From eb8dd9dca1228af0cd132f515509051ecfabf6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:32:06 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'. --- src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 368 --------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 368 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c deleted file mode 100644 index d1e138c299..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,368 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa_oaep.c,v 1.39 2024/03/26 05:37:28 joshua Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ - -/* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, - * - * for problems with the security proof for the - * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. - * - * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, - * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", - * Dec. 2000, . - * The new proof has stronger requirements for the - * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead - * of one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is - * an equivalent notion. - */ - -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "constant_time.h" -#include "evp_local.h" -#include "rsa_local.h" - -int -RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen) -{ - return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, param, - plen, NULL, NULL); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP); - -int -RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen, - const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) -{ - int i, emlen = tlen - 1; - unsigned char *db, *seed; - unsigned char *dbmask = NULL; - unsigned char seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int mdlen, dbmask_len = 0; - int rv = 0; - - if (md == NULL) - md = EVP_sha1(); - if (mgf1md == NULL) - mgf1md = md; - - if ((mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md)) <= 0) - goto err; - - if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); - goto err; - } - - if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - goto err; - } - - to[0] = 0; - seed = to + 1; - db = to + mdlen + 1; - - if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL)) - goto err; - - memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1); - db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01; - memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, flen); - arc4random_buf(seed, mdlen); - - dbmask_len = emlen - mdlen; - if ((dbmask = malloc(dbmask_len)) == NULL) { - RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, dbmask_len, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < dbmask_len; i++) - db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; - if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, dbmask_len, mgf1md) < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) - seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; - - rv = 1; - - err: - explicit_bzero(seedmask, sizeof(seedmask)); - freezero(dbmask, dbmask_len); - - return rv; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1); - -int -RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, - int plen) -{ - return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num, - param, plen, NULL, NULL); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP); - -int -RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, - int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) -{ - int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; - unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask; - const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; - unsigned char seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL; - int mdlen; - - if (md == NULL) - md = EVP_sha1(); - if (mgf1md == NULL) - mgf1md = md; - - if ((mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md)) <= 0) - return -1; - - if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) - return -1; - - /* - * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the - * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by - * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, - * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective - * of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. - * This does not leak any side-channel information. - */ - if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - dblen = num - mdlen - 1; - if ((db = malloc(dblen)) == NULL) { - RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto cleanup; - } - if ((em = malloc(num)) == NULL) { - RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* - * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with - * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s - * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern - * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance. - */ - for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) { - mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen); - flen -= 1 & mask; - from -= 1 & mask; - *--em = *from & mask; - } - - /* - * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is - * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA - * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). - */ - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); - - maskedseed = em + 1; - maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) - goto cleanup; - for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) - seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) - goto cleanup; - for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) - db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; - - if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) - goto cleanup; - - good &= constant_time_is_zero(timingsafe_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen)); - - found_one_byte = 0; - for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) { - /* - * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. - */ - unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); - unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); - - one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, - i, one_index); - found_one_byte |= equals1; - good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); - } - - good &= found_one_byte; - - /* - * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, - * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a - * concern. - */ - msg_index = one_index + 1; - mlen = dblen - msg_index; - - /* - * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. - */ - good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); - - /* - * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying - * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. The last |tlen| of - * |dblen| bytes are viewed as a circular buffer starting at |tlen|-|mlen'|, - * where |mlen'| is the "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information - * about failure or |mlen| would require an attacker to observe - * memory access patterns with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It - * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal - * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. - */ - tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen), - dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen); - msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen); - mlen = dblen - msg_index; - for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, dblen); - - msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ - mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ - to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[msg_index++], to[i]); - } - - /* - * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not - * reveal which kind of decoding error happened. - */ - RSAerror(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); - err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good); - - cleanup: - explicit_bzero(seed, sizeof(seed)); - freezero(db, dblen); - freezero(em, num); - - return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1); - -int -PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, - long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) -{ - long i, outlen = 0; - unsigned char cnt[4]; - EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int mdlen; - int rv = -1; - - if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); - if (mdlen < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { - cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); - cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); - cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; - cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, dgst, NULL) || - !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seed, seedlen) || - !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, cnt, 4)) - goto err; - if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, mask + outlen, NULL)) - goto err; - outlen += mdlen; - } else { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) - goto err; - memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); - outlen = len; - } - } - - rv = 0; - - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - - return rv; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(PKCS1_MGF1); -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb