From eb8dd9dca1228af0cd132f515509051ecfabf6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:32:06 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'. --- src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c | 930 ------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 930 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 619a4b890a..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_purp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,930 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: x509_purp.c,v 1.43 2024/07/12 18:15:10 beck Exp $ */ -/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL - * project 2001. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include - -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "x509_internal.h" -#include "x509_local.h" - -struct x509_purpose_st { - int purpose; - int trust; /* Default trust ID */ - int flags; - int (*check_purpose)(const struct x509_purpose_st *, const X509 *, int); - char *name; - char *sname; - void *usr_data; -} /* X509_PURPOSE */; - -#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) -#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) -#define xku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) -#define ns_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) - -static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); -static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); -static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); -static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); - -static const X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, - .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_ssl_client, - .name = "SSL client", - .sname = "sslclient", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, - .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_ssl_server, - .name = "SSL server", - .sname = "sslserver", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, - .trust = X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, - .name = "Netscape SSL server", - .sname = "nssslserver", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, - .trust = X509_TRUST_EMAIL, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_smime_sign, - .name = "S/MIME signing", - .sname = "smimesign", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, - .trust = X509_TRUST_EMAIL, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_smime_encrypt, - .name = "S/MIME encryption", - .sname = "smimeencrypt", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, - .trust = X509_TRUST_COMPAT, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_crl_sign, - .name = "CRL signing", - .sname = "crlsign", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_ANY, - .trust = X509_TRUST_ACCEPT_ALL, - .check_purpose = no_check, - .name = "Any Purpose", - .sname = "any", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, - .trust = X509_TRUST_COMPAT, - .check_purpose = ocsp_helper, - .name = "OCSP helper", - .sname = "ocsphelper", - }, - { - .purpose = X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, - .trust = X509_TRUST_TSA, - .check_purpose = check_purpose_timestamp_sign, - .name = "Time Stamp signing", - .sname = "timestampsign", - }, -}; - -#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard) / sizeof(xstandard[0])) - -/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* - * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const - * things. */ -int -X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) -{ - int idx; - const X509_PURPOSE *pt; - - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) - return -1; - - if (id == -1) - return 1; - - if ((idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id)) == -1) - return -1; - if ((pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx)) == NULL) - return -1; - - return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_purpose); - -int -X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) -{ - return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_count); - -const X509_PURPOSE * -X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) -{ - if (idx < 0 || (size_t)idx >= X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) - return NULL; - - return &xstandard[idx]; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0); - -int -X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) -{ - int i; - const X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; - - for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { - xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); - if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) - return i; - } - return -1; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname); - -int -X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) -{ - /* - * Ensure the purpose identifier is between MIN and MAX inclusive. - * If so, translate it to an index into the xstandard[] table. - */ - if (purpose < X509_PURPOSE_MIN || purpose > X509_PURPOSE_MAX) - return -1; - - return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; -} - -int -X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->purpose; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get_id); - -const char * -X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->name; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0_name); - -const char * -X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->sname; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname); - -int -X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->trust; -} - -/* - * List of NIDs of extensions supported by the verifier. If an extension - * is critical and doesn't appear in this list, then the certificate will - * normally be rejected. - */ -int -X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ext) -{ - switch (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext))) { - case NID_basic_constraints: - case NID_certificate_policies: - case NID_ext_key_usage: - case NID_inhibit_any_policy: - case NID_key_usage: - case NID_name_constraints: - case NID_netscape_cert_type: - case NID_policy_constraints: - case NID_policy_mappings: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 - case NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock: - case NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum: -#endif - case NID_subject_alt_name: - return 1; - default: - return 0; - } -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_supported_extension); - -static void -setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) -{ - X509_NAME *iname = NULL; - int i; - - if (dp->reasons) { - if (dp->reasons->length > 0) - dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; - if (dp->reasons->length > 1) - dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); - dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; - } else - dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; - if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) - return; - for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { - GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); - if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { - iname = gen->d.directoryName; - break; - } - } - if (!iname) - iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); - - DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); -} - -static void -setup_crldp(X509 *x) -{ - int i; - - x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL); - if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) - setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); -} - -static int -x509_extension_oid_cmp(const X509_EXTENSION *const *a, - const X509_EXTENSION *const *b) -{ - return OBJ_cmp((*a)->object, (*b)->object); -} - -static int -x509_extension_oids_are_unique(X509 *x509) -{ - STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL; - const X509_EXTENSION *prev_ext, *curr_ext; - int i; - int ret = 0; - - if (X509_get_ext_count(x509) <= 1) - goto done; - - if ((exts = sk_X509_EXTENSION_dup(x509->cert_info->extensions)) == NULL) - goto err; - - (void)sk_X509_EXTENSION_set_cmp_func(exts, x509_extension_oid_cmp); - sk_X509_EXTENSION_sort(exts); - - prev_ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, 0); - for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { - curr_ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); - if (x509_extension_oid_cmp(&prev_ext, &curr_ext) == 0) - goto err; - prev_ext = curr_ext; - } - - done: - ret = 1; - - err: - sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(exts); - - return ret; -} - -static void -x509v3_cache_extensions_internal(X509 *x) -{ - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; - ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; - ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; - EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; - X509_EXTENSION *ex; - long version; - int i; - - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) - return; - - /* - * XXX - this should really only set EXFLAG_INVALID if extensions are - * invalid. However, the X509_digest() failure matches OpenSSL/BoringSSL - * behavior and the version checks are at least vaguely related to - * extensions. - */ - - if (!X509_digest(x, X509_CERT_HASH_EVP, x->hash, NULL)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - - version = X509_get_version(x); - if (version < 0 || version > 2) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - if (version == 0) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; - /* UIDs may only appear in v2 or v3 certs */ - if (x->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL || - x->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - if (version != 2 && X509_get_ext_count(x) != 0) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - - /* Handle basic constraints */ - if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL))) { - if (bs->ca) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; - if (bs->pathlen) { - if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || - !bs->ca) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - x->ex_pathlen = 0; - } else - x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); - } else - x->ex_pathlen = -1; - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; - } else if (i != -1) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - - /* Handle key usage */ - if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL))) { - if (usage->length > 0) { - x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; - if (usage->length > 1) - x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; - } else - x->ex_kusage = 0; - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; - ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); - } else if (i != -1) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - - x->ex_xkusage = 0; - if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL))) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; - for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { - switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { - case NID_server_auth: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; - break; - - case NID_client_auth: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; - break; - - case NID_email_protect: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; - break; - - case NID_code_sign: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; - break; - - case NID_ms_sgc: - case NID_ns_sgc: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; - break; - - case NID_OCSP_sign: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; - break; - - case NID_time_stamp: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; - break; - - case NID_dvcs: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; - break; - - case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; - break; - } - } - sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); - } else if (i != -1) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - - if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL))) { - if (ns->length > 0) - x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; - else - x->ex_nscert = 0; - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; - ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); - } else if (i != -1) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - - x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL); - if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL); - if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - - /* Does subject name match issuer? */ - if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; - /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed. */ - if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && - !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; - } - - x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL); - if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); - if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - setup_crldp(x); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 - x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL); - if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL); - if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; -#endif - - for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { - ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); - if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == - NID_freshest_crl) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; - if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) - continue; - if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; - break; - } - } - - if (!x509_extension_oids_are_unique(x)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; -} - -int -x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) -{ - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) == 0) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - x509v3_cache_extensions_internal(x); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } - - return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; -} - -/* CA checks common to all purposes - * return codes: - * 0 not a CA - * 1 is a CA - * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA - * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. - * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. - */ - -static int -check_ca(const X509 *x) -{ - /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - return 0; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) - return 1; - /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ - else - return 0; - } else { - /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ - if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) - return 3; - /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) - return 4; - /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && - x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) - return 5; - /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ - return 0; - } -} - -int -X509_check_ca(X509 *x) -{ - x509v3_cache_extensions(x); - - return check_ca(x); -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_ca); - -/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ -static int -check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) -{ - int ca_ret; - - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) - return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; -} - -static int -check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) - return 0; - if (ca) - return check_ssl_ca(x); - /* We need to do digital signatures with it */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) - return 0; - /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ - if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int -check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) - return 0; - if (ca) - return check_ssl_ca(x); - - if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) - return 0; - /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - - return 1; -} - -static int -check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - int ret; - - ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -/* common S/MIME checks */ -static int -purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) - return 0; - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) - return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; - } - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) - return 1; - /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) - return 2; - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static int -check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - int ret; - - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -static int -check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - int ret; - - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -static int -check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; - } - if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that - * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. - */ -static int -ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" - value (2)? */ - if (ca) - return check_ca(x); - /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ - return 1; -} - -static int -check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - int i_ext; - - /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ - if (ca) - return check_ca(x); - - /* - * Check the optional key usage field: - * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature - * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall - * be rejected). - */ - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && - ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || - !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) - return 0; - - /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) - return 0; - - /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ - i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); - if (i_ext >= 0) { - X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext); - if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int -no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - return 1; -} - -/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. - * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates - * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by - * subject name. - * These are: - * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) - * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer - * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing - * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match - * codes for X509_verify_cert() - */ - -int -X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) -{ - if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), - X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) - return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; - - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer)) - return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) - return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; - - if (subject->akid) { - int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); - if (ret != X509_V_OK) - return ret; - } - - if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; - return X509_V_OK; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_issued); - -int -X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) -{ - if (!akid) - return X509_V_OK; - - /* Check key ids (if present) */ - if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && - ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; - /* Check serial number */ - if (akid->serial && - ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; - /* Check issuer name */ - if (akid->issuer) { - /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes - * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName. - * There may be more than one but we only take any - * notice of the first. - */ - GENERAL_NAMES *gens; - GENERAL_NAME *gen; - X509_NAME *nm = NULL; - int i; - gens = akid->issuer; - for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { - gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); - if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { - nm = gen->d.dirn; - break; - } - } - if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; - } - return X509_V_OK; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_akid); - -uint32_t -X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) -{ - /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) - return EXFLAG_INVALID; - - return x->ex_flags; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_extension_flags); - -uint32_t -X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) -{ - /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) - return 0; - - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) - return x->ex_kusage; - - return UINT32_MAX; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_key_usage); - -uint32_t -X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) -{ - /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) - return 0; - - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) - return x->ex_xkusage; - - return UINT32_MAX; -} -LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_extended_key_usage); -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb