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* Update initial changelog for 2.1.4Brent Cook2015-02-221-0/+39
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* enable Windows NX / ALSR / stack protectorBrent Cook2015-02-191-1/+5
| | | | | | I will update my toolchain and try --high-entropy-va and stack-protector-strong later. We will probably need to ship libssp-0.dll as well. Thanks to jsg for hints.
* add script for building windows binary distribution packagesBrent Cook2015-02-191-0/+52
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* add missing line continuationBrent Cook2015-02-191-1/+1
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* disable system issetugid on OS X since it is not fork-safeBrent Cook2015-02-173-0/+24
| | | | | Noticed while testing similar code for AIX. ok beck@
* remove getuid/getgid fallbacks from hp-ux issetugid emulationBrent Cook2015-02-161-15/+6
| | | | | Fail closed if we cannot obtain the process flags. Noticed while looking at a similar function for AIX.
* add strsep fallback for libtlsBrent Cook2015-02-144-2/+16
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* conditionally build certhash into openssl(1)Brent Cook2015-02-144-1/+22
| | | | | For now, look for openat and symlink. We may switch to just needing symlink later.
* update for new manpage conversions, add linksBrent Cook2015-02-142-0/+6
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* add the new openssl(1) certhash commandBrent Cook2015-02-111-0/+1
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* rc5 is removedBrent Cook2015-02-101-1/+1
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* c_all* have merged into c_all.cBrent Cook2015-02-081-2/+0
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* disable biotestBrent Cook2015-02-061-0/+3
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* update with latest, add more testsBrent Cook2015-02-064-15/+11
| | | | this adds the new bytestring apis and new regression tests
* be even nicer to OS X's forkBrent Cook2015-01-311-1/+0
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* be nicer to travis OS X machines, remove unneeded 'make clean'Brent Cook2015-01-311-11/+15
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* only use the specific build matrixBrent Cook2015-01-312-13/+5
| | | | use sudo to install mingw toolchains
* fix whitespace in ymlBrent Cook2015-01-311-12/+12
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* update travis-ci build to check mingw32/64 targetsBrent Cook2015-01-312-1/+55
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* include 'struct iovec' for WindowsBrent Cook2015-01-312-0/+18
| | | | this is used for in-memory cert loading
* bump versionBrent Cook2015-01-261-1/+1
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* add by_mem.c for X509_STORE_load_memBrent Cook2015-01-261-0/+1
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* add 2.1.3 notesv2.1.3Brent Cook2015-01-211-0/+42
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* add NetBSD shims for arc4randomBrent Cook2015-01-213-8/+22
| | | | | | The current NetBSD release, 6.1.5, fails to reseed arc4random fork. Work around it by providing arc4random/getentropy shims. Revisit when NetBSD 7 is available.
* catch GCC versions that only warn on unused flagsBrent Cook2015-01-061-3/+3
| | | | | Noticed while building with GCC 4.2 with HP-UX. Switching the ERROR to a WARN for a first release while we continue to survey the field.
* remove bash-style comparisons from testsBrent Cook2015-01-061-3/+3
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* Add support for HP-UXkinichiro2015-01-064-0/+42
| | | | | | | | | | tested on: HP-UX 11.31 ia64, gcc 4.7.1(HP AllianceOne version) gcc 4.2.3(http://hpux.connect.org.uk) HP C/aC++ HP-UX defaults to use LP32 and it treats long as 32 bit (= 4 bytes). This build forces LP64 for treating long as 64 bit.
* quoting and ensure old_*flags are restored before the 'else'Brent Cook2015-01-051-8/+10
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* preserve CFLAGS between hardening checks, enable mingwBrent Cook2015-01-051-26/+46
| | | | | | Allow hardening CFLAGS for mingw that do not cause link-time failures. Add proper quoting on flags for commas Check LDFLAGS for linker-only flags.
* simplify hardening check logic, disable for mingwBrent Cook2015-01-053-185/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | Rather than doing separate linker/compiler checks, just build a non-empty program with each so that the compiler will actually try to use the hardening features. Reduce redundancy in the macro calls by just setting the flag that was just tested. Also, disable hardening for mingw, since its trying to use a libssp-0.dll file that I can't find right now. The detected hardening flags break mingw builds currently.
* move public domain to top, help automatic toolsBrent Cook2015-01-021-1/+3
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* Change comments to remark on script not being needed for clang >= 5.1Jim Barlow2015-01-012-4/+8
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* Fix build failure of "make distcheck" (new scripts/ folder missing)Jim Barlow2014-12-311-1/+1
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* Fix typo causing output of clang test to read "CLANG" instead of yes/noJim Barlow2014-12-311-1/+1
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* Merge recent upstream changes with compiler hardeningJim Barlow2014-12-302-4/+29
|\ | | | | | | | | Conflicts: configure.ac
| * Revert "do not double-link libcrypto"Brent Cook2014-12-272-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit c83d468cfd5d3ca60a499b69c0b7c9d0b159d405. It wasn't as superfluous as I thought on all platforms.
| * do not double-link libcryptoBrent Cook2014-12-272-2/+0
| | | | | | | | libssl already has LIBFLAGS for libcrypto, so adding -lcrypto is superfluous.
| * enable __STRICT_ALIGNMENT on sparcBrent Cook2014-12-271-0/+6
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| * do not mark GNU_STACK WX in ELFs generated from assemblyBrent Cook2014-12-222-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When generating ELF objects from assembly, gcc and clang mark the GNU_STACK program headers as RWX by default. This is a security issue, so we make sure it is marked only RW. This modifies Anthony G. Basile's original patch for Linux to set .note.GNU-stack whenever the assembler supports it. It is surprising that any modern toolchain would enable an executable stack without an explicit request. The number of programs that need an executable stack is surely much smaller than the number of programs that include assembly.
* | configure.ac: use executable hardening where availableJim Barlow2014-12-231-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". The code added to m4/ is GPLv3 but con Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
* | configure.ac: use executable hardening where availableJim Barlow2014-12-233-0/+209
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
* | configure.ac: Modify clang check to save result to a variableJim Barlow2014-12-231-10/+14
|/ | | | | ...and leave a note that -Qunused-arguments is being applied to CFLAGS not LDFLAGS, probably in error.
* Add wrapper file "config" to distribution.Technion2014-12-151-1/+1
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* enable OS X and Linux CI buildsBrent Cook2014-12-141-0/+3
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* add Travis CI configurationBrent Cook2014-12-141-0/+5
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* add all LIBADD dependencies for tlsBrent Cook2014-12-141-1/+1
| | | | | The libtool transitive dependency magic does not seem to work for cross-compilation, so explicitly specify them here.
* bump versionBrent Cook2014-12-142-2/+6
| | | | append portable version number to the version string
* allow Windows DLLs to be builtBrent Cook2014-12-144-4/+4
| | | | based on a patch from Jan Engelhardt
* add LIBADD library dependencies to libssl/libtlsBrent Cook2014-12-142-0/+2
| | | | From Jan Engelhardt
* Use the individual library versions in LibreSSL pc filesBrent Cook2014-12-143-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously, they were all using the portable package version, rather than the individual library versions. openssl(1)'s pc file represents the LibreSSL-portable release however. $ pkg-config --modversion libtls 1:0:0 $ pkg-config --modversion openssl 2.1.2 $ pkg-config --modversion libssl 30:0:0 $ pkg-config --modversion libcrypto 30:3:0 ok beck@ deraadt@