From cd3d8b6f4c16680100acc89db5b955e2aa399daa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jsing <> Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2017 05:51:54 +0000 Subject: Rename s3_{both,clnt,pkt_srvr}.c to have an ssl_ prefix since they are no longer SSLv3 code. ok beck@ --- src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c | 1446 ----------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1446 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5dadc0654e..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1446 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.70 2017/01/26 05:31:25 jsing Exp $ */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include - -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -#include -#include - -#include "bytestring.h" - -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); - -/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase - * packet by another n bytes. - * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified - * by s->internal->packet and s->internal->packet_length. - * (If s->internal->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf - * [plus s->internal->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) - */ -static int -ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) -{ - int i, len, left; - size_t align; - unsigned char *pkt; - SSL3_BUFFER *rb; - - if (n <= 0) - return n; - - rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); - if (rb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - left = rb->left; - align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); - - if (!extend) { - /* start with empty packet ... */ - if (left == 0) - rb->offset = align; - else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - /* check if next packet length is large - * enough to justify payload alignment... */ - pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; - if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) { - /* Note that even if packet is corrupted - * and its length field is insane, we can - * only be led to wrong decision about - * whether memmove will occur or not. - * Header values has no effect on memmove - * arguments and therefore no buffer - * overrun can be triggered. */ - memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); - rb->offset = align; - } - } - s->internal->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; - s->internal->packet_length = 0; - /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ - } - - /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets - * because the read operation returns the whole packet - * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (left > 0 && n > left) - n = left; - } - - /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ - if (left >= n) { - s->internal->packet_length += n; - rb->left = left - n; - rb->offset += n; - return (n); - } - - /* else we need to read more data */ - - len = s->internal->packet_length; - pkt = rb->buf + align; - /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: - * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', - * 'left' extra ones at the end */ - if (s->internal->packet != pkt) { - /* len > 0 */ - memmove(pkt, s->internal->packet, len + left); - s->internal->packet = pkt; - rb->offset = len + align; - } - - if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { - /* does not happen */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if (!s->internal->read_ahead) { - /* ignore max parameter */ - max = n; - } else { - if (max < n) - max = n; - if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) - max = rb->len - rb->offset; - } - - while (left < n) { - /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf - * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to - * len+max if possible) */ - - errno = 0; - if (s->rbio != NULL) { - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; - i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); - i = -1; - } - - if (i <= 0) { - rb->left = left; - if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (len + left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - } - return (i); - } - left += i; - - /* - * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because - * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as - * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case. - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (n > left) - n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ - } - } - - /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ - rb->offset += n; - rb->left = left - n; - s->internal->packet_length += n; - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - return (n); -} - -int -ssl3_packet_read(SSL *s, int plen) -{ - int n; - - n = ssl3_read_n(s, plen, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); - if (n <= 0) - return n; - if (s->internal->packet_length < plen) - return s->internal->packet_length; - - return plen; -} - -int -ssl3_packet_extend(SSL *s, int plen) -{ - int rlen, n; - - if (s->internal->packet_length >= plen) - return plen; - rlen = plen - s->internal->packet_length; - - n = ssl3_read_n(s, rlen, rlen, 1); - if (n <= 0) - return n; - if (s->internal->packet_length < plen) - return s->internal->packet_length; - - return plen; -} - -/* Call this to get a new input record. - * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error - * or non-blocking IO. - * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes - */ -/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ -static int -ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) -{ - int al; - int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned mac_size, orig_len; - - rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec); - sess = s->session; - -again: - /* check if we have the header */ - if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (s->internal->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - CBS header; - uint16_t len, ssl_version; - uint8_t type; - - n = ssl3_packet_read(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); - - s->internal->mac_packet = 1; - s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; - - if (s->server && s->internal->first_packet) { - if ((ret = ssl_server_legacy_first_packet(s)) != 1) - return (ret); - ret = -1; - } - - CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); - - /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ - if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) || - !CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) || - !CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - - rr->type = type; - rr->length = len; - - /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) && - !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) - /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ - s->version = ssl_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - - if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto err; - } - - if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* now s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } - - /* s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ - - n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); - if (n != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length) - return (n); - - s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ - - /* At this point, s->internal->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, - * and we have that many bytes in s->internal->packet - */ - rr->input = &(s->internal->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - - /* ok, we can now read from 's->internal->packet' data into 'rr' - * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which - * need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression - * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, - * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ - - /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] - * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ - - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data = rr->input; - - enc_err = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); - /* enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid */ - if (enc_err == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - - - /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { - /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ - unsigned char *mac = NULL; - unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - - /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ - orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); - - /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was - * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, - * therefore we can safely process the record in a different - * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. - */ - if (orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ - (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes - * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract - * the MAC in constant time from within the record, - * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. - * */ - mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); - rr->length -= mac_size; - } else { - /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| - * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's - * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } - - i = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || - timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) - enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) - enc_err = -1; - } - - if (enc_err < 0) { - /* - * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with - * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a - * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext - * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error - * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker - * (e.g. via a logfile) - */ - al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); - goto f_err; - } - - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - rr->off = 0; - /* - * So at this point the following is true - * - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ - - /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - s->internal->packet_length = 0; - - /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) - goto again; - - return (1); - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return (ret); -} - -/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' - * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. - */ -int -ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) -{ - const unsigned char *buf = buf_; - unsigned int tot, n, nw; - int i; - - if (len < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - tot = S3I(s)->wnum; - S3I(s)->wnum = 0; - - if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) { - i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - } - - if (len < tot) - len = tot; - n = (len - tot); - for (;;) { - if (n > s->max_send_fragment) - nw = s->max_send_fragment; - else - nw = n; - - i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); - if (i <= 0) { - S3I(s)->wnum = tot; - return i; - } - - if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { - /* - * Next chunk of data should get another prepended - * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV - * weakness. - */ - S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 0; - - return tot + i; - } - - n -= i; - tot += i; - } -} - -static int -do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) -{ - unsigned char *p, *plen; - int i, mac_size, clear = 0; - int prefix_len = 0; - int eivlen; - size_t align; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - SSL_SESSION *sess; - - if (wb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written - * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ - if (wb->left != 0) - return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); - - /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { - i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - if (i <= 0) - return (i); - /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ - /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */ - if (wb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return -1; - } - - if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) - return 0; - - wr = &(S3I(s)->wrec); - sess = s->session; - - if ((sess == NULL) || (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash) == NULL)) { - clear = s->internal->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ - mac_size = 0; - } else { - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); - if (mac_size < 0) - goto err; - } - - /* - * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls - * itself. - */ - if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done) { - /* - * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites - * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) - */ - if (S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments && - type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { - /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; - * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment - * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later - * together with the actual payload) */ - prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); - if (prefix_len <= 0) - goto err; - - if (prefix_len > - (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { - /* insufficient space */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - S3I(s)->empty_fragment_done = 1; - } - - if (create_empty_fragment) { - /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, - * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so - * if we want to align the real payload, then we can - * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ - align = (size_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); - - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } else if (prefix_len) { - p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; - } else { - align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); - - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } - - /* write the header */ - - *(p++) = type&0xff; - wr->type = type; - - *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); - /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 - * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 - */ - if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->internal->renegotiate && - TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) - *(p++) = 0x1; - else - *(p++) = s->version&0xff; - - /* field where we are to write out packet length */ - plen = p; - p += 2; - - /* Explicit IV length. */ - if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { - int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); - if (eivlen <= 1) - eivlen = 0; - } - /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - else - eivlen = 0; - } else if (s->internal->aead_write_ctx != NULL && - s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) { - eivlen = s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len; - } else - eivlen = 0; - - /* lets setup the record stuff. */ - wr->data = p + eivlen; - wr->length = (int)len; - wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; - - /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ - - memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); - wr->input = wr->data; - - /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input - * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. - * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ - - if (mac_size != 0) { - if (s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->mac(s, - &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) - goto err; - wr->length += mac_size; - } - - wr->input = p; - wr->data = p; - - if (eivlen) { - /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) - goto err; - */ - wr->length += eivlen; - } - - /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ - s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); - - /* record length after mac and block padding */ - s2n(wr->length, plen); - - /* we should now have - * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is - * wr->length long */ - wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ - wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - - if (create_empty_fragment) { - /* we are in a recursive call; - * just return the length, don't write out anything here - */ - return wr->length; - } - - /* now let's set up wb */ - wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; - - /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect - * bad write retries later */ - S3I(s)->wpend_tot = len; - S3I(s)->wpend_buf = buf; - S3I(s)->wpend_type = type; - S3I(s)->wpend_ret = len; - - /* we now just need to write the buffer */ - return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); -err: - return -1; -} - -/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ -int -ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) -{ - int i; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - - /* XXXX */ - if ((S3I(s)->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((S3I(s)->wpend_buf != buf) && - !(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || - (S3I(s)->wpend_type != type)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); - return (-1); - } - - for (;;) { - errno = 0; - if (s->wbio != NULL) { - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - i = BIO_write(s->wbio, - (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), - (unsigned int)wb->left); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); - i = -1; - } - if (i == wb->left) { - wb->left = 0; - wb->offset += i; - if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (S3I(s)->wpend_ret); - } else if (i <= 0) { - /* - * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the - * whole point in using a datagram service. - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - wb->left = 0; - return (i); - } - wb->offset += i; - wb->left -= i; - } -} - -/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. - * 'type' is one of the following: - * - * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) - * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) - * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) - * - * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first - * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). - * - * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as - * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really - * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. - * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store - * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol - * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): - * Change cipher spec protocol - * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored - * Alert protocol - * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) - * Handshake protocol - * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have - * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages - * here, anything else is handled by higher layers - * Application data protocol - * none of our business - */ -int -ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) -{ - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; - int al, i, j, ret, rrcount = 0; - unsigned int n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - BIO *bio; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return (-1); - - if (len < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) || - (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { - /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ - unsigned char *src = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; - unsigned char *dst = buf; - unsigned int k; - - /* peek == 0 */ - n = 0; - while ((len > 0) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { - *dst++ = *src++; - len--; - S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len--; - n++; - } - /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ - for (k = 0; k < S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; k++) - S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; - return n; - } - - /* - * Now S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if - * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. - */ - if (!s->internal->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { - /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ - i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - } - -start: - /* - * Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the - * peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an - * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further - * processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and - * non-application data records per connection should probably also be - * limited... - */ - if (rrcount++ >= 3) { - if ((bio = SSL_get_rbio(s)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; - return -1; - } - - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - /* - * S3I(s)->rrec.type - is the type of record - * S3I(s)->rrec.data, - data - * S3I(s)->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * S3I(s)->rrec.length, - number of bytes. - */ - rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec); - - /* get new packet if necessary */ - if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { - ret = ssl3_get_record(s); - if (ret <= 0) - return (ret); - } - - /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ - - if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, - * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ - && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away - * (even in 'peek' mode) */ - if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { - rr->length = 0; - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (0); - } - - - /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ - if (type == rr->type) { - /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we - * are doing a handshake for the first time */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (len <= 0) - return (len); - - if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) - n = rr->length; - else - n = (unsigned int)len; - - memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); - if (!peek) { - memset(&(rr->data[rr->off]), 0, n); - rr->length -= n; - rr->off += n; - if (rr->length == 0) { - s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->off = 0; - if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - } - } - return (n); - } - - - /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake - * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ - - { - /* - * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' - * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data - * at a fixed place. - */ - unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; - unsigned char *dest = NULL; - unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; - dest = S3I(s)->handshake_fragment; - dest_len = &S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; - } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof S3I(s)->alert_fragment; - dest = S3I(s)->alert_fragment; - dest_len = &S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len; - } - if (dest_maxlen > 0) { - /* available space in 'dest' */ - n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; - if (rr->length < n) - n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ - - /* now move 'n' bytes: */ - while (n-- > 0) { - dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; - rr->length--; - } - - if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) - goto start; /* fragment was too small */ - } - } - - /* S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ - - /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ - if ((!s->server) && (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { - S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - - if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->internal->msg_callback) - s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - S3I(s)->handshake_fragment, 4, s, - s->internal->msg_callback_arg); - - if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && - !S3I(s)->renegotiate) { - ssl3_renegotiate(s); - if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { - i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { - /* no read-ahead left? */ - /* In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - } - } - /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, - * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ - goto start; - } - /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't - * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. - * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) - */ - if (s->server && - SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding && - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { - /*S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ - rr->length = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto start; - } - if (S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { - int alert_level = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[0]; - int alert_descr = S3I(s)->alert_fragment[1]; - - S3I(s)->alert_fragment_len = 0; - - if (s->internal->msg_callback) - s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, - S3I(s)->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->internal->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; - cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); - } - - if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { - S3I(s)->warn_alert = alert_descr; - if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { - s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return (0); - } - /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested - * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with - * a fatal alert because if application tried to - * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and - * expects it to succeed. - * - * In future we might have a renegotiation where we - * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. - */ - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto f_err; - } - } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - S3I(s)->fatal_alert = alert_descr; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); - ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d", - alert_descr); - s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); - return (0); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - goto start; - } - - if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { - /* but we have not received a shutdown */ - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - rr->length = 0; - return (0); - } - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know - * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ - if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || - (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ - if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - rr->length = 0; - - if (s->internal->msg_callback) { - s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, - SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, - s->internal->msg_callback_arg); - } - - S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 1; - if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) - goto err; - else - goto start; - } - - /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ - if ((S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->internal->in_handshake) { - if (((s->internal->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { - s->internal->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; - s->internal->renegotiate = 1; - s->internal->new_session = 1; - } - i = s->internal->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ - BIO *bio; - /* In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - goto start; - } - - switch (rr->type) { - default: - /* - * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: - * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. - */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && - s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - case SSL3_RT_ALERT: - case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: - /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception - * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->internal->in_handshake is set, but that - * should not happen when type != rr->type */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: - /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, - * but have application data. If the library was - * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data - * is set) and it makes sense to read application data - * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), - * we will indulge it. - */ - if (S3I(s)->in_read_app_data && - (S3I(s)->total_renegotiations != 0) && - (((s->internal->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && - (s->internal->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && - (s->internal->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || - ((s->internal->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && - (s->internal->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && - (s->internal->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) { - S3I(s)->in_read_app_data = 2; - return (-1); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - } - } - /* not reached */ - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) -{ - int i; - const char *sender; - int slen; - - if (s->internal->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; - else - i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; - - if (S3I(s)->tmp.key_block == NULL) { - if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { - /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - return (0); - } - - s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) - return (0); - } - - if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) - return (0); - - /* we have to record the message digest at - * this point so we can get it before we read - * the finished message */ - if (s->internal->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { - sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } else { - sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } - - i = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, - S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; - - return (1); -} - -int -ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) -{ - /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ - desc = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); - if (desc < 0) - return -1; - /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ - if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); - - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; - s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; - s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; - if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ - return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - - /* else data is still being written out, we will get written - * some time in the future */ - return -1; -} - -int -ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) -{ - int i, j; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; - i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); - if (i <= 0) { - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; - } else { - /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. - * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, - * we will not worry too much. */ - if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) - (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); - - if (s->internal->msg_callback) - s->internal->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, - s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->internal->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; - cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); - } - } - return (i); -} -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb