From 0e63a127c5e6f5d7db30ee252127966473dd8a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: itojun <> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2003 09:47:47 +0000 Subject: better formatting. from wiz@netbsd --- src/lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3 | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/lib') diff --git a/src/lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3 b/src/lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3 index 2416a8bf82..d99d98f50d 100644 --- a/src/lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3 +++ b/src/lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.25 2003/08/28 01:50:37 itojun Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.26 2003/08/28 09:47:47 itojun Exp $ .\" $KAME: getnameinfo.3,v 1.20 2001/01/05 13:37:37 itojun Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993 @@ -289,8 +289,8 @@ returns both numeric and FQDN notation of the address specified in There is no return value that indicates if the string returned in .Fa host is a result of binary to numeric-text translation (like -.Xr inet_ntop 3 -), or the result of DNS reverse lookup. +.Xr inet_ntop 3) , +or the result of DNS reverse lookup. Therefore, malicious parties could set up PTR record like below: .Bd -literal -offset indent 1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 10.1.1.1 @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ is when it actually is .Li 127.0.0.1 . .Pp -To prevent such attacks, the use of +To prevent such attacks, the use of .Li NI_NAMEREQD like below is recommended when you use the result of .Nm -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb