Use timingsafe_memcmp when comparing authenticators

Replace memcmp() with timingsafe_memcmp() for authentication tag
comparison in AES-CCM, GCM, PKCS12 and AES key unwrap code paths
to ensure constant-time behavior and avoid potential timing side
channels.

This aligns with OpenSSL 1e4a355.

ok tb@

3 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/aes/aes.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/aes/aes.c
index 50e4ce13cc..e630c3f81a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/aes/aes.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/aes/aes.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: aes.c,v 1.8 2025/05/25 06:27:02 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: aes.c,v 1.9 2025/06/03 08:42:15 kenjiro Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out,
         }
         if (!iv)
                 iv = aes_wrap_default_iv;
-        if (memcmp(A, iv, 8)) {
+        if (timingsafe_memcmp(A, iv, 8) != 0) {
                 explicit_bzero(out, inlen);
                 return 0;
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes.c
index bfdfed8172..a0f192905d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: e_aes.c,v 1.68 2025/05/19 04:32:52 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: e_aes.c,v 1.69 2025/06/03 08:42:15 kenjiro Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1557,7 +1557,7 @@ aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
 
                 /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
-                if (memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+                if (timingsafe_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) != 0) {
                         explicit_bzero(out, len);
                         goto err;
                 }
@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                     cctx->str) : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
                         unsigned char tag[16];
                         if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
-                                if (!memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
+                                if (timingsafe_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M) == 0)
                                         rv = len;
                         }
                 }
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 513aa54ada..4a9d0f9757 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: p12_mutl.c,v 1.39 2025/05/10 05:54:38 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: p12_mutl.c,v 1.40 2025/06/03 08:42:15 kenjiro Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 1999.
  */
@@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
                 PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
                 return 0;
         }
-        if ((maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length) ||
-            memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen))
+        if (maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length)
                 return 0;
-        return 1;
+
+        return timingsafe_memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen) == 0;
 }
 LCRYPTO_ALIAS(PKCS12_verify_mac);