Incorrect/unneeded fix for 5.8OPENBSD_5_8

noticed by jsing@

2 files changed, 9 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
index 811101f385..d4f847023b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_cl.c,v 1.8.6.1 2016/06/25 16:42:40 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_cl.c,v 1.8.6.2 2016/06/27 15:42:31 beck Exp $ */
 /* Written by Tom Titchener <Tom_Titchener@groove.net> for the OpenSSL
  * project. */
 
@@ -71,9 +71,6 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
-int asn1_time_parse(const char *, size_t, struct tm *, int);
-int asn1_tm_cmp(struct tm *, struct tm *);
-
 /* Utility functions related to sending OCSP requests and extracting
  * relevant information from the response.
  */
@@ -332,43 +329,25 @@ OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
 {
         int ret = 1;
         time_t t_now, t_tmp;
-        struct tm tm_this, tm_next, tm_tmp;
 
         time(&t_now);
-
-        /*
-         * Times must explicitly be a GENERALIZEDTIME as per section
-         * 4.2.2.1 of RFC 6960 - It is invalid to accept other times
-         * (such as UTCTIME permitted/required by RFC 5280 for certificates)
-         */
-
         /* Check thisUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the future */
-        if (asn1_time_parse(thisupd->data, thisupd->length, &tm_this,
-            V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) {
+        if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(thisupd)) {
                 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
                     OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD);
                 ret = 0;
         } else {
                 t_tmp = t_now + nsec;
-                if (gmtime_r(&t_tmp, &tm_tmp) == NULL)
-                        return 0;
-                if (asn1_tm_cmp(&tm_this, &tm_tmp) > 0) {
+                if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) > 0) {
                         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
                             OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID);
                         ret = 0;
                 }
 
-                /*
-                 * If maxsec specified check thisUpdate is not more than maxsec
-                 * in the past
-                 */
+                /* If maxsec specified check thisUpdate is not more than maxsec in the past */
                 if (maxsec >= 0) {
                         t_tmp = t_now - maxsec;
-                        if (gmtime_r(&t_tmp, &tm_tmp) == NULL)
-                                return 0;
-                        if (gmtime_r(&t_tmp, &tm_tmp) == NULL)
-                                return 0;
-                        if (asn1_tm_cmp(&tm_this, &tm_tmp) < 0) {
+                        if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) < 0) {
                                 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
                                     OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD);
                                 ret = 0;
@@ -380,16 +359,13 @@ OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
                 return ret;
 
         /* Check nextUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the past */
-        if (asn1_time_parse(nextupd->data, nextupd->length, &tm_next,
-            V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) {
+        if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(nextupd)) {
                 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
                     OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD);
                 ret = 0;
         } else {
                 t_tmp = t_now - nsec;
-                if (gmtime_r(&t_tmp, &tm_tmp) == NULL)
-                        return 0;
-                if (asn1_tm_cmp(&tm_next, &tm_tmp) < 0) {
+                if (X509_cmp_time(nextupd, &t_tmp) < 0) {
                         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY,
                             OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED);
                         ret = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
index a215c4ac0e..be462141a4 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_srv.c,v 1.7.6.1 2016/06/25 16:42:40 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_srv.c,v 1.7.6.2 2016/06/27 15:42:31 beck Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2001.
  */
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key,
         }
 
         if (!(flags & OCSP_NOTIME) &&
-            !ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(brsp->tbsResponseData->producedAt, time(NULL)))
+            !X509_gmtime_adj(brsp->tbsResponseData->producedAt, 0))
                 goto err;
 
         /* Right now, I think that not doing double hashing is the right