From 1a5bd4cb78097710de5283a737286c1b65609dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tb <>
Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2023 15:27:13 +0000
Subject: Drop policy printing from openssl

Nothing really uses the policy tree. It's desgined with built-in DoS
capabilities directly from the RFC. It will be removed from the attack
surface and replaced with something equivalent that doesn't grow
exponentially with the depth.

This removes the only reason the policy tree itself ever leaked out of
the library.

ok jsing
---
 src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c | 21 +--------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c')

diff --git a/src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c b/src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c
index e54c8d0b84..46bfa08679 100644
--- a/src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c
+++ b/src/usr.bin/openssl/smime.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: smime.c,v 1.19 2023/03/06 14:32:06 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: smime.c,v 1.20 2023/04/14 15:27:13 tb Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project.
  */
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
 static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
-static int smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 
 #define SMIME_OP	0x10
 #define SMIME_IP	0x20
@@ -933,7 +932,6 @@ smime_main(int argc, char **argv)
 		if ((store = setup_verify(bio_err, cfg.CAfile,
 		    cfg.CApath)) == NULL)
 			goto end;
-		X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, smime_cb);
 		if (cfg.vpm != NULL) {
 			if (!X509_STORE_set1_param(store, cfg.vpm))
 				goto end;
@@ -1103,20 +1101,3 @@ save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers)
 
 	return 1;
 }
-
-/* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */
-static int
-smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
-
-	if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) &&
-	    ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2)))
-		return ok;
-
-	policies_print(NULL, ctx);
-
-	return ok;
-}
-- 
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