refactor correct_password.c to avoid one if

Signed-off-by: walter harms <wharms@bfs.de>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/libbb/correct_password.c b/libbb/correct_password.c
index 6301589e6..7cabd33d0 100644
--- a/libbb/correct_password.c
+++ b/libbb/correct_password.c
@@ -41,12 +41,6 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
         char *unencrypted, *encrypted;
         const char *correct;
         int r;
-#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
-        /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
-        struct spwd spw;
-        char buffer[256];
-#endif
-
         /* fake salt. crypt() can choke otherwise. */
         correct = "aa";
         if (!pw) {
@@ -55,7 +49,10 @@ int FAST_FUNC correct_password(const struct passwd *pw)
         }
         correct = pw->pw_passwd;
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+        /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
         if ((correct[0] == 'x' || correct[0] == '*') && !correct[1]) {
+                struct spwd spw;
+                char buffer[256];
                 /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
                  * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
                 struct spwd *result = NULL;