From 86c49b31af735796dfde37aa29473a30d36367db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2016 19:31:36 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_6_0_BASE'. --- src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c | 324 ----------------------------- 1 file changed, 324 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c deleted file mode 100644 index e5395ad8ca..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,324 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.14 2016/04/28 16:06:53 jsing Exp $ */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter - * Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION - * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN - * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include -#include - -#include - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "evp_locl.h" - -#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16 -#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD 8 - -/* - * The informational RFC 7539, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", - * introduced a modified AEAD construction that is incompatible with the - * common style that has been already used in TLS. The IETF version also - * adds a constant (salt) that is prepended to the nonce. - */ -#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4 -#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8 -#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN) - -struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx { - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char tag_len; -}; - -static int -aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) -{ - struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx; - - if (tag_len == 0) - tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN; - - if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_INIT, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - /* Internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */ - if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) - return 0; - - c20_ctx = malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx)); - if (c20_ctx == NULL) - return 0; - - memcpy(&c20_ctx->key[0], key, key_len); - c20_ctx->tag_len = tag_len; - ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx; - - return 1; -} - -static void -aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) -{ - struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state; - - explicit_bzero(c20_ctx->key, sizeof(c20_ctx->key)); - free(c20_ctx); -} - -static void -poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) -{ - size_t j = data_len; - unsigned char length_bytes[8]; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) { - length_bytes[i] = j; - j >>= 8; - } - - if (data != NULL) - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes)); -} - -static void -poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) -{ - static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16]; - size_t pad_len; - - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); - - /* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */ - if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0) - return; - - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len); -} - -static int -aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, - size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) -{ - const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state; - unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; - poly1305_state poly1305; - const unsigned char *iv; - const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; - uint64_t ctr; - - /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block - * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow - * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. - * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only - * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. - * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop - * the warning. */ - if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SEAL, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SEAL, - EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SEAL, EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) { - /* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */ - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len); - } else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { - /* RFC 7539, May 2015 */ - - ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 | - nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32; - iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr + 1); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len); - } - - if (c20_ctx->tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { - unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag); - memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len); - *out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len; - return 1; - } - - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len); - *out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN; - return 1; -} - -static int -aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, - size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) -{ - const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state; - unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; - unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; - const unsigned char *iv = nonce; - poly1305_state poly1305; - const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; - size_t plaintext_len; - uint64_t ctr = 0; - - if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); - return 0; - } - - /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block - * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow - * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. - * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only - * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. - * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop - * the warning. */ - if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OPEN, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OPEN, EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len; - - if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OPEN, - EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) { - /* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */ - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); - } else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { - /* RFC 7539, May 2015 */ - - ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 | - nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32; - iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len); - } - - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac); - - if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); - return 0; - } - - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr + 1); - *out_len = plaintext_len; - return 1; -} - -static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = { - .key_len = 32, - .nonce_len = CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN, - .overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, - .max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, - - .init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, - .cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup, - .seal = aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, - .open = aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, -}; - -static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305_old = { - .key_len = 32, - .nonce_len = CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD, - .overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, - .max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, - - .init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, - .cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup, - .seal = aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, - .open = aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, -}; - -const EVP_AEAD * -EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305() -{ - return &aead_chacha20_poly1305; -} - -const EVP_AEAD * -EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old() -{ - return &aead_chacha20_poly1305_old; -} - -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */ -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb