From e3350922cdf6f87e98fa62cd9c641232af168534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: beck <>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2000 17:16:32 +0000
Subject: RSA goes in tree for next our next release, as it will be after Sept
 21.  Note: This means you shouldn't really be running -current for anything
 in the United States. Either wait for Sept 21, or for the next release, or
 move to the free world :)

---
 src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 252 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 222 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index f835be8afc..b7d2460754 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -1,13 +1,3 @@
-
-/* This file has been explicitly broken by ryker for OpenBSD, July
- * 1, 1998. In spite of the title, there is no implementation of the
- * RSA algorithm left in this file. All these routines will return an
- * error and fail when called. They exist as stubs and can be
- * ressurected from the bit bucket by someone in the free world once
- * the RSA algorithm is no longer subject to patent problems. Eric
- * Young's original copyright is below. 
- */
-
 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -184,13 +174,62 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+	BN_init(&f);
+	BN_init(&ret);
+
+	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+	default:
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+		if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
 
-	/* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-	 * when the RSA patent expires
-	 */
+	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+	else
+		{
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+		if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+	 * length of the modulus */
+	j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+	i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+		to[k]=0;
 
+	r=num;
 err:
 	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	BN_clear_free(&ret);
@@ -212,12 +251,77 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+	BN_init(&f);
+	BN_init(&ret);
+	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+	if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* make data into a big number */
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 
-	/* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-	 * when the RSA patent expires
-	 */
+	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+		if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+	/* do the decrypt */
+	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+	else
+		{
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+		if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+
+	p=buf;
+	j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
+		break;
+#ifndef NO_SHA
+        case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+	        r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+                break;
+#endif
+ 	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
 	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -240,12 +344,56 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-        BN_init(&f);
-        BN_init(&ret);
+	BN_init(&f);
+	BN_init(&ret);
+	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
 
-	/* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-	 * when the RSA patent expires
-	 */
+	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* do the decrypt */
+	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+		{
+		if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
+			    goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+	p=buf;
+	i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
 
 err:
 	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -263,15 +411,59 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 	{
 	BIGNUM r1,m1;
 	int ret=0;
-	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
 
+	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_init(&m1);
 	BN_init(&r1);
-	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 
-	/* Body of this routine removed for OpenBSD - will return
-	 * when the RSA patent expires
-	 */
+	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+		{
+		if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+			{
+			if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+				if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
+						     ctx))
+					goto err;
+			}
+		if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+			{
+			if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+				if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
+						     ctx))
+					goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
+
+	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+		rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
+
+	if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+	/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+	 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+	if (r0->neg)
+		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+
+	if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+	/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+         * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+	 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+	 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+	 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+         * they ensure p > q [steve]
+         */
+	if (r0->neg)
+		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+
+	ret=1;
 err:
 	BN_clear_free(&m1);
 	BN_clear_free(&r1);
-- 
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