
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OK tb@
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Move up md_ctx and add EVP_MD_CTX_free under the 'err:' label.
CID 149810
comment and ok jsing@
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An IA5STRING is a Pascal string that can have embedded NULs and is
not NUL terminated (except that for legacy reasons it happens to be).
Instead of taking the strlen(), use the already known ASN.1 length and
use strndup() instead of strdup() to generate NUL terminated strings
after some existing code has checked that there are no embedded NULs.
In v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex() use %.*s to print the bytes. This is not
optimal and might be switched to using strvis() later.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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Now that {dtls1,ssl3}_read_bytes() have been refactored, do a clean up
pass - this cleans up various parts of the code and reduces differences
between these two functions.
ok = 1; *(&(ok)) tb@
ok inoguchi@
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The code that handles each record type already has appropriate length
checks. Furthermore, the handling of application data here is likely
incorrect and bypasses the normal state checks at the end of this function.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Along the way, rather than having yet another piece of code that parses
OID arcs, reuse oid_parse_arc(). Always allocate a new ASN1_OBJECT rather
than doing a crazy dance with ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC and trying to free
parts of an ASN1_OBJECT if one is passed in.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This takes a CBS, gets the ASN.1 identifier and length, ensures the
resulting identifier is a valid primitive, then returns the tag number and
the content as a CBS.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok tb@, deraadt@, kettenis@
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API.
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should not be used. It will be revisited after release.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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Apply new option handling to openssl(1) ts, and there is no functional
changes here.
usage strings are comes from manual page.
comments and ok jsing@
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Two missing initializations in the new option handling cause a
segfault when -nodetach or -noindef is passed to openssl cms.
ok inoguchi jsing miod
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arm_arch.h and armcap.c are shared between armv7 and aarch64 which
results in an inscrutable #ifdef maze. Move copies of these files
into arch/{arm,aarch64}/ with appropriate names and some trivial
minor adjustments.
ok deraadt inoguchi kettenis
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The asn1test depends on asn1_mac.h which had a date with the bitbucket a
few years back (and the test "isn't meant to run particularly, it's just
to test type checking"). methtest.c tests an API that was never present
in OpenSSL's git history. r160test.c is nothing but a licence.
"nuke away" jsing
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The current OBJ_txt2obj() implementation converts the text to ASN.1
object content octets, builds a full DER encoding from it, then feeds
the entire thing back through the DER to ASN.1 object conversion. Rather
than doing this crazy dance, provide an t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() function
that converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, then creates a new
ASN1_OBJECT and attaches the content octets to it.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rewrite the ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion code using CBB/CBS,
while also addressing some of the bizarre behaviour (such as allowing
mixed separators and treating '..' as a zero value).
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rewrite the code that handles unexpected handshake messages in the legacy
DTLS stack. Parse the DTLS message header up front, then process it based
on the message type. Overall the code should be more strict and we should
reject various invalid messages that would have previously been accepted.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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