From cdb6bcf3476378691e071d8d8f473d8b01283221 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: jsing <>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 22:24:25 +0000
Subject: Pull out the code that identifies if we have an ECC cipher in the
cipher list or if we are negotiating an ECC cipher in the handshake. This
dedups some of the existing code and will make the EC extension rewrites
easier.
ok doug@
---
src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h | 4 +++-
src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c | 39 +++++++--------------------------------
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
(limited to 'src/lib')
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
index c593e7b42b..d933acb32d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_lib.c,v 1.161 2017/05/07 04:22:24 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_lib.c,v 1.162 2017/08/09 22:24:25 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -1259,6 +1259,33 @@ ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
return (NULL);
}
+/* See if we have any ECC cipher suites. */
+int
+ssl_has_ecc_ciphers(SSL *s)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return 0;
+ if ((ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+
+ alg_k = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers(). */
const char *
SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
@@ -2085,6 +2112,20 @@ ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
c->valid = 1;
}
+/* See if this handshake is using an ECC cipher suite. */
+int
+ssl_using_ecc_cipher(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_a, alg_k;
+
+ alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ return SSI(s)->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ SSI(s)->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0 &&
+ ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA));
+}
+
int
ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
{
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
index 0d48920471..f98ce681a2 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.182 2017/07/24 17:10:31 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.183 2017/08/09 22:24:25 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -1127,6 +1127,7 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s);
int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
+int ssl_has_ecc_ciphers(SSL *s);
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
@@ -1312,6 +1313,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
int tls1_alert_code(int code);
int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
+int ssl_using_ecc_cipher(SSL *s);
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **out_group_ids, size_t *out_group_ids_len,
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
index b061bd1100..ea44e7579a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.122 2017/07/24 17:39:43 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.123 2017/08/09 22:24:25 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -679,28 +679,11 @@ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen = 0;
unsigned char *ret = p;
- int using_ecc = 0;
+ int using_ecc;
size_t len;
CBB cbb;
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites. */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
+ using_ecc = ssl_has_ecc_ciphers(s);
ret += 2;
if (ret >= limit)
@@ -954,16 +937,12 @@ unsigned char *
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
{
int using_ecc, extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned long alg_a, alg_k;
unsigned char *ret = p;
int next_proto_neg_seen;
size_t len;
CBB cbb;
- alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
- SSI(s)->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL;
+ using_ecc = ssl_using_ecc_cipher(s);
ret += 2;
if (ret >= limit)
@@ -1809,13 +1788,9 @@ ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
* it must contain uncompressed.
*/
- unsigned long alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->internal->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) &&
- (s->internal->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
- (SSI(s)->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) &&
- (SSI(s)->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
- ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ if (ssl_using_ecc_cipher(s) &&
+ s->internal->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->internal->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list;
--
cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb