From 568af76a0d1a807b73087c7dcdc4cb57b4c044df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: deraadt <>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 12:14:26 +0000
Subject: Do not feed RSA private key information to the random subsystem as
 entropy.  It might be fed to a pluggable random subsystem....

What were they thinking?!

ok guenther
---
 src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c')

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
index 7750366613..2e100ca457 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
 	else
 		e = rsa->e;
 
-	
-	if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
-		{
-		/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
-		 * exponent as unpredictable seed */
-		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
-		}
-
 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
 		{
 		/* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
-- 
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