| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
IANA made a permanent registration in the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS
Content Type registry at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#security-smime-1
for signed objects conforming to draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal.
OK tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
These ciphers have long based APIs, while EVP has a size_t based API. The
intent of these loops is to handle sizes that are bigger than LONG_MAX.
Rather than using the rather crazy EVP_MAXCHUNK construct, use LONG_MAX
rounded down to a large block size, ensuring that it is a block size
multiple. Revert the recently added overflow checks now that this is
handled more appropriately.
ok tb@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Now that EVP_CIPHER is opaque, stop pretending that EVP_CIPHER cleanup can
fail.
ok tb@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is no longer public API. Also remove some comments about i2c and c2i
functions being intentionally undocumented since they are no longer public.
|
|
|
|
| |
From Joshua Sing
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
CID 356777
|
|
|
|
| |
CID 356778
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Various projects use bio_info_cb and BIO_info_cb interchangeably, for
example mupdf and freerdp. This is because this was changed in OpenSSL
commit fce78bd4 (2017), triggered by new warnings in gcc 8.
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4493
This results in some scary compiler warnings and useless patches in ports.
Nobody seems to be using the old bio_info_cb() version.
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This removes c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(), {c2i,i2c}_ASN1_BIT_STRING() and
{c2i,i2c}_ASN1_INTEGER(). These are not part of the OpenSSL 1.1
API and should never have been exposed in the first place.
ok jsing
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Only allow a TLSv1.3 client to request middlebox compatibility mode if
this is permitted. Ensure that the legacy session identifier is either
zero length or 32 bytes in length. Additionally, only allow CCS messages
on the server side if the client actually requested middlebox compatibility
mode.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Currently the TLSv1.3 client always permits the server to send CCS
messages. Be more strict and only permit this if the client is actually
requesitng middlebox compatibility mode.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
because these inspire devotion to cargo cult in developers.
Cleanup suggested by kn@.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
from josiah frentsos, tweaked by schwarze
ok schwarze
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The length is decremented, however the input is repeatedly read from and
output written to the same position. Correct this by actually incrementing
the input and output pointers.
Found via OpenSSL 604e591ed7,
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The BLOCK_CIPHER_* macros contained a bug where the total length is passed
to the underlying cipher implementation, rather than the length of the
current chunk. Correct this and use the chunk length instead.
Should address the remaining issues reported by Coverity.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Use this from the TLSv1.3 code.
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jmc@ miod@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok ok miod@ ack ack jmc@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok miod@ jmc@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is a safer fix for the bug where we might read outside rule_str
buffer and is how BoringSSL fixed it. OK tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
If rule_str ended in a "-", "l" was incremented one byte past the
end of the buffer. This resulted in an out-of-bounds read when "l"
is dereferenced at the end of the loop. OK tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
From Joshua Sing
|
|
|
|
| |
From Joshua Sing
|
|
|
|
| |
From Joshua Sing
|