From eb8dd9dca1228af0cd132f515509051ecfabf6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:32:06 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'. --- src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 456 --------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 456 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c deleted file mode 100644 index c53c8b9001..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,456 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dsa_ossl.c,v 1.56 2024/05/11 06:43:50 tb Exp $ */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ - -/* Original version from Steven Schoch */ - -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "bn_local.h" -#include "dsa_local.h" - -/* - * Since DSA parameters are entirely arbitrary and checking them to be - * consistent is very expensive, we cannot do so on every sign operation. - * Instead, cap the number of retries so we do not loop indefinitely if - * the generator of the multiplicative group happens to be nilpotent. - * The probability of needing a retry with valid parameters is negligible, - * so trying 32 times is amply enough. - */ -#define DSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS 32 - -static DSA_SIG * -dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -{ - BIGNUM *b = NULL, *bm = NULL, *bxr = NULL, *binv = NULL, *m = NULL; - BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; - DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; - int attempts = 0; - int noredo = 0; - - if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) { - reason = DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS; - goto err; - } - - if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((bm = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((m = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - /* - * If the digest length is greater than N (the bit length of q), the - * leftmost N bits of the digest shall be used, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2. - * In this case the digest length is given in bytes. - */ - if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) - dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) - goto err; - - redo: - if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) { - if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) - goto err; - } else { - kinv = dsa->kinv; - dsa->kinv = NULL; - r = dsa->r; - dsa->r = NULL; - noredo = 1; - } - - /* - * Compute: - * - * s = inv(k)(m + xr) mod q - * - * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the - * following is calculated using a blinding value: - * - * s = inv(b)(bm + bxr)inv(k) mod q - * - * Where b is a random value in the range [1, q). - */ - if (!bn_rand_interval(b, 1, dsa->q)) - goto err; - if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bx */ - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bxr */ - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_mul(bm, b, m, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bm */ - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_add(s, bxr, bm, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = bm + bxr */ - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = b(m + xr)k^-1 */ - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = (m + xr)k^-1 */ - goto err; - - /* - * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very - * unlikely. - */ - if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) { - if (noredo) { - reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES; - goto err; - } - if (++attempts > DSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) { - reason = DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS; - goto err; - } - goto redo; - } - - if ((ret = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { - reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; - goto err; - } - ret->r = r; - ret->s = s; - - err: - if (!ret) { - DSAerror(reason); - BN_free(r); - BN_free(s); - } - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_free(kinv); - - return ret; -} - -static int -dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) -{ - BIGNUM *k = NULL, *l = NULL, *m = NULL, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int q_bits; - int ret = 0; - - if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) - goto err; - - if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if ((ctx = ctx_in) == NULL) - ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if (ctx == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - if ((k = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((l = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((m = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - /* Preallocate space */ - q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); - if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) || - !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) || - !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) - goto err; - - if (!bn_rand_interval(k, 1, dsa->q)) - goto err; - - BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, - CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ - - /* - * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, - * so we compute G^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed - * bit-length. - * - * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a - * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is - * one bit longer than the modulus. - * - * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic - * conditional copy. - */ - - if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) || - !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) || - !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_ct(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mod_ct(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ - if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse_ct(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_free(*kinvp); - *kinvp = kinv; - kinv = NULL; - - BN_free(*rp); - *rp = r; - - ret = 1; - - err: - if (!ret) { - DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); - BN_free(r); - } - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - if (ctx != ctx_in) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - - return ret; -} - -static int -dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) -{ - BIGNUM *u1 = NULL, *u2 = NULL, *t1 = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; - int qbits; - int ret = -1; - - if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) - goto err; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - if ((u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || - BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { - ret = 0; - goto err; - } - if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || - BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { - ret = 0; - goto err; - } - - /* Calculate w = inv(s) mod q, saving w in u2. */ - if ((BN_mod_inverse_ct(u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - /* - * If the digest length is greater than the size of q use the - * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-4, 4.2. - */ - qbits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); - if (dgst_len > (qbits >> 3)) - dgst_len = (qbits >> 3); - - /* Save m in u1. */ - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL) - goto err; - - /* u1 = m * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* u2 = r * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { - mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, - CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); - if (!mont) - goto err; - } - - if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, - ctx, mont)) - goto err; - - /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_ct(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* v is in u1 - if the signature is correct, it will be equal to r. */ - ret = BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0; - - err: - if (ret < 0) - DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - - return ret; -} - -static int -dsa_init(DSA *dsa) -{ - dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; - return 1; -} - -static int -dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) -{ - BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); - return 1; -} - -static const DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { - .name = "OpenSSL DSA method", - .dsa_do_sign = dsa_do_sign, - .dsa_sign_setup = dsa_sign_setup, - .dsa_do_verify = dsa_do_verify, - .init = dsa_init, - .finish = dsa_finish, -}; - -const DSA_METHOD * -DSA_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return &openssl_dsa_meth; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_OpenSSL); - -DSA_SIG * -DSA_SIG_new(void) -{ - return calloc(1, sizeof(DSA_SIG)); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_SIG_new); - -void -DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) -{ - if (sig == NULL) - return; - - BN_free(sig->r); - BN_free(sig->s); - free(sig); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_SIG_free); - -int -DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) -{ - return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_sign_setup); - -DSA_SIG * -DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -{ - return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_do_sign); - -int -DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) -{ - return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(DSA_do_verify); -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb