From de48c77a08514ed654e05e710444452ffab6d0aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: deraadt <>
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2014 22:23:12 +0000
Subject: 
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162ec30718b5e7480add42598158
 Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random perfectly, so
 do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and replaced with "only do it
 badly if a flag is set".  New flags (SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and
 SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old
 scheme of "use time_t for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".

Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]

Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them.  The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned.  No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen
---
 src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h')

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
index 4aa2911da7..a96402ec5c 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -621,7 +621,6 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
 void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
 
 const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
 int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb