ash: do not use "safe applets" in non-standalone shell

1 files changed, 26 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/shell/ash.c b/shell/ash.c
index 371b5d9c3..335dcbab1 100644
--- a/shell/ash.c
+++ b/shell/ash.c
@@ -6455,7 +6455,9 @@ casematch(union node *pattern, char *val)
 
 /* ============ find_command */
 
-static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
+static int
+is_safe_applet(char *name)
 {
         /* It isn't a bug to have non-existent applet here... */
         /* ...just a waste of space... */
@@ -6488,6 +6490,7 @@ static int is_safe_applet(char *name)
 
         return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 struct builtincmd {
         const char *name;
@@ -6551,27 +6554,26 @@ static void
 tryexec(char *cmd, char **argv, char **envp)
 {
         int repeated = 0;
-        struct BB_applet *a;
-        int argc = 0;
-        char **c;
 
-        if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL
-         && (a = find_applet_by_name(cmd)) != NULL
-         && is_safe_applet(cmd)
-        ) {
-                c = argv;
-                while (*c != NULL) {
-                        c++; argc++;
-                }
-                applet_name = cmd;
-                exit(a->main(argc, argv));
-        }
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
-        if (find_applet_by_name(cmd) != NULL) {
-                /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
-                execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
-                /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
-                 * executable, fall through */
+        if (strchr(cmd, '/') == NULL) {
+                struct BB_applet *a;
+                char **c;
+
+                a = find_applet_by_name(cmd);
+                if (a) {
+                        if (is_safe_applet(cmd)) {
+                                c = argv;
+                                while (*c)
+                                        c++;
+                                applet_name = cmd;
+                                exit(a->main(c - argv, argv));
+                        }
+                        /* re-exec ourselves with the new arguments */
+                        execve(CONFIG_BUSYBOX_EXEC_PATH, argv, envp);
+                        /* If they called chroot or otherwise made the binary no longer
+                         * executable, fall through */
+                }
         }
 #endif
 
@@ -6619,7 +6621,7 @@ shellexec(char **argv, const char *path, int idx)
 
         clearredir(1);
         envp = environment();
-        if (strchr(argv[0], '/') || is_safe_applet(argv[0])
+        if (strchr(argv[0], '/')
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE_SHELL
          || find_applet_by_name(argv[0])
 #endif
@@ -11141,13 +11143,13 @@ find_command(char *name, struct cmdentry *entry, int act, const char *path)
                 entry->u.index = -1;
                 return;
         }
-#endif
-
+        /* Already caught above
         if (is_safe_applet(name)) {
                 entry->cmdtype = CMDNORMAL;
                 entry->u.index = -1;
                 return;
-        }
+        }*/
+#endif
 
         updatetbl = (path == pathval());
         if (!updatetbl) {