| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok beck
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This currently only has enough code to handle fallback to the legacy TLS
stack for TLSv1.2 or earlier, however allows for further development and
testing.
ok beck@
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This avoids every receive handler from having to get the handshake message
content itself. Additionally, pull the trailing data check up so that each
receive handler does not have to implement it. This makes the code more
readable and reduces duplication.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok tb@
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ok beck jsing
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This also makes it available to clients that use libtls, including ftp(1)
and nc(1).
Note that this does not expose additional defines via public headers, which
means that any code conditioning on defines like TLS1_3_VERSION or
SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 will not enable or use TLSv1.3. This approach is
necessary since too many pieces of software assume that if TLS1_3_VERSION
is available, other OpenSSL 1.1 API will also be available, which is not
necessarily the case.
ok beck@ tb@
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been installed prior to building.
Requested by and ok tb@
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ok tedu
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reverts previous attempt which would have broken ports
ok jsing@
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ok beck@
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ok jsing@
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This will as yet not do anything, until we turn it on in the
lower level libraries.
ok jsing@
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ok beck@
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ok beck@ tb@
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Finished message has been received, a change cipher spec may be received
and must be ignored. Add a flag to the record layer struct and set it at
the appropriate moments during the handshake so that we will ignore it.
ok jsing
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peeks data before reading, compares to subsequent read.
ok jsing@
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The legacy version field is capped at TLSv1.2, however it may be lower than
this if we are only choosing to use TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok jsing@
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in the ClientHello where it may be set to TLS1_VERSION. Use
the minimal supported version to decide whether we choose to do
so or not. Use a sent hook to set it back TLS1_2_VERSION right
after the ClientHello message is on the wire.
ok beck jsing
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Missed in an earlier commit.
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We currently don't support sending a modified clienthello
ok jsing@ tb@
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ok beck@ tb@
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ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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When falling back to the legacy TLS client, in the case where a server has
sent a TLS record that contains more than one handshake message, we also
need to stash the unprocessed record data for later processing. Otherwise
we end up with missing handshake data.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok bcook@
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This allows us to indicate that the cause of the failure is unknown, rather
than implying that it was an internal error when it was not.
ok beck@
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SSL_{clear,free}(3). Make sure the handshake context is
cleaned up completely: the hs_tls13 reacharound is taken
care of by ssl3_{clear,free}(3). Add a missing
tls13_handshake_msg_free() call to tls13_ctx_free().
ok beck jsing
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tls13 context, and emiting the alert at the upper layers when
the lower level code fails
ok jsing@, tb@
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ok jsing@, inoguchi@, tb@
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This is based on the libtls error handling code, but adds machine readable
codes and subcodes. We then map these codes back to libssl error codes.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
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This makes tls_config_parse_protocols() recognise and handle "tlsv1.3".
If TLSv1.3 is enabled libtls will also request libssl to enable it.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok bcook@
ok and "move it down two lines" jsing@
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Use exit code 2 for setup failure and 1 for test fail. Unfortunately
this regress is still failing.
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at the first non-option argument.
I had to read source code to figure it out.
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printable error message when failing.
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potential problems. Regress still failing on amd64.
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ok jsing@ tb@
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it is required by the RFC and some CAs require it (e.g. sectigo).
From daharmasterkor at gmail com, ok jca@
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ok tb@
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hash value on the nc(1) server command line, the netcat server must
use the TLS context of the accepted socket for verification. As
the listening socket was used instead, the verification was always
successful.
If the peer provides a certificate, there must be a hash. Make the
hash verification fail safe.
OK tb@
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the file system as it has to connect to the UNIX domain client
socket. The path of the latter is determined dynamically. Instead
add a restrictive pledge(2) after connect(2).
OK tb@
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path name of the socket. This avoids bad errors from getnameinfo(3).
Use the same error check for both calls to getnameinfo(3).
OK millert@ tb@
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