From de48c77a08514ed654e05e710444452ffab6d0aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: deraadt <>
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2014 22:23:12 +0000
Subject: 
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162ec30718b5e7480add42598158
 Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random perfectly, so
 do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and replaced with "only do it
 badly if a flag is set".  New flags (SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and
 SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old
 scheme of "use time_t for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".

Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]

Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them.  The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned.  No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen
---
 src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c')

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
index 8ff4d8e369..976b753a87 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -791,8 +791,7 @@ dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		for (i = 0; p[i]=='\0' && i < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); i++)
 			;
 		if (i == sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
-			ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
-			    sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-- 
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