From 3779c39bff8e2ae1adcc6f1324eb388d0bd49a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jsing <> Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 16:07:22 +0000 Subject: First pass at applying KNF to the OpenSSL code, which almost makes it readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using tr and md5. --- src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c | 1223 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 562 insertions(+), 661 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c index 6b55d21a3e..6c677d9f6b 100644 --- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -118,11 +118,12 @@ #include static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); -int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) - { +int +ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) +{ /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified @@ -130,37 +131,35 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ - int i,len,left; - long align=0; + int i, len, left; + long align = 0; unsigned char *pkt; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; - if (n <= 0) return n; + if (n <= 0) + return n; - rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); + rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); if (rb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return -1; - left = rb->left; + left = rb->left; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); + align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif - if (!extend) - { + if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (left == 0) rb->offset = align; - else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { + else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* check if next packet length is large * enough to justify payload alignment... */ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA - && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) - { + && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) { /* Note that even if packet is corrupted * and its length field is insane, we can * only be led to wrong decision about @@ -168,109 +167,100 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) * Header values has no effect on memmove * arguments and therefore no buffer * overrun can be triggered. */ - memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); + memmove (rb->buf + align, pkt, left); rb->offset = align; - } } + } s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; s->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ - } + } /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets * because the read operation returns the whole packet * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if (left > 0 && n > left) n = left; - } + } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ - if (left >= n) - { - s->packet_length+=n; - rb->left=left-n; - rb->offset+=n; - return(n); - } + if (left >= n) { + s->packet_length += n; + rb->left = left - n; + rb->offset += n; + return (n); + } /* else we need to read more data */ len = s->packet_length; - pkt = rb->buf+align; + pkt = rb->buf + align; /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', * 'left' extra ones at the end */ if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ - { - memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); + { + memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); s->packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; - } + } if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; - } + } if (!s->read_ahead) /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; - else - { + else { if (max < n) max = n; if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) max = rb->len - rb->offset; - } + } - while (left < n) - { + while (left < n) { /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to * len+max if possible) */ errno = 0; - if (s->rbio != NULL) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); + if (s->rbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; - } + } - if (i <= 0) - { + if (i <= 0) { rb->left = left; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - if (len+left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - return(i); - } - left+=i; + SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + if (len + left == 0) + ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); + return (i); + } + left += i; /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if (n > left) n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ - } } + } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ rb->offset += n; rb->left = left - n; s->packet_length += n; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(n); - } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (n); +} /* Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error @@ -281,10 +271,11 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) - { - int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; - int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; +static int +ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) +{ + int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; + int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; @@ -293,90 +284,83 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; - rr= &(s->s3->rrec); - sess=s->session; + rr = &(s->s3->rrec); + sess = s->session; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) - extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; + extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else - extra=0; - if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) - { + extra = 0; + if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; - } + } again: /* check if we have the header */ - if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) - { - n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); + if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || + (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; + s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; - p=s->packet; + p = s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr->type= *(p++); ssl_major= *(p++); ssl_minor= *(p++); - version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; - n2s(p,rr->length); + version = (ssl_major << 8)|ssl_minor; + n2s(p, rr->length); #if 0 -fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); + fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); #endif /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->first_packet) - { - if (version != s->version) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) - /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ - s->version = (unsigned short)version; - al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + if (!s->first_packet) { + if (version != s->version) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) + /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ + s->version = (unsigned short)version; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; - } } + } - if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; - } + } - if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; - } + } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } + } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ - if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { + if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i=rr->length; - n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); + i = rr->length; + n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ /* now n == rr->length, * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ - } + } s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ - rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which @@ -389,47 +373,43 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; - } + } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data=rr->input; + rr->data = rr->input; - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /* enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ - if (enc_err == 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); + if (enc_err == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; - } + } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG -printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); -{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; zlength; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } -printf("\n"); + printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); + { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; zlength; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } + printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && - (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) - { + if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && + (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ - orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); + orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, @@ -437,17 +417,15 @@ printf("\n"); * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ + /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - orig_len < mac_size+1)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; - } + } - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract * the MAC in constant time from within the record, @@ -456,60 +434,53 @@ printf("\n"); mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; - } - else - { + } else { /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } + } i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) enc_err = -1; - } + } - if (enc_err < 0) - { + if (enc_err < 0) { /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ - al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; - } + } /* r->length is now just compressed */ - if (s->expand != NULL) - { - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + if (s->expand != NULL) { + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; - } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + } + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; - } } + } - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; - } + } - rr->off=0; + rr->off = 0; /* So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record @@ -519,178 +490,171 @@ printf("\n"); */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - s->packet_length=0; + s->packet_length = 0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) goto again; + if (rr->length == 0) + goto again; #if 0 -fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); + fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); #endif - return(1); + return (1); f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - return(ret); - } + return (ret); +} -int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) - { +int +ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; - rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); - i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); + rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); + i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,(int)rr->length); if (i < 0) - return(0); + return (0); else - rr->length=i; - rr->data=rr->comp; + rr->length = i; + rr->data = rr->comp; #endif - return(1); - } + return (1); +} -int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) - { +int +ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *wr; - wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); - i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, - wr->input,(int)wr->length); + wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); + i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, + wr->input,(int)wr->length); if (i < 0) - return(0); + return (0); else - wr->length=i; + wr->length = i; - wr->input=wr->data; + wr->input = wr->data; #endif - return(1); - } + return (1); +} /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ -int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) - { - const unsigned char *buf=buf_; - unsigned int tot,n,nw; +int +ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) +{ + const unsigned char *buf = buf_; + unsigned int tot, n, nw; int i; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - tot=s->s3->wnum; - s->s3->wnum=0; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + tot = s->s3->wnum; + s->s3->wnum = 0; - if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) - { - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; - } } + } - n=(len-tot); - for (;;) - { + n = (len - tot); + for (;;) { if (n > s->max_send_fragment) - nw=s->max_send_fragment; + nw = s->max_send_fragment; else - nw=n; + nw = n; - i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->s3->wnum=tot; + i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; - } + } - if ((i == (int)n) || - (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) - { + if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && + (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; - - return tot+i; - } - n-=i; - tot+=i; + return tot + i; } - } -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) - { - unsigned char *p,*plen; - int i,mac_size,clear=0; - int prefix_len=0; + n -= i; + tot += i; + } +} + +static int +do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) +{ + unsigned char *p, *plen; + int i, mac_size, clear = 0; + int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; - long align=0; + long align = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); SSL_SESSION *sess; - if (wb->buf == NULL) + if (wb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return -1; /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) - return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); + return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) - { - i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) - return(i); + return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ - } + } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; - wr= &(s->s3->wrec); - sess=s->session; + wr = &(s->s3->wrec); + sess = s->session; - if ( (sess == NULL) || - (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) - { + if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || + (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { #if 1 - clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ + clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ #else - clear=1; + clear = 1; #endif - mac_size=0; - } - else - { - mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + mac_size = 0; + } else { + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; - } + } /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ - if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) - { + if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ - if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) - { + if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later @@ -700,216 +664,195 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, goto err; if (prefix_len > - (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) - { + (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - } } - - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } - if (create_empty_fragment) - { + s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; + } + + if (create_empty_fragment) { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so * if we want to align the real payload, then we can * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); + align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } - else if (prefix_len) - { + wb->offset = align; + } else if (prefix_len) { p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; - } - else - { + } else { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); + align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } + wb->offset = align; + } /* write the header */ - *(p++)=type&0xff; - wr->type=type; + *(p++) = type&0xff; + wr->type = type; - *(p++)=(s->version>>8); + *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B - && !s->renegotiate - && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->renegotiate && + TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) *(p++) = 0x1; else - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; + *(p++) = s->version&0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ - plen=p; - p+=2; + plen = p; + + p += 2; /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ - if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) - { + if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - { + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; - } + } /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; - } - else + } else eivlen = 0; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ - wr->data=p + eivlen; - wr->length=(int)len; - wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; + wr->data = p + eivlen; + wr->length = (int)len; + wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into * wr->data */ /* first we compress */ - if (s->compress != NULL) - { - if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); + if (s->compress != NULL) { + if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; - } - } - else - { - memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); - wr->input=wr->data; } + } else { + memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); + wr->input = wr->data; + } /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ - if (mac_size != 0) - { - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) + if (mac_size != 0) { + if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; - wr->length+=mac_size; - } + wr->length += mac_size; + } - wr->input=p; - wr->data=p; + wr->input = p; + wr->data = p; - if (eivlen) - { + if (eivlen) { /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) - goto err; */ + goto err; +*/ wr->length += eivlen; - } + } /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ - s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); + s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ - s2n(wr->length,plen); + s2n(wr->length, plen); /* we should now have * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ - wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - if (create_empty_fragment) - { + if (create_empty_fragment) { /* we are in a recursive call; * just return the length, don't write out anything here */ return wr->length; - } + } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ - s->s3->wpend_tot=len; - s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; - s->s3->wpend_type=type; - s->s3->wpend_ret=len; + s->s3->wpend_tot = len; + s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; + s->s3->wpend_type = type; + s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ - return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); + return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; - } +} /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ -int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len) - { +int +ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int len) +{ int i; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); + SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); /* XXXX */ - if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) - || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && - !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) - || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); - return(-1); - } + if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && + !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || + (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); + return (-1); + } - for (;;) - { + for (;;) { errno = 0; - if (s->wbio != NULL) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - i=BIO_write(s->wbio, - (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), - (unsigned int)wb->left); - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); - i= -1; - } - if (i == wb->left) - { - wb->left=0; - wb->offset+=i; + if (s->wbio != NULL) { + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + i = BIO_write(s->wbio, + (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), + (unsigned int)wb->left); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); + i = -1; + } + if (i == wb->left) { + wb->left = 0; + wb->offset += i; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && + SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(s->s3->wpend_ret); - } - else if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (s->s3->wpend_ret); + } else if (i <= 0) { if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in using a datagram service */ wb->left = 0; } - return(i); - } - wb->offset+=i; - wb->left-=i; + return (i); } + wb->offset += i; + wb->left -= i; } +} /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: @@ -938,39 +881,40 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, * Application data protocol * none of our business */ -int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) - { - int al,i,j,ret; +int +ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) +{ + int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return(-1); + return (-1); - if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || - (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) - { + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || + (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; - } + } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ - { + { unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; - while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) - { + while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; - len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; + len--; + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; - } + } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; @@ -979,19 +923,18 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ - if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) - { + if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); } + } start: - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data @@ -1000,67 +943,63 @@ start: rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ - if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) - { - ret=ssl3_get_record(s); - if (ret <= 0) return(ret); - } + if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { + ret = ssl3_get_record(s); + if (ret <= 0) + return (ret); + } /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ - && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); + && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; - } + } /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away * (even in 'peek' mode) */ - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) - { - rr->length=0; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(0); - } + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + rr->length = 0; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ - { + { /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we * are doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; - } + } - if (len <= 0) return(len); + if (len <= 0) + return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; - memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); - if (!peek) - { - rr->length-=n; - rr->off+=n; - if (rr->length == 0) - { - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->off=0; + memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); + if (!peek) { + rr->length -= n; + rr->off += n; + if (rr->length == 0) { + s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + rr->off = 0; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - } } - return(n); } + return (n); + } /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake @@ -1069,137 +1008,122 @@ start: /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ - { + { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - { + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; - } - else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) - { + } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; - } + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) - { + else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { tls1_process_heartbeat(s); /* Exit and notify application to read again */ rr->length = 0; - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - return(-1); - } + return (-1); + } #endif - if (dest_maxlen > 0) - { + if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ - while (n-- > 0) - { + while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; - } + } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ - } } + } /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ - if ((!s->server) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) - { + if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; - } + } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && - !s->s3->renegotiate) - { + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && + !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); - if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) - { - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) - { + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ - { + { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return(-1); - } + return (-1); } } } + } /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; - } + } /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && - SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !s->s3->send_connection_binding && - (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && - !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - - { + SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !s->s3->send_connection_binding && + (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && + !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ rr->length = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; - } - if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) - { + } + if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; @@ -1209,24 +1133,22 @@ start: s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; + cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - if (cb != NULL) - { + if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); - } + } if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ - { + { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; - if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) - { + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return(0); - } + return (0); + } /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with * a fatal alert because if application tried to @@ -1236,139 +1158,126 @@ start: * In future we might have a renegotiation where we * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. */ - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) - { + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; - } + } #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) - return(0); + return (0); #endif - } - else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ - { + } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ + { char tmp[16]; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); - BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); - ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); + BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); - return(0); - } - else - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); + return (0); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; - } + } goto start; - } + } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ - { - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - rr->length=0; - return(0); - } + { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + rr->length = 0; + return (0); + } - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) - { + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ - if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || - (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || + (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; - } + } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; - } + } - rr->length=0; + rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; - } + } /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ - if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) - { + if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) - { + !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and - * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting + * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting * protocol violations): */ - s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) - ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT - :SSL_ST_CONNECT; + s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | + (s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif - s->renegotiate=1; - s->new_session=1; - } - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + i = s->handshake_func(s); + if (i < 0) + return (i); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) - { + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ - { + { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return(-1); - } + return (-1); } - goto start; } + goto start; + } - switch (rr->type) - { + switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) - { + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; - } + } #endif - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: @@ -1376,8 +1285,8 @@ start: /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that * should not happen when type != rr->type */ - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, @@ -1388,123 +1297,116 @@ start: * we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && - (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && - (( - (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) - ) || ( - (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) - ) - )) - { - s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; - return(-1); - } - else - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && + (( + (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && + (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && + (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) + ) || ( + (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && + (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && + (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) + ) + )) { + s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; + return (-1); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; - } } + } /* not reached */ f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - return(-1); - } + return (-1); +} -int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - { +int +ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +{ int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; + i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; + i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; - if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) - { - if (s->session == NULL) - { + if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { + if (s->session == NULL) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); - } - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); } - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) - return(0); + s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) + return (0); + } + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) + return (0); /* we have to record the message digest at * this point so we can get it before we read * the finished message */ - if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } - else - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } + if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); - if (i == 0) - { + sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; - } + } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; - return(1); - } + return (1); +} -int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) - { +int +ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) +{ /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ - desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); + desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ - if (desc < 0) return -1; + if (desc < 0) + return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); - s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; - s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; - s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; + s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; + s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; + s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* else data is still being written out, we will get written * some time in the future */ return -1; - } +} -int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) - { - int i,j; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; +int +ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) +{ + int i, j; + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; + s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; - } - else - { + if (i <= 0) { + s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; + } else { /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, * we will not worry too much. */ @@ -1515,15 +1417,14 @@ int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; + cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - if (cb != NULL) - { - j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; - cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); - } + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; + cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } - return(i); } + return (i); +} -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb