wix/src/burn, branch bob/MSTestTraversal A mirror of https://github.com/wixtoolset/wix.git https://git.lua4.win/wix/atom?h=bob%2FMSTestTraversal 2025-02-11T23:49:33+00:00 Try setting DOTNET_DISABLE_GUI_ERRORS to prevent .NET install prompts for BAs 2025-02-11T23:49:33+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2025-02-11T14:14:06+00:00 urn:sha1:ccfed95b510f7cd1b205379d0cec50de69c2d850 Harden Burn's BootstrapperApplication and elevated engine extraction 2025-02-11T23:49:33+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2025-02-11T13:21:34+00:00 urn:sha1:f2e9af96142439ebfdbc1e884335bb8874f8a427 Fixes 8914 Remove the working folder as late as possible 2025-02-11T23:49:33+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2025-02-11T13:03:30+00:00 urn:sha1:81fb512834c65b0a8f99c3a266879c476e382875 Clean up the base working folder *after* the elevated engine is shutdown to prevent the scheduling of PendingFileRenameOptions during clean up. Fixes 8053 Support extracting cabbed file straight to file handle 2025-02-11T23:49:33+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2024-12-28T20:04:00+00:00 urn:sha1:a797638d231b568b3e53bb2f478c28b6c0d5a1dc Rename "bundle id" concept to "bundle code" 2024-12-30T14:45:49+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2024-12-30T02:01:20+00:00 urn:sha1:523c66a62a619e6aa9f30070173ea33edfb5e328 The "bundle id" always had more in common with the PackageCode from the Windows Installer. With the introduction of an actual Id attribute on the Bundle element, there is potential for confusion, so there is finally real motivation to rename "bundle id" to "bundle code". Remove unused const. 2024-12-27T01:11:13+00:00 Bob Arnson bob@firegiant.com 2024-06-30T00:27:54+00:00 urn:sha1:d6f784beffca852bd89c7b1a734158b24dd45989 Typos are bad; visible typos are an abomination. 2024-11-11T01:14:39+00:00 Bob Arnson bob@firegiant.com 2024-11-10T19:11:16+00:00 urn:sha1:f440fb317c630e7bc6d4ee4d657a200654e2f876 At least one person makes the same typo almost-but-not-quite everywhere. Log bundle registration scope. 2024-11-11T01:14:39+00:00 Bob Arnson bob@firegiant.com 2024-11-10T04:54:49+00:00 urn:sha1:53d84c9b96b027df505ab99f3db0719a82108b2b Move to ReleaseFlow and SomeVer 2024-04-25T20:31:39+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2024-04-07T10:26:12+00:00 urn:sha1:4983aeeb2da6e96bc8aad698752b3b962f58e585 Protect elevated working folder from malicious data 2024-03-22T18:57:27+00:00 Rob Mensching rob@firegiant.com 2024-03-21T06:51:53+00:00 urn:sha1:fed3d69eb4da7fa2bafdd8f555ce5869c36925f7 When running elevated, Burn uses the Windows Temp folder as its working folder to prevent normal processes from tampering with the files. Windows Temp does allow non-elevated processes to write to the folder but they cannot see the files there. Unfortunately, contrary to our belief, non-elevated processes can read the files in Windows Temp by watching for directory changes. This allows a malicious process to lie in wait, watching the Windows Temp folder until a Burn process is launched elevated, then attack the working folder. Mitigate that attack by protecting the working folder to only elevated users. Managed custom actions also fall back to using the Windows Temp folder in some cases and thus can be exposed in a similar fashion as an elevated Burn process. Remove that possibility.