From 2ae4a931445dd6121f260bcc0af2dde32a871cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: pvalchev <> Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2006 07:10:32 +0000 Subject: openssl security fixes, diff from markus@, ok & "commit it" djm@ http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060928.txt for more --- src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa.h | 4 ++++ src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_err.c | 2 ++ src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/dsa') diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa.h index 851e3f0445..aa0669eb7a 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa.h +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa.h @@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ # include #endif +#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 3072 + #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01 #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA * implementation now uses constant time @@ -259,8 +261,10 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void); #define DSA_F_SIG_CB 114 /* Reason codes. */ +#define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE 102 #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 100 #define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 101 +#define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 103 #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_err.c index fd42053572..d7fac69154 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_err.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_err.c @@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[]= static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]= { +{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE) ,"bad q value"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS) ,"missing parameters"}, +{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) ,"modulus too large"}, {0,NULL} }; diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index 12509a7083..5de5fc7e91 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -274,6 +274,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, return -1; } + if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160) + { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + BN_init(&u1); BN_init(&u2); BN_init(&t1); -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb