From 86c49b31af735796dfde37aa29473a30d36367db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2016 19:31:36 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_6_0_BASE'. --- src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c | 1374 ---------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1374 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c deleted file mode 100644 index bce084f1ee..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_both.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1374 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: d1_both.c,v 1.39 2016/03/06 14:52:15 beck Exp $ */ -/* - * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu - * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "pqueue.h" -#include "bytestring.h" - -#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8) - -#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \ - if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \ - long ii; \ - for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \ - } else { \ - long ii; \ - bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \ - for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \ - bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \ - } } - -#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \ - long ii; \ - OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \ - is_complete = 1; \ - if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \ - if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \ - if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } } - -static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = { - 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 -}; -static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = { - 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f -}; - -/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ -static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28}; - -static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu); -static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len); -static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); -static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len); -static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, - int *ok); - -static hm_fragment * -dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly) -{ - hm_fragment *frag = NULL; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - unsigned char *bitmask = NULL; - - frag = malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); - if (frag == NULL) - return NULL; - - if (frag_len) { - buf = malloc(frag_len); - if (buf == NULL) { - free(frag); - return NULL; - } - } - - /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ - frag->fragment = buf; - - /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */ - if (reassembly) { - bitmask = malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); - if (bitmask == NULL) { - free(buf); - free(frag); - return NULL; - } - memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); - } - - frag->reassembly = bitmask; - - return frag; -} - -static void -dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) -{ - if (frag == NULL) - return; - - if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free( - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy( - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash); - } - free(frag->fragment); - free(frag->reassembly); - free(frag); -} - -/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ -int -dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) -{ - int ret; - int curr_mtu; - unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize; - - /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ - if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && - !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { - s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), - BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); - - /* - * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it - * doesn't know the MTU (ie., the initial write), so just - * make sure we have a reasonable number - */ - if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) { - s->d1->mtu = 0; - s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu); - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, - s->d1->mtu, NULL); - } - } - - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); - /* should have something reasonable now */ - - if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == - (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - - if (s->write_hash) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - else - mac_size = 0; - - if (s->enc_write_ctx && - (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) - blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); - else - blocksize = 0; - - frag_off = 0; - while (s->init_num) { - curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize; - - if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { - /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ - ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - - mac_size - blocksize; - } - - if (s->init_num > curr_mtu) - len = curr_mtu; - else - len = s->init_num; - - - /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ - if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - if (s->init_off != 0) { - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - if (s->init_num > curr_mtu) - len = curr_mtu; - else - len = s->init_num; - } - - dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, - len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - - dtls1_write_message_header(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]); - - OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - } - - ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, - &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); - if (ret < 0) { - /* - * Might need to update MTU here, but we don't know - * which previous packet caused the failure -- so - * can't really retransmit anything. continue as - * if everything is fine and wait for an alert to - * handle the retransmit - */ - if (BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), - BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) - s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), - BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); - else - return (-1); - } else { - - /* - * Bad if this assert fails, only part of the - * handshake message got sent. but why would - * this happen? - */ - OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); - - if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - !s->d1->retransmitting) { - /* - * Should not be done for 'Hello Request's, - * but in that case we'll ignore the result - * anyway - */ - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; - const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - int xlen; - - if (frag_off == 0) { - /* - * Reconstruct message header is if it - * is being sent in single fragment - */ - *p++ = msg_hdr->type; - l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); - s2n (msg_hdr->seq, p); - l2n3(0, p); - l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); - p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - xlen = ret; - } else { - p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - } - - tls1_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); - } - - if (ret == s->init_num) { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, - s->init_buf->data, - (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->init_off = 0; - /* done writing this message */ - s->init_num = 0; - - return (1); - } - s->init_off += ret; - s->init_num -= ret; - frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - } - } - return (0); -} - - -/* - * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), - * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. - * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in - * fragments. - */ -long -dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) -{ - int i, al; - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned long msg_len; - - /* - * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused - * by the absence of an optional handshake message - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; - if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - *ok = 1; - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; - return s->init_num; - } - - msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; - memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); - -again: - i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); - if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || - i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */ - goto again; - else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) - return i; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; - - /* reconstruct message header */ - *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; - l2n3(msg_len, p); - s2n (msg_hdr->seq, p); - l2n3(0, p); - l2n3(msg_len, p); - - p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - tls1_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len); - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, msg_len, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); - - /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ - if (!s->d1->listen) - s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; - - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - return s->init_num; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - *ok = 0; - return -1; -} - - -static int -dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int max) -{ - size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len; - - msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; - frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; - frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - - /* sanity checking */ - if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, - SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - - if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, - SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - - if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */ - { - /* - * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked - * against max above - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, - msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; - s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; - s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; - } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) { - /* - * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce - * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, - SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - - return 0; /* no error */ -} - -static int -dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) -{ - /* - * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available - * if so: - * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] - * (2) update s->init_num - */ - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - int al; - - *ok = 0; - item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); - if (item == NULL) - return 0; - - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - - /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */ - if (frag->reassembly != NULL) - return 0; - - if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) { - unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; - pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); - - al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max); - - if (al == 0) /* no alert */ - { - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], - frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.frag_len); - } - - dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - pitem_free(item); - - if (al == 0) { - *ok = 1; - return frag_len; - } - - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - s->init_num = 0; - *ok = 0; - return -1; - } else - return 0; -} - -/* - * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes - * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, - * but may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. - */ -static unsigned long -dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long max_len; - - max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; - if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) - return s->max_cert_list; - return max_len; -} - -static int -dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) -{ - hm_fragment *frag = NULL; - pitem *item = NULL; - int i = -1, is_complete; - unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || - msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) - goto err; - - if (frag_len == 0) { - i = DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - goto err; - } - - /* Try to find item in queue */ - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq; - item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); - - if (item == NULL) { - frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1); - if (frag == NULL) - goto err; - memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); - frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; - frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; - } else { - frag = (hm_fragment*)item->data; - if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { - item = NULL; - frag = NULL; - goto err; - } - } - - /* - * If message is already reassembled, this must be a - * retransmit and can be dropped. - */ - if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { - unsigned char devnull [256]; - - while (frag_len) { - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? - sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - frag_len -= i; - } - i = DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - goto err; - } - - /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off, frag_len, 0); - if (i <= 0 || (unsigned long)i != frag_len) - goto err; - - RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, - (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len)); - - RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len, - is_complete); - - if (is_complete) { - free(frag->reassembly); - frag->reassembly = NULL; - } - - if (item == NULL) { - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); - if (item == NULL) { - i = -1; - goto err; - } - - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); - } - - return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - -err: - if (item == NULL && frag != NULL) - dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - *ok = 0; - return i; -} - - -static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) -{ - int i = -1; - hm_fragment *frag = NULL; - pitem *item = NULL; - unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) - goto err; - - /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq; - item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); - - /* - * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, - * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it. - */ - if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) - item = NULL; - - /* - * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is - * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received - * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale - * retransmit. - */ - if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || - msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || - (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && - msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { - unsigned char devnull [256]; - - while (frag_len) { - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? - sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - frag_len -= i; - } - } else { - if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) - return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); - - if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) - goto err; - - frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); - if (frag == NULL) - goto err; - - memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); - - if (frag_len) { - /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - frag->fragment, frag_len, 0); - if (i <= 0 || (unsigned long)i != frag_len) - goto err; - } - - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); - if (item == NULL) - goto err; - - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); - } - - return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - -err: - if (item == NULL && frag != NULL) - dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - *ok = 0; - return i; -} - - -static long -dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) -{ - unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; - unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len; - int i, al; - struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; - -again: - /* see if we have the required fragment already */ - if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) { - if (*ok) - s->init_num = frag_len; - return frag_len; - } - - /* read handshake message header */ - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire, - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); - if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */ - { - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - *ok = 0; - return i; - } - /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ - if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH || - /* parse the message fragment header */ - dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered - * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time - * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie) - * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) - */ - if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && - !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1)) - return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); - - len = msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; - frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; - - if (frag_len && frag_len < len) - return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok); - - if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && - wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { - /* - * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- - * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them - * if their format is correct. Does not count for - * 'Finished' MAC. - */ - if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire, - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->init_num = 0; - goto again; - } - else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ - { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max))) - goto f_err; - - /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ - s->state = stn; - - if (frag_len > 0) { - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0); - /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ - if (i <= 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - *ok = 0; - return i; - } - } else - i = 0; - - /* - * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the - * handshake to fail - */ - if (i != (int)frag_len) { - al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, - SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - goto f_err; - } - - *ok = 1; - - /* - * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in - * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' - * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet - * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. - */ - s->init_num = frag_len; - return frag_len; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - s->init_num = 0; - - *ok = 0; - return (-1); -} - -/* - * for these 2 messages, we need to - * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init - * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero - * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init - * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign - * ssl->session->read_hash assign - */ -int -dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) -{ - unsigned char *p; - - if (s->state == a) { - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; - - s->init_off = 0; - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, - s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); - - /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ - dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); - - s->state = b; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ - return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); -} - -static int -dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) -{ - int n; - unsigned char *p; - - n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + (*l) + 3)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return 0; - } - p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); - l2n3(n, p); - i2d_X509(x, &p); - *l += n + 3; - - return 1; -} - -unsigned long -dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x) -{ - unsigned char *p; - int i; - unsigned long l = 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ - buf = s->init_buf; - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return (0); - } - if (x != NULL) { - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; - - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, - x, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return (0); - } - - X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); - /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ - ERR_clear_error(); - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); - - if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); - return 0; - } - } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); - } - /* Thawte special :-) */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i); - if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) - return 0; - } - - l -= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - - p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); - l2n3(l, p); - l += 3; - p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]); - p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l); - - l += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - return (l); -} - -int -dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) -{ - if (code > 0) { -#ifdef DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", - __FILE__, __LINE__); -#endif - return 1; - } - - if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { - /* - * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers - * handle this. in fact it's probably an error - */ - return code; - } - - if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ - { - BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); - return code; - } - - return dtls1_handle_timeout(s); -} - -int -dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) -{ - /* - * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message - * sequence number, since the queue only contains messages of a - * single handshake. However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message - * sequence number and so using only the sequence will result in - * the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this, the - * sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is - * subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also - * maintains the order of the index (important for priority queues) - * and fits in the unsigned short variable. - */ - return seq * 2 - is_ccs; -} - -int -dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) -{ - pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; - piterator iter; - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - int found = 0; - - iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); - - for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; - item = pqueue_next(&iter)) { - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, - (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority( - frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0, - &found) <= 0 && found) { -#ifdef DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); -#endif - return -1; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -int -dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) -{ - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - unsigned char seq64be[8]; - - /* Buffer the messsage in order to handle DTLS retransmissions. */ - - /* - * This function is called immediately after a message has - * been serialized - */ - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - - frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); - if (frag == NULL) - return 0; - - memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); - - if (is_ccs) { - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) ? - DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH : 3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num); - } else { - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); - } - - frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; - frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; - frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; - frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; - - /* save current state*/ - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session; - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; - - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority( - frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority( - frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); - - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); - if (item == NULL) { - dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - return 0; - } - - pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); - return 1; -} - -int -dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, - int *found) -{ - int ret; - /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ - pitem *item; - hm_fragment *frag; - unsigned long header_length; - unsigned char seq64be[8]; - struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; - unsigned char save_write_sequence[8]; - - /* - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - */ - - /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ - memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq; - - item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be); - if (item == NULL) { -#ifdef DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); -#endif - *found = 0; - return 0; - } - - *found = 1; - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - - if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) - header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; - else - header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, - frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); - s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, - frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, - frag->msg_header.frag_len); - - /* save current state */ - saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; - saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; - saved_state.session = s->session; - saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; - - s->d1->retransmitting = 1; - - /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */ - s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx; - s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash; - s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; - s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch; - - if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == - saved_state.epoch - 1) { - memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, - sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); - memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, - sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); - } - - ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? - SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); - - /* restore current state */ - s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx; - s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash; - s->session = saved_state.session; - s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch; - - if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == - saved_state.epoch - 1) { - memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, - sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); - memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, - sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); - } - - s->d1->retransmitting = 0; - - (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); - return ret; -} - -/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ -void -dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) -{ - pitem *item; - - for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); item != NULL; - item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) { - dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } -} - -unsigned char * -dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) -{ - /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ - if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) { - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; - } - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, - frag_off, frag_len); - - return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; -} - -/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ -static void -dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, - unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) -{ - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - msg_hdr->type = mt; - msg_hdr->msg_len = len; - msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; - msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; - msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; -} - -static void -dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) -{ - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; - msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; -} - -static unsigned char * -dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) -{ - struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - - *p++ = msg_hdr->type; - l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); - - s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); - l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); - l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); - - return p; -} - -unsigned int -dtls1_min_mtu(void) -{ - return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / - sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); -} - -static unsigned int -dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu) -{ - unsigned int i; - - if (curr_mtu == 0) - return g_probable_mtu[0]; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++) - if (curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i]) - return g_probable_mtu[i]; - - return curr_mtu; -} - -int -dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) -{ - CBS header; - uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; - uint16_t seq; - uint8_t type; - - CBS_init(&header, data, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); - - memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); - - if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type)) - return 0; - if (!CBS_get_u24(&header, &msg_len)) - return 0; - if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &seq)) - return 0; - if (!CBS_get_u24(&header, &frag_off)) - return 0; - if (!CBS_get_u24(&header, &frag_len)) - return 0; - - msg_hdr->type = type; - msg_hdr->msg_len = msg_len; - msg_hdr->seq = seq; - msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; - msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; - - return 1; -} - -void -dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr) -{ - memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); - - ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); -} - -int -dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) -{ - int ret; - - ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); - return ret; -} -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb