From e2496982472bdf233be95c5ea72d1c4dc6c91db3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cvs2svn Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2023 13:43:47 +0000 Subject: This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20230422'. --- src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c | 2625 --------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 2625 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c') diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 556107f5a1..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2625 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.153 2022/12/26 07:31:44 jmc Exp $ */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST -#include -#endif - -#include "bytestring.h" -#include "dtls_local.h" -#include "ssl_local.h" -#include "ssl_sigalgs.h" -#include "ssl_tlsext.h" - -static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_dtls_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_client_finished(SSL *s); - -int -ssl3_accept(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long alg_k; - int new_state, state, skip = 0; - int listen = 0; - int ret = -1; - - ERR_clear_error(); - errno = 0; - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - listen = s->d1->listen; - - /* init things to blank */ - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) - SSL_clear(s); - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - s->d1->listen = listen; - - for (;;) { - state = s->s3->hs.state; - - switch (s->s3->hs.state) { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate = 1; - /* s->s3->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ - - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - s->server = 1; - - ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); - - if (!ssl_legacy_stack_version(s, s->version)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl_supported_tls_version_range(s, - &s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version, - &s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl_security_version(s, - s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - s->init_num = 0; - - if (s->s3->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { - /* - * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO - * so that the output is sent in a way that - * TCP likes :-) - */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if (!SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with - * client that doesn't support secure - * renegotiation. - */ - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } else { - /* - * s->s3->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, - * we will just send a HelloRequest. - */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: - s->shutdown = 0; - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); - dtls1_start_timer(s); - } - ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - else - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num = 0; - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: - s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - s->shutdown = 0; - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - dtls1_stop_timer(s); - - if (ret == 1 && - (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) - s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; - else - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - - s->init_num = 0; - - /* - * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain - * stateless while listening. - */ - if (listen) { - tls12_record_layer_reflect_seq_num( - s->rl); - } - - /* If we're just listening, stop here */ - if (listen && s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { - ret = 2; - s->d1->listen = 0; - /* - * Set expected sequence numbers to - * continue the handshake. - */ - s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; - goto end; - } - } else { - if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { - ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - } - - s->renegotiate = 2; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num = 0; - } - break; - - case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: - case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: - ret = ssl3_send_dtls_hello_verify_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - - /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */ - tls1_transcript_reset(s); - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - s->renegotiate = 2; - dtls1_start_timer(s); - } - ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } else { - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ - if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & - SSL_aNULL)) { - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - dtls1_start_timer(s); - ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } else { - skip = 1; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* - * Only send if using a DH key exchange. - * - * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange - * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other - * cases, the server certificate contains the server's - * public key for key exchange. - */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - dtls1_start_timer(s); - ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - } else - skip = 1; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: - /* - * Determine whether or not we need to request a - * certificate. - * - * Do not request a certificate if: - * - * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). - * - * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are - * renegotiating. - * - * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites - * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts - * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application - * insists on verification (against the specs, but - * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). - */ - if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || - ((s->session->peer_cert != NULL) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || - ((s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & - SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & - SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { - /* No cert request. */ - skip = 1; - s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 0; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - - if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) - tls1_transcript_free(s); - } else { - s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 1; - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - dtls1_start_timer(s); - ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - dtls1_start_timer(s); - ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - /* - * This code originally checked to see if - * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO - * and then flushed. This caused problems - * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed - * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue - * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING - * still exist. So instead we just flush - * unconditionally. - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */ - if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state; - } - } - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: - if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request != 0) { - ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - } - s->init_num = 0; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num = 0; - } - - alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - /* - * A GOST client may use the key from its - * certificate for key exchange, in which case - * the CertificateVerify message is not sent. - */ - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num = 0; - if (!s->session->peer_cert) - break; - /* - * Freeze the transcript for use during client - * certificate verification. - */ - tls1_transcript_freeze(s); - } else { - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - tls1_transcript_free(s); - - /* - * We need to get hashes here so if there is - * a client cert, it can be verified. - */ - if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, - s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify, - sizeof(s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify), - NULL)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; - else - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ - ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; - else - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret = ssl3_get_client_finished(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) - dtls1_stop_timer(s); - if (s->hit) - s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; - else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_change_cipher_spec(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - s->session->cipher = s->s3->hs.cipher; - - if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - if (!tls1_change_write_cipher_state(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_finished(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (s->hit) { - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - tls1_transcript_free(s); - } else - s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if (s->s3->handshake_transcript != NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) - ssl3_release_init_buffer(s); - - /* remove buffering on output */ - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - - s->init_num = 0; - - /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */ - if (s->renegotiate == 2) { - s->renegotiate = 0; - s->new_session = 0; - - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; - /* s->server=1; */ - s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; - - ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - } - - ret = 1; - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */ - s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; - /* Next message is server hello. */ - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; - } - goto end; - /* break; */ - - default: - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - if (!s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message && !skip) { - if (s->debug) { - if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - - if (s->s3->hs.state != state) { - new_state = s->s3->hs.state; - s->s3->hs.state = state; - ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); - s->s3->hs.state = new_state; - } - } - skip = 0; - } - end: - /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ - s->in_handshake--; - ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, hello; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello, - SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) -{ - CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; - CBS compression_methods; - uint16_t client_version; - uint8_t comp_method; - int comp_null; - int i, j, al, ret, cookie_valid = 0; - unsigned long id; - SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - unsigned long alg_k; - const SSL_METHOD *method; - uint16_t shared_version; - - /* - * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. - * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, - * This down switching should be handled by a different method. - * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with - * TLSv1. - */ - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; - - s->first_packet = 1; - if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, - SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) <= 0) - return ret; - s->first_packet = 0; - - ret = -1; - - if (s->init_num < 0) - goto err; - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); - - /* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */ - if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) - goto decode_err; - if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) - goto decode_err; - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) - goto decode_err; - if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto fatal_err; - } - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) - goto decode_err; - } - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) - goto decode_err; - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) - goto decode_err; - - /* - * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. - * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) - */ - if (!ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version)) { - if ((client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && - !tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->rl)) { - /* - * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote - * version number. - */ - s->version = client_version; - } - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version = client_version; - s->version = shared_version; - - s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version = ssl_tls_version(shared_version); - if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == 0) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((method = ssl_get_method(shared_version)) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s->method = method; - - /* - * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain - * one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. - * So check cookie length... - */ - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { - if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) - return (1); - } - } - - if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, - sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) - goto err; - - s->hit = 0; - - /* - * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in - * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally - * ignore resumption requests with flag - * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag - * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications - * relying on this for security won't even compile against older - * library versions). - * - * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() - * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session - * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the - * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be - * ignored. - */ - if ((s->new_session && (s->options & - SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) - goto err; - } else { - CBS ext_block; - - CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block); - - i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &session_id, &ext_block, &al); - if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ - s->hit = 1; - } else if (i == -1) - goto fatal_err; - else { - /* i == 0 */ - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) - goto err; - } - } - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - /* - * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify - * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause - * an overflow. - */ - if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto fatal_err; - } - - /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && - CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { - size_t cookie_len; - - /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ - if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, - sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) - goto err; - - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, - s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto fatal_err; - } - /* else cookie verification succeeded */ - /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ - } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, - s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { - /* default verification */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto fatal_err; - } - cookie_valid = 1; - } - } - - /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ - if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { - /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { - if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, - &cipher_suites)) == NULL) - goto err; - } - - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */ - if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { - j = 0; - id = s->session->cipher->id; - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); - if (c->id == id) { - j = 1; - break; - } - } - if (j == 0) { - /* - * We need to have the cipher in the cipher - * list if we are asked to reuse it - */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto fatal_err; - } - } - - comp_null = 0; - while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { - if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) - goto decode_err; - if (comp_method == 0) - comp_null = 1; - } - if (comp_null == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &cbs, &al)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) - goto decode_err; - - if (!s->s3->renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this - * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate - * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow - * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. - */ - arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - if (s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && - s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version) { - /* - * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. If we are downgrading from TLS 1.3 - * we must set the last 8 bytes of the server random to magical - * values to indicate we meant to downgrade. For TLS 1.2 it is - * recommended that we do the same. - */ - size_t index = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12); - uint8_t *magic = &s->s3->server_random[index]; - if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { - /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.2. */ - memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_12, - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12)); - } else { - /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.1 or lower */ - memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_11, - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11)); - } - } - - if (!s->hit && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - int master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - - if (!s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, - s->session->master_key, &master_key_length, ciphers, - &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (master_key_length <= 0) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; - - s->hit = 1; - s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - ciphers = NULL; - - /* Check if some cipher was preferred by the callback. */ - if (pref_cipher == NULL) - pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - if (pref_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto fatal_err; - } - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); - s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); - } - - /* - * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must - * pick a cipher - */ - - if (!s->hit) { - if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); - goto fatal_err; - } - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - ciphers = NULL; - - if ((c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers(s))) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->hs.cipher = c; - } else { - s->s3->hs.cipher = s->session->cipher; - } - - if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) - goto err; - - alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) - tls1_transcript_free(s); - - /* - * We now have the following setup. - * client_random - * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers - * compression - basically ignored right now - * ssl version is set - sslv3 - * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. - * s->hit - session reuse flag - * s->hs.cipher - the new cipher to use. - */ - - /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; - - if (0) { - decode_err: - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - err: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_dtls_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, verify, cookie; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) { - if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || - s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, - &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - /* - * Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should - * always contain DTLSv1.0 regardless of the version that is - * going to be negotiated. - */ - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &verify, - DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u16(&verify, DTLS1_VERSION)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&verify, &cookie)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B; - } - - /* s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id; - size_t sl; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello, - SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) - goto err; - - if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random, - sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) - goto err; - - /* - * There are several cases for the session ID to send - * back in the server hello: - * - * - For session reuse from the session cache, - * we send back the old session ID. - * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) - * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" - * (which doesn't actually identify the session). - * - If it is a new session, we send back the new - * session ID. - * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, - * we send back a 0-length session ID. - * - * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, - * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed - * to send back. - */ - if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) - && !s->hit) - s->session->session_id_length = 0; - - sl = s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) - goto err; - - /* Cipher suite. */ - if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, - ssl3_cipher_get_value(s->s3->hs.cipher))) - goto err; - - /* Compression method (null). */ - if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0)) - goto err; - - /* TLS extensions */ - if (!tlsext_server_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &server_hello)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, done; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done, - SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) -{ - int nid = NID_dhKeyAgreement; - - tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share); - if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (s->cert->dhe_params_auto != 0) { - size_t key_bits; - - if ((key_bits = ssl_dhe_params_auto_key_bits(s)) == 0) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - tls_key_share_set_key_bits(s->s3->hs.key_share, - key_bits); - } else { - DH *dh_params = s->cert->dhe_params; - - if (dh_params == NULL && s->cert->dhe_params_cb != NULL) - dh_params = s->cert->dhe_params_cb(s, 0, - SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->hs.cipher)); - - if (dh_params == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!tls_key_share_set_dh_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, dh_params)) - goto err; - } - - if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share)) - goto err; - - if (!tls_key_share_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb)) - goto err; - if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb)) - goto err; - - if (!tls_key_share_peer_security(s, s->s3->hs.key_share)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - - err: - return 0; -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) -{ - CBB public; - int nid; - - if (!tls1_get_supported_group(s, &nid)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share); - if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share)) - goto err; - - /* - * ECC key exchange - see RFC 8422, section 5.4. - */ - if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, tls_key_share_group(s->s3->hs.key_share))) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &public)) - goto err; - if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) - goto err; - - return 1; - - err: - return 0; -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex; - const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; - unsigned char *signature = NULL; - size_t signature_len = 0; - unsigned char *params = NULL; - size_t params_len; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - unsigned long type; - EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - int al; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params)); - - if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex, - SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) - goto err; - - if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0)) - goto err; - - type = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (type & SSL_kDHE) { - if (!ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params)) - goto err; - } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { - if (!ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params)) - goto err; - } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) - goto err; - - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len)) - goto err; - - /* Add signature unless anonymous. */ - if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { - if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->hs.cipher, - &md, &sigalg)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->hs.our_sigalg = sigalg; - - /* Send signature algorithm. */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto fatal_err; - } - } - - if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && - (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, - RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || - !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, params, params_len)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) || - !signature_len) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex, - &cbb_signature)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, - signature_len)) - goto err; - } - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; - } - - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - free(params); - free(signature); - - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params); - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - free(params); - free(signature); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - int i; - - /* - * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4. - */ - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) - goto err; - - if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types)) - goto err; - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, - &sigalgs)) - goto err; - if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version, - &sigalgs, SSL_get_security_level(s))) - goto err; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth)) - goto err; - - sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { - unsigned char *name_data; - size_t name_len; - - name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); - name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len)) - goto err; - if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len) - goto err; - } - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) -{ - unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char *pms = NULL; - unsigned char *p; - size_t pms_len = 0; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - RSA *rsa = NULL; - CBS enc_pms; - int decrypt_len; - int al = -1; - - arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); - - fakekey[0] = s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version >> 8; - fakekey[1] = s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version & 0xff; - - pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey; - if (pkey == NULL || (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto fatal_err; - } - - pms_len = RSA_size(rsa); - if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - goto err; - if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL) - goto err; - p = pms; - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms)) - goto decode_err; - if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto err; - } - - decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms), - pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - - ERR_clear_error(); - - if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ - } - - if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version >> 8)) && - (pms[1] == (s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version & 0xff)))) { - /* - * The premaster secret must contain the same version number - * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks - * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for - * DH ciphersuites). - * - * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack - * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version - * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would - * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext - * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that - * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should - * treat this just like any other decryption error. - */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ - } - - if (al != -1) { - /* - * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead - * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack - * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, - * section 7.4.7.1). - */ - p = fakekey; - } - - if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) - goto err; - - freezero(pms, pms_len); - - return 1; - - decode_err: - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - freezero(pms, pms_len); - - return 0; -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) -{ - uint8_t *key = NULL; - size_t key_len = 0; - int decode_error, invalid_key; - int ret = 0; - - if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs, - &decode_error, &invalid_key)) { - if (decode_error) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - } - goto err; - } - if (invalid_key) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - goto err; - } - - if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len)) - goto err; - - if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len)) - goto err; - - ret = 1; - - err: - freezero(key, key_len); - - return ret; -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) -{ - uint8_t *key = NULL; - size_t key_len = 0; - int decode_error; - CBS public; - int ret = 0; - - if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public, - &decode_error, NULL)) { - if (decode_error) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - } - goto err; - } - - if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len)) - goto err; - - if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len)) - goto err; - - ret = 1; - - err: - freezero(key, key_len); - - return ret; -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) -{ - unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *client_pubkey; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - size_t outlen; - CBS gostblob; - - /* Get our certificate private key*/ - if ((s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST01) != 0) - pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; - - if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) - goto err; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* - * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, - * maybe use it for key exchange. - * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because - * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for - * authorization only. - */ - if ((client_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert)) != NULL) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pubkey) <= 0) - ERR_clear_error(); - } - - /* Decrypt session key */ - if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) - goto decode_err; - if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) - goto decode_err; - outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret); - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, - CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - - if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, - sizeof(premaster_secret))) - goto err; - - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, - 2, NULL) > 0) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - - explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - - return 1; - - decode_err: - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - err: - explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - - return 0; -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long alg_k; - int al, ret; - CBS cbs; - - /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ - if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048)) <= 0) - return ret; - - if (s->init_num < 0) - goto err; - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); - - alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs)) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs)) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs)) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs)) - goto err; - } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto fatal_err; - } - - return (1); - - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) -{ - CBS cbs, signature; - const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL; - uint16_t sigalg_value = SIGALG_NONE; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - X509 *peer_cert = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; - int al, verify; - const unsigned char *hdata; - size_t hdatalen; - int type = 0; - int ret; - - if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) <= 0) - return ret; - - ret = 0; - - if (s->init_num < 0) - goto err; - - if ((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); - - peer_cert = s->session->peer_cert; - pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert); - type = X509_certificate_type(peer_cert, pkey); - - if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { - s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; - if (peer_cert != NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); - goto fatal_err; - } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } - - if (peer_cert == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) - goto decode_err; - } - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) - goto err; - if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - - if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_for_peer(s, pkey, - sigalg_value)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->hs.peer_sigalg = sigalg; - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; - - if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(), - NULL, pkey)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && - (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, - RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || - !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 && - EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, - NULL) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, CBS_data(&signature), - CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto fatal_err; - } - } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - RSA *rsa; - - if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto fatal_err; - } - verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), - CBS_len(&signature), rsa); - if (verify < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto fatal_err; - } - if (verify == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); - goto fatal_err; - } - } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - EC_KEY *eckey; - - if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto fatal_err; - } - verify = ECDSA_verify(0, - &(s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature), - CBS_len(&signature), eckey); - if (verify <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); - goto fatal_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || - EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { - unsigned char sigbuf[128]; - unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf); - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; - const EVP_MD *md; - int nid; - - if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || - !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto fatal_err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || - !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || - !EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) || - (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || - (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || - (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, - GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - goto fatal_err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), - CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - goto fatal_err; - } - - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); -#endif - } else { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - goto fatal_err; - } - - ret = 1; - if (0) { - decode_err: - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - end: - tls1_transcript_free(s); - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - CBS cbs, cert_list, cert_data; - STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; - X509 *cert = NULL; - const uint8_t *p; - int al, ret; - - if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, - -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) - return ret; - - ret = -1; - - if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto fatal_err; - } - - /* - * If we asked for a client certificate and the client has none, - * it must respond with a certificate list of length zero. - */ - if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request != 0) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; - return (1); - } - - if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (s->init_num < 0) - goto decode_err; - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list)) - goto decode_err; - if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) - goto decode_err; - - /* - * A TLS client must send an empty certificate list, if no suitable - * certificate is available (rather than omitting the Certificate - * handshake message) - see RFC 5246 section 7.4.6. - */ - if (CBS_len(&cert_list) == 0) { - if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto fatal_err; - } - /* No client certificate so free transcript. */ - tls1_transcript_free(s); - goto done; - } - - if ((certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) { - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert_data)) - goto decode_err; - p = CBS_data(&cert_data); - if ((cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, CBS_len(&cert_data))) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (p != CBS_data(&cert_data) + CBS_len(&cert_data)) - goto decode_err; - if (!sk_X509_push(certs, cert)) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - cert = NULL; - } - - if (ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, certs) <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); - goto fatal_err; - } - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - ERR_clear_error(); - - if (!tls_process_peer_certs(s, certs)) - goto err; - - done: - ret = 1; - if (0) { - decode_err: - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - err: - sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); - X509_free(cert); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, server_cert; - SSL_CERT_PKEY *cpk; - - /* - * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. - */ - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { - if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) { - SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return (0); - } - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (0); -} - -/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ -static int -ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len; - size_t session_len = 0; - unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char key_name[16]; - unsigned char *hmac; - unsigned int hlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; - HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; - int len; - - /* - * New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3. - */ - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((hctx = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket, - SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) - goto err; - - if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) - goto err; - if (session_len > 0xffff) - goto err; - - /* - * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present - * it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from - * parent context. - */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) { - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, - key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0) - goto err; - } else { - arc4random_buf(iv, 16); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); - HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, - 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); - } - - /* Encrypt the session state. */ - enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; - if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL) - goto err; - enc_session_len = 0; - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, enc_session, &len, session, - session_len)) - goto err; - enc_session_len += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len, - &len)) - goto err; - enc_session_len += len; - - if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len) - goto err; - - /* Generate the HMAC. */ - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len)) - goto err; - - if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(hctx)) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* - * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): - * We leave this unspecified for resumed session - * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new - * sessions will live as long as their sessions. - */ - if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket, - s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) - goto err; - - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name))) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len)) - goto err; - - if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac, &hlen)) - goto err; - if (hlen != hmac_len) - goto err; - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - freezero(session, session_len); - free(enc_session); - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - freezero(session, session_len); - free(enc_session); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) -{ - size_t outlen; - CBB cbb; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A) { - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, s->init_buf->data, - s->init_buf->length)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, SSL3_MT_CCS)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen)) - goto err; - - if (outlen > INT_MAX) - goto err; - - s->init_num = (int)outlen; - s->init_off = 0; - - if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = - s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, - s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); - dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); - } - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B */ - return ssl3_record_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return -1; -} - -static int -ssl3_get_client_finished(SSL *s) -{ - int al, md_len, ret; - CBS cbs; - - /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ - if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64)) <= 0) - return ret; - - /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto fatal_err; - } - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - - md_len = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; - - if (s->init_num < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto fatal_err; - } - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); - - if (s->s3->hs.peer_finished_len != md_len || - CBS_len(&cbs) != md_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto fatal_err; - } - - if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cbs, s->s3->hs.peer_finished, CBS_len(&cbs))) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto fatal_err; - } - - /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ - OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->hs.peer_finished, md_len); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; - - return (1); - fatal_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return (0); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL *s) -{ - CBB cbb, finished; - - memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); - - if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A) { - if (!tls12_derive_finished(s)) - goto err; - - /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, - s->s3->hs.finished, s->s3->hs.finished_len); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = s->s3->hs.finished_len; - - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &finished, - SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) - goto err; - if (!CBB_add_bytes(&finished, s->s3->hs.finished, - s->s3->hs.finished_len)) - goto err; - if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) - goto err; - - s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B; - } - - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - - err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - - return (-1); -} -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb