From cabbb4908741a4504b0a41b0e90f0cfccf0a1e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: deraadt <>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2000 20:09:59 +0000
Subject: fread() of /dev/random reads an entire huge stdio buffer, instead of
the 32 bytes that we actually need, thus wasting a lot of system entropy.
found by alecm@coyote.uk.sun.com, passed on by Pete.Zaytsev@EBay.Sun.COM
---
src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c | 14 +++++++++-----
src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 14 +++++++++-----
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 6bd1960e1d..c9a071bd22 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
static int init=1;
unsigned long l;
#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- FILE *fh;
+ int fd;
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
@@ -259,20 +260,23 @@ static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
/* #ifdef DEVRANDOM */
/*
* Use a random entropy pool device.
- * Linux 1.3.x and FreeBSD-Current has
+ * Linux 1.3.x, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD have
* this. Use /dev/urandom if you can
* as /dev/random will block if it runs out
* of random entries.
*/
- if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
+ if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM, O_RDONLY)) != NULL)
{
unsigned char tmpbuf[32];
- fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,32,fh);
+ read(fd, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
/* we don't care how many bytes we read,
* we will just copy the 'stack' if there is
* nothing else :-) */
- fclose(fh);
+ /* the above comment is EVIL. Security software
+ * RELIES ON THESE PRIMITIVES HAVING MORE SECURE
+ * BEHAVIOUR! Secure entropy is required in
+ * many cases! */
RAND_seed(tmpbuf,32);
memset(tmpbuf,0,32);
}
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 6bd1960e1d..c9a071bd22 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
static int init=1;
unsigned long l;
#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- FILE *fh;
+ int fd;
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
@@ -259,20 +260,23 @@ static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
/* #ifdef DEVRANDOM */
/*
* Use a random entropy pool device.
- * Linux 1.3.x and FreeBSD-Current has
+ * Linux 1.3.x, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD have
* this. Use /dev/urandom if you can
* as /dev/random will block if it runs out
* of random entries.
*/
- if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
+ if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM, O_RDONLY)) != NULL)
{
unsigned char tmpbuf[32];
- fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,32,fh);
+ read(fd, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
/* we don't care how many bytes we read,
* we will just copy the 'stack' if there is
* nothing else :-) */
- fclose(fh);
+ /* the above comment is EVIL. Security software
+ * RELIES ON THESE PRIMITIVES HAVING MORE SECURE
+ * BEHAVIOUR! Secure entropy is required in
+ * many cases! */
RAND_seed(tmpbuf,32);
memset(tmpbuf,0,32);
}
--
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