Detect zero-length encrypted session data early, instead of when malloc(0)

fails or the HMAC check fails.

Noted independently by jsing@ and Kurt Cancemi (kurt (at) x64architecture.com)
ok bcook@

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
index 3f66e2e6d0..67eabdae06 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.90 2016/09/22 12:33:50 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.91 2016/10/02 21:05:44 guenther Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -2225,7 +2225,7 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
         }
 
         /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
-        if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
+        if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
                 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
                 return 2;