cherry pick bugfixes for http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20130205.txt

from the openssl git (changes between openssl 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d).
ok djm@

30 files changed, 2564 insertions, 557 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 432722e409..fc84cd3d19 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 
         int mdnid, pknid;
 
+        if (!pkey)
+                {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
         /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
index ee7b87c45c..de83a15b99 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
                         a->neg=!(a->neg);
                 return(i);
                 }
-        /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-        if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-                        (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-                return(0);
-        i=0;
-        for (;;)
+        for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
                 {
-                if (i >= a->top)
-                        l=w;
-                else
-                        l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-                a->d[i]=l;
-                if (w > l)
-                        w=1;
-                else
-                        break;
-                i++;
+                a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+                w = (w>l)?1:0;
                 }
-        if (i >= a->top)
+        if (w && i==a->top)
+                {
+                if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
                 a->top++;
+                a->d[i]=w;
+                }
         bn_check_top(a);
         return(1);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 710fb79baf..483e04b605 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ typedef struct
         defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      || \
         defined(__INTEL__)      )
 
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# define BSWAP(x) ({ unsigned int r=(x); asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; })
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
 #define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
 
@@ -167,6 +171,9 @@ static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c,const void *data,size_t len)
                 SHA1_Update(c,ptr,res);
 }
 
+#ifdef SHA1_Update
+#undef SHA1_Update
+#endif
 #define SHA1_Update sha1_update
 
 static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
@@ -184,6 +191,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
 #endif
 
+        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
         if (len%AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0;
 
         if (ctx->encrypt) {
@@ -234,47 +243,210 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                                         &key->ks,ctx->iv,1);
                 }
         } else {
-                unsigned char mac[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+                union { unsigned int  u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+                        unsigned char c[32+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac;
+
+                /* arrange cache line alignment */
+                pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c+31)&((size_t)0-32));
 
                 /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
                 aesni_cbc_encrypt(in,out,len,
                                 &key->ks,ctx->iv,0);
 
                 if (plen) {     /* "TLS" mode of operation */
-                        /* figure out payload length */
-                        if (len<(size_t)(out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
-
-                        len -= (out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+                        unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+                        int ret = 1;
+                        union { unsigned int  u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+                                unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK]; }
+                                *data = (void *)key->md.data;
 
                         if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen-4]<<8|key->aux.tls_aad[plen-3])
-                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
-                                len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
                                 iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-                        }
 
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = len>>8;
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = len;
+                        if (len<(iv+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1))
+                                return 0;
+
+                        /* omit explicit iv */
+                        out += iv;
+                        len -= iv;
+
+                        /* figure out payload length */
+                        pad = out[len-1];
+                        maxpad = len-(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1);
+                        maxpad |= (255-maxpad)>>(sizeof(maxpad)*8-8);
+                        maxpad &= 255;
+
+                        inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+pad+1);
+                        mask = (0-((inp_len-len)>>(sizeof(inp_len)*8-1)));
+                        inp_len &= mask;
+                        ret &= (int)mask;
+
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = inp_len>>8;
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = inp_len;
 
-                        /* calculate HMAC and verify it */
+                        /* calculate HMAC */
                         key->md = key->head;
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,key->aux.tls_aad,plen);
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out+iv,len);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
 
+#if 1
+                        len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;               /* amend mac */
+                        if (len>=(256+SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+                                j = (len-(256+SHA_CBLOCK))&(0-SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j += SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
+                                SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,j);
+                                out += j;
+                                len -= j;
+                                inp_len -= j;
+                        }
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        bitlen = key->md.Nl+(inp_len<<3);       /* at most 18 bits */
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        bitlen = BSWAP(bitlen);
+#else
+                        mac.c[0] = 0;
+                        mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>16);
+                        mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>8);
+                        mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+                        bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#endif
+
+                        pmac->u[0]=0;
+                        pmac->u[1]=0;
+                        pmac->u[2]=0;
+                        pmac->u[3]=0;
+                        pmac->u[4]=0;
+
+                        for (res=key->md.num, j=0;j<len;j++) {
+                                size_t c = out[j];
+                                mask = (j-inp_len)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8);
+                                c &= mask;
+                                c |= 0x80&~mask&~((inp_len-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8));
+                                data->c[res++]=(unsigned char)c;
+
+                                if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
+
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+                                res=0;
+                        }
+
+                        for(i=res;i<SHA_CBLOCK;i++,j++) data->c[i]=0;
+
+                        if (res>SHA_CBLOCK-8) {
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+                                memset(data,0,SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j+=64;
+                        }
+                        data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] = bitlen;
+                        sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        mask = 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                        pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        pmac->u[0] = BSWAP(pmac->u[0]);
+                        pmac->u[1] = BSWAP(pmac->u[1]);
+                        pmac->u[2] = BSWAP(pmac->u[2]);
+                        pmac->u[3] = BSWAP(pmac->u[3]);
+                        pmac->u[4] = BSWAP(pmac->u[4]);
+#else
+                        for (i=0;i<5;i++) {
+                                res = pmac->u[i];
+                                pmac->c[4*i+0]=(unsigned char)(res>>24);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+1]=(unsigned char)(res>>16);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+2]=(unsigned char)(res>>8);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+3]=(unsigned char)res;
+                        }
+#endif
+                        len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#else
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,inp_len);
+                        res = key->md.num;
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
+
+                        {
+                        unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        inp_blocks = 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        res += (unsigned int)(len-inp_len);
+                        pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        res %= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        pad_blocks += 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        for (;inp_blocks<pad_blocks;inp_blocks++)
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        }
+#endif
                         key->md = key->tail;
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,pmac->c,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
 
-                        if (memcmp(out+iv+len,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
+                        /* verify HMAC */
+                        out += inp_len;
+                        len -= inp_len;
+#if 1
+                        {
+                        unsigned char *p = out+len-1-maxpad-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        size_t off = out-p;
+                        unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+                        maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        for (res=0,i=0,j=0;j<maxpad;j++) {
+                                c = p[j];
+                                cmask = ((int)(j-off-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pad)&~cmask;  /* ... and padding */
+                                cmask &= ((int)(off-1-j))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pmac->c[i])&cmask;
+                                i += 1&cmask;
+                        }
+                        maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+                        }
+#else
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pmac->c[i];
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+
+                        /* verify padding */
+                        pad = (pad&~res) | (maxpad&res);
+                        out = out+len-1-pad;
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<pad;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pad;
+
+                        res = (0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1);
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+#endif
+                        return ret;
                 } else {
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,len);
                 }
         }
 
-        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
-
         return 1;
         }
 
@@ -309,6 +481,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void
                 SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
                 SHA1_Update(&key->tail,hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
 
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
+
                 return 1;
                 }
         case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 415d67e61c..91a45c9133 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                 {
                 EVP_PKEY *skey;
                 skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-                ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-                if(ret <= 0)
+                if (skey)
+                        {
+                        ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                        }
+                if(!skey || ret <= 0)
                         {
                         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
                         goto end;
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 553d212ebe..e08ac151ff 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
                 return -1;
 
-        if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
                 goto decoding_err;
         else
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_enc.c
index 07a5e97ce5..712c4647f2 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,20 +126,28 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         {
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+        int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-                        if (n < 0)
+                        mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+                        if (mac_size < 0)
                                 return -1;
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -164,9 +172,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                        if (n < 0)
-                                return -1;
+                        mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
                 rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (!send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                                return -1;
+                                return 0;
                         }
                 
                 EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -246,43 +253,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                        {
-                        ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-                        i++;
-                        if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                                {
-                                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-                                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-                                        "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-                                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-                                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                        i--;
-                                }
-                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                        if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
-                                {
-                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-                                 */
-                                return -1;
-                                }
-                        for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-                                {
-                                if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-                                        {
-                                        /* Incorrect padding */
-                                        return -1;
-                                        }
-                                }
-                        rec->length-=i;
-
-                        rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-                        rec->input += bs;
-                        rec->length -= bs;
-                        }
+                        return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
                 }
         return(1);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
index 987af60835..cfe4524553 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -376,15 +376,11 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
         int i,al;
-        int clear=0;
         int enc_err;
         SSL_SESSION *sess;
         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-        unsigned int mac_size;
+        unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
         sess = s->session;
@@ -416,12 +412,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         rr->data=rr->input;
 
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-        if (enc_err <= 0)
+        /* enc_err is:
+         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+         *    1: if the padding is valid
+         *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+        if (enc_err == 0)
                 {
-                /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-                 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-                 */
-                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                s->packet_length = 0;
+                goto err;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -431,45 +431,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-                (s->read_hash == NULL))
-                clear=1;
-
-        if (!clear)
+        if ((sess != NULL) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                 {
-                /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-                int t;
-                t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-                mac_size=t;
-
-                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+                /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+                unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+                mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+                /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+                orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+                /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+                 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+                 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+                 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+                 */
+                if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+                    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                     orig_len < mac_size+1))
                         {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-                        al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif                  
                         }
-                /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-                if (rr->length >= mac_size)
+
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                         {
+                        /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+                         * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+                         * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+                         * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+                         * */
+                        mac = mac_tmp;
+                        ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
                         rr->length -= mac_size;
-                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
                 else
-                        rr->length = 0;
-                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
                         {
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                        /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+                         * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+                         * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+                        rr->length -= mac_size;
+                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
+
+                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_bcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                        enc_err = -1;
+                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+                        enc_err = -1;
                 }
 
-        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+        if (enc_err < 0)
                 {
                 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
                 rr->length = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c
index b63460a56d..6981852b5b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_both.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
-        if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
                 {
                 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..443a31e746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/* Some utility functions are needed:
+ *
+ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
+ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
+
+/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        a -= b;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
+        }
+
+/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        a -= b;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
+        }
+
+/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        unsigned c = a ^ b;
+        c--;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size)
+        {
+        unsigned padding_length, good;
+        const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+        /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+         * time. */
+        if (overhead > rec->length)
+                return 0;
+
+        padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+        good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
+        /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+        good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
+        padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+        rec->length -= padding_length;
+        rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+        return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+}
+
+/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size)
+        {
+        unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+        const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+        /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                {
+                /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+                 * non-constant time.
+                 */
+                if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+                        return 0;
+                /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+                rec->data += block_size;
+                rec->input += block_size;
+                rec->length -= block_size;
+                }
+        else if (overhead > rec->length)
+                return 0;
+
+        padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+
+        /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
+         * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
+         * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
+         * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
+         */
+        if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand)
+                {
+                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) &&
+                    !(padding_length & 1))
+                        {
+                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+                        }
+                if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) &&
+                    padding_length > 0)
+                        {
+                        padding_length--;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+                {
+                /* padding is already verified */
+                rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+                return 1;
+                }
+
+        good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length);
+        /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+         * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+         * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+         * bytes of padding.
+         *
+         * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+         * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+         * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+         * public information so we can use it.) */
+        to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
+        if (to_check > rec->length-1)
+                to_check = rec->length-1;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+                unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
+                /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+                 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+                good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
+                }
+
+        /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+         * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+         * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+         * bits. */
+        good &= good >> 4;
+        good &= good >> 2;
+        good &= good >> 1;
+        good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
+        good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+        padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+        rec->length -= padding_length;
+        rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+
+        return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
+        {
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+        unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+        /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
+        unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+        unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+        /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+         * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+        unsigned scan_start = 0;
+        unsigned i, j;
+        unsigned div_spoiler;
+        unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
+#endif
+
+        /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+        if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+                scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+        /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
+         * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
+         * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
+         *
+         * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
+         * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
+         * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
+        div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
+        div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8;
+        rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+
+        memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+        for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
+                unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+                unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+                rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+                j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
+                }
+
+        /* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        j = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+                {
+                /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+                ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
+                out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+                }
+#else
+        memset(out, 0, md_size);
+        rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+                {
+                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+                        out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+                rotate_offset++;
+                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+                }
+#endif
+        }
+
+/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+        (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+ * typically does. */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+        u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+        }
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+        l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+        }
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+        unsigned i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                {
+                l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+                }
+        }
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+        unsigned i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                {
+                l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+                }
+        }
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+#endif
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+        if (FIPS_mode())
+                return 0;
+#endif
+        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+                {
+                case NID_md5:
+                case NID_sha1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+                case NID_sha224:
+                case NID_sha256:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+                case NID_sha384:
+                case NID_sha512:
+#endif
+                        return 1;
+                default:
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. ) */
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+        const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned char* md_out,
+        size_t* md_out_size,
+        const unsigned char header[13],
+        const unsigned char *data,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+        const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+        unsigned mac_secret_length,
+        char is_sslv3)
+        {
+        union { double align;
+                unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
+        void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+        void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+        unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+        unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+                 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+                 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+        unsigned int bits;      /* at most 18 bits */
+        unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+        /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+        unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+        EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+        /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+        * the hash. */
+        unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+        char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+
+        /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+         * many possible overflows later in this function. */
+        OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
+
+        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+                {
+                case NID_md5:
+                        MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
+                        md_size = 16;
+                        sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+                        length_is_big_endian = 0;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha1:
+                        SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
+                        md_size = 20;
+                        break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+                case NID_sha224:
+                        SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+                        md_size = 224/8;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha256:
+                        SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+                        md_size = 32;
+                        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+                case NID_sha384:
+                        SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+                        md_size = 384/8;
+                        md_block_size = 128;
+                        md_length_size = 16;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha512:
+                        SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+                        md_size = 64;
+                        md_block_size = 128;
+                        md_length_size = 16;
+                        break;
+#endif
+                default:
+                        /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
+                         * called first to check that the hash function is
+                         * supported. */
+                        OPENSSL_assert(0);
+                        if (md_out_size)
+                                *md_out_size = -1;
+                        return;
+                }
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+        header_length = 13;
+        if (is_sslv3)
+                {
+                header_length =
+                        mac_secret_length +
+                        sslv3_pad_length +
+                        8 /* sequence number */ +
+                        1 /* record type */ +
+                        2 /* record length */;
+                }
+
+        /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+         * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+         * padding value.
+         *
+         * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
+         * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
+         * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
+         * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
+         * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+         *
+         * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+         * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+         * can vary based on the padding.
+         *
+         * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
+         * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
+        variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+        /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+         * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+         * (SSLv3) */
+        len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+        /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+        * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
+        max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+        /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+        num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+        /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+         * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+         * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
+         * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+         * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+         * they are plaintext. */
+        num_starting_blocks = 0;
+        /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+         * we start processing. */
+        k = 0;
+        /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+         * MACed. */
+        mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+        /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+         * contains application data. */
+        c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+        /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+         * value. */
+        index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+        /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+         * length, in bits. */
+        index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+        /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+         * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
+         * SSLv3. */
+
+        /* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
+         * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
+        if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
+                {
+                num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+                k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
+                }
+
+        bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
+        if (!is_sslv3)
+                {
+                /* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
+                 * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
+                 * than a single block. */
+                bits += 8*md_block_size;
+                memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+                memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+                for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+                        hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+                md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+                }
+
+        if (length_is_big_endian)
+                {
+                memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+                }
+
+        if (k > 0)
+                {
+                if (is_sslv3)
+                        {
+                        /* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
+                         * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
+                         * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
+                         * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
+                        unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+                        memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+                        memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+                        for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
+                                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+                        memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+                        memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+                        for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
+                                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
+                        }
+                }
+
+        memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+        /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+         * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+         * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+         * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
+        for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+                unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+                unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+                for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
+                        {
+                        unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+                        if (k < header_length)
+                                b = header[k];
+                        else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+                                b = data[k-header_length];
+                        k++;
+
+                        is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
+                        is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+                        /* If this is the block containing the end of the
+                         * application data, and we are at the offset for the
+                         * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
+                        b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+                        /* If this the the block containing the end of the
+                         * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+                         * just write zero. */
+                        b = b&~is_past_cp1;
+                        /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+                         * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+                         * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+                         * add an extra block of zeros. */
+                        b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+                        /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+                         * length. */
+                        if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
+                                {
+                                /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+                                b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+                                }
+                        block[j] = b;
+                        }
+
+                md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+                md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+                /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+                        mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
+                }
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
+        if (is_sslv3)
+                {
+                /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+                memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+                for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+                        hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+                }
+        EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+        if (md_out_size)
+                *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+        }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases
+ * by digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+        const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+        {
+        size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                return;
+        block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+        /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+         * digests and TLS to deal with.
+         * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+         * otherwise.
+         * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+         * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+         * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+         * So we have:
+         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+         * equivalently:
+         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+         * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+         * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+         * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+         * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+         * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+         * otherwise.
+         */
+        digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+        blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+        blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+        /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original
+         * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a
+         * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to
+         * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum
+         * length TLS buffer. 
+         */
+        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+                                (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+        }
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c
index adf8c387cc..a7d2defbea 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -290,11 +290,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         short version;
-        int mac_size;
-        int clear=0;
+        unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
         size_t extra;
-        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
         sess=s->session;
@@ -403,17 +400,15 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
         rr->data=rr->input;
 
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-        if (enc_err <= 0)
+        /* enc_err is:
+         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+         *    1: if the padding is valid
+         *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+        if (enc_err == 0)
                 {
-                if (enc_err == 0)
-                        /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
-                        goto err;
-
-                /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
-                 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
-                 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
-                 * the MAC computation anyway. */
-                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+                goto f_err;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -423,53 +418,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-                (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
-                clear=1;
-
-        if (!clear)
+        if ((sess != NULL) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                 {
-                /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+                unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+                /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+                orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+                /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+                 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+                 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+                 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+                 */
+                if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+                    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                     orig_len < mac_size+1))
                         {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-                        al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif                  
                         }
-                /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-                if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                         {
+                        /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+                         * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+                         * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+                         * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+                         * */
+                        mac = mac_tmp;
+                        ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
                         rr->length -= mac_size;
-                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
                 else
                         {
-                        /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
-                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-                        goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-                        rr->length = 0;
-#endif
-                        }
-                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-                        {
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                        /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+                         * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+                         * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+                        rr->length -= mac_size;
+                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
+
+                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_bcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                        enc_err = -1;
+                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+                        enc_err = -1;
                 }
 
-        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+        if (enc_err < 0)
                 {
                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 432722e409..fc84cd3d19 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 
         int mdnid, pknid;
 
+        if (!pkey)
+                {
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
         /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
index ee7b87c45c..de83a15b99 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
                         a->neg=!(a->neg);
                 return(i);
                 }
-        /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-        if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-                        (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-                return(0);
-        i=0;
-        for (;;)
+        for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
                 {
-                if (i >= a->top)
-                        l=w;
-                else
-                        l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-                a->d[i]=l;
-                if (w > l)
-                        w=1;
-                else
-                        break;
-                i++;
+                a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+                w = (w>l)?1:0;
                 }
-        if (i >= a->top)
+        if (w && i==a->top)
+                {
+                if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
                 a->top++;
+                a->d[i]=w;
+                }
         bn_check_top(a);
         return(1);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 710fb79baf..483e04b605 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ typedef struct
         defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      || \
         defined(__INTEL__)      )
 
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# define BSWAP(x) ({ unsigned int r=(x); asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; })
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
 #define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
 
@@ -167,6 +171,9 @@ static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c,const void *data,size_t len)
                 SHA1_Update(c,ptr,res);
 }
 
+#ifdef SHA1_Update
+#undef SHA1_Update
+#endif
 #define SHA1_Update sha1_update
 
 static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
@@ -184,6 +191,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
 #endif
 
+        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
         if (len%AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0;
 
         if (ctx->encrypt) {
@@ -234,47 +243,210 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                                         &key->ks,ctx->iv,1);
                 }
         } else {
-                unsigned char mac[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+                union { unsigned int  u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+                        unsigned char c[32+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac;
+
+                /* arrange cache line alignment */
+                pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c+31)&((size_t)0-32));
 
                 /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
                 aesni_cbc_encrypt(in,out,len,
                                 &key->ks,ctx->iv,0);
 
                 if (plen) {     /* "TLS" mode of operation */
-                        /* figure out payload length */
-                        if (len<(size_t)(out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
-
-                        len -= (out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+                        unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+                        int ret = 1;
+                        union { unsigned int  u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+                                unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK]; }
+                                *data = (void *)key->md.data;
 
                         if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen-4]<<8|key->aux.tls_aad[plen-3])
-                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
-                                len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+                            >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
                                 iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-                        }
 
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = len>>8;
-                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = len;
+                        if (len<(iv+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1))
+                                return 0;
+
+                        /* omit explicit iv */
+                        out += iv;
+                        len -= iv;
+
+                        /* figure out payload length */
+                        pad = out[len-1];
+                        maxpad = len-(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1);
+                        maxpad |= (255-maxpad)>>(sizeof(maxpad)*8-8);
+                        maxpad &= 255;
+
+                        inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+pad+1);
+                        mask = (0-((inp_len-len)>>(sizeof(inp_len)*8-1)));
+                        inp_len &= mask;
+                        ret &= (int)mask;
+
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = inp_len>>8;
+                        key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = inp_len;
 
-                        /* calculate HMAC and verify it */
+                        /* calculate HMAC */
                         key->md = key->head;
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,key->aux.tls_aad,plen);
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out+iv,len);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
 
+#if 1
+                        len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;               /* amend mac */
+                        if (len>=(256+SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+                                j = (len-(256+SHA_CBLOCK))&(0-SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j += SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
+                                SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,j);
+                                out += j;
+                                len -= j;
+                                inp_len -= j;
+                        }
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        bitlen = key->md.Nl+(inp_len<<3);       /* at most 18 bits */
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        bitlen = BSWAP(bitlen);
+#else
+                        mac.c[0] = 0;
+                        mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>16);
+                        mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>8);
+                        mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+                        bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#endif
+
+                        pmac->u[0]=0;
+                        pmac->u[1]=0;
+                        pmac->u[2]=0;
+                        pmac->u[3]=0;
+                        pmac->u[4]=0;
+
+                        for (res=key->md.num, j=0;j<len;j++) {
+                                size_t c = out[j];
+                                mask = (j-inp_len)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8);
+                                c &= mask;
+                                c |= 0x80&~mask&~((inp_len-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8));
+                                data->c[res++]=(unsigned char)c;
+
+                                if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
+
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+                                res=0;
+                        }
+
+                        for(i=res;i<SHA_CBLOCK;i++,j++) data->c[i]=0;
+
+                        if (res>SHA_CBLOCK-8) {
+                                mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                                mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                                pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                                pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+                                memset(data,0,SHA_CBLOCK);
+                                j+=64;
+                        }
+                        data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] = bitlen;
+                        sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        mask = 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+                        pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+                        pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+#ifdef BSWAP
+                        pmac->u[0] = BSWAP(pmac->u[0]);
+                        pmac->u[1] = BSWAP(pmac->u[1]);
+                        pmac->u[2] = BSWAP(pmac->u[2]);
+                        pmac->u[3] = BSWAP(pmac->u[3]);
+                        pmac->u[4] = BSWAP(pmac->u[4]);
+#else
+                        for (i=0;i<5;i++) {
+                                res = pmac->u[i];
+                                pmac->c[4*i+0]=(unsigned char)(res>>24);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+1]=(unsigned char)(res>>16);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+2]=(unsigned char)(res>>8);
+                                pmac->c[4*i+3]=(unsigned char)res;
+                        }
+#endif
+                        len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#else
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,inp_len);
+                        res = key->md.num;
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
+
+                        {
+                        unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+                        /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+                        inp_blocks = 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        res += (unsigned int)(len-inp_len);
+                        pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        res %= SHA_CBLOCK;
+                        pad_blocks += 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        for (;inp_blocks<pad_blocks;inp_blocks++)
+                                sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+                        }
+#endif
                         key->md = key->tail;
-                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-                        SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
+                        SHA1_Update(&key->md,pmac->c,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+                        SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
 
-                        if (memcmp(out+iv+len,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-                                return 0;
+                        /* verify HMAC */
+                        out += inp_len;
+                        len -= inp_len;
+#if 1
+                        {
+                        unsigned char *p = out+len-1-maxpad-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        size_t off = out-p;
+                        unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+                        maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+                        for (res=0,i=0,j=0;j<maxpad;j++) {
+                                c = p[j];
+                                cmask = ((int)(j-off-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pad)&~cmask;  /* ... and padding */
+                                cmask &= ((int)(off-1-j))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+                                res |= (c^pmac->c[i])&cmask;
+                                i += 1&cmask;
+                        }
+                        maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+                        }
+#else
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pmac->c[i];
+                        res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+
+                        /* verify padding */
+                        pad = (pad&~res) | (maxpad&res);
+                        out = out+len-1-pad;
+                        for (res=0,i=0;i<pad;i++)
+                                res |= out[i]^pad;
+
+                        res = (0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1);
+                        ret &= (int)~res;
+#endif
+                        return ret;
                 } else {
                         SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,len);
                 }
         }
 
-        key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
-
         return 1;
         }
 
@@ -309,6 +481,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void
                 SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
                 SHA1_Update(&key->tail,hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
 
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
+
                 return 1;
                 }
         case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 415d67e61c..91a45c9133 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                 {
                 EVP_PKEY *skey;
                 skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-                ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-                if(ret <= 0)
+                if (skey)
+                        {
+                        ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                        }
+                if(!skey || ret <= 0)
                         {
                         OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
                         goto end;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 553d212ebe..e08ac151ff 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
                 return -1;
 
-        if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
                 goto decoding_err;
         else
                 {
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
index 07a5e97ce5..712c4647f2 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,20 +126,28 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         {
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+        int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-                        if (n < 0)
+                        mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+                        if (mac_size < 0)
                                 return -1;
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -164,9 +172,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                        if (n < 0)
-                                return -1;
+                        mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
                 rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (!send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                                return -1;
+                                return 0;
                         }
                 
                 EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -246,43 +253,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                        {
-                        ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-                        i++;
-                        if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                                {
-                                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-                                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-                                        "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-                                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-                                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                        i--;
-                                }
-                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                        if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
-                                {
-                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-                                 */
-                                return -1;
-                                }
-                        for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-                                {
-                                if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-                                        {
-                                        /* Incorrect padding */
-                                        return -1;
-                                        }
-                                }
-                        rec->length-=i;
-
-                        rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-                        rec->input += bs;
-                        rec->length -= bs;
-                        }
+                        return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
                 }
         return(1);
         }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 987af60835..cfe4524553 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -376,15 +376,11 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
         int i,al;
-        int clear=0;
         int enc_err;
         SSL_SESSION *sess;
         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-        unsigned int mac_size;
+        unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
         sess = s->session;
@@ -416,12 +412,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         rr->data=rr->input;
 
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-        if (enc_err <= 0)
+        /* enc_err is:
+         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+         *    1: if the padding is valid
+         *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+        if (enc_err == 0)
                 {
-                /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-                 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-                 */
-                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+                rr->length = 0;
+                s->packet_length = 0;
+                goto err;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -431,45 +431,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-                (s->read_hash == NULL))
-                clear=1;
-
-        if (!clear)
+        if ((sess != NULL) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                 {
-                /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-                int t;
-                t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-                mac_size=t;
-
-                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+                /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+                unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+                mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+                /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+                orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+                /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+                 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+                 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+                 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+                 */
+                if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+                    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                     orig_len < mac_size+1))
                         {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-                        al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif                  
                         }
-                /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-                if (rr->length >= mac_size)
+
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                         {
+                        /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+                         * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+                         * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+                         * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+                         * */
+                        mac = mac_tmp;
+                        ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
                         rr->length -= mac_size;
-                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
                 else
-                        rr->length = 0;
-                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
                         {
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                        /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+                         * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+                         * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+                        rr->length -= mac_size;
+                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
+
+                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_bcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                        enc_err = -1;
+                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+                        enc_err = -1;
                 }
 
-        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+        if (enc_err < 0)
                 {
                 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
                 rr->length = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 00ac158f9b..c65d27946f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
                 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
         p += 1;
 
-        if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
                 {
                 ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index ac963b2d47..b6ac9caf4a 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
                         s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
                         ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
                         s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
-                        if (    (memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
-                                (unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
+                        if (    (timingsafe_bcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) ||
                                 (s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_both.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_both.c
index b63460a56d..6981852b5b 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
-        if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
                 {
                 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..443a31e746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/* Some utility functions are needed:
+ *
+ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
+ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
+
+/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        a -= b;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
+        }
+
+/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        a -= b;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
+        }
+
+/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+        {
+        unsigned c = a ^ b;
+        c--;
+        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size)
+        {
+        unsigned padding_length, good;
+        const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+        /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+         * time. */
+        if (overhead > rec->length)
+                return 0;
+
+        padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+        good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
+        /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+        good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
+        padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+        rec->length -= padding_length;
+        rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+        return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+}
+
+/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size)
+        {
+        unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+        const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+        /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                {
+                /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+                 * non-constant time.
+                 */
+                if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+                        return 0;
+                /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+                rec->data += block_size;
+                rec->input += block_size;
+                rec->length -= block_size;
+                }
+        else if (overhead > rec->length)
+                return 0;
+
+        padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+
+        /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
+         * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
+         * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
+         * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
+         */
+        if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand)
+                {
+                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) &&
+                    !(padding_length & 1))
+                        {
+                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+                        }
+                if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) &&
+                    padding_length > 0)
+                        {
+                        padding_length--;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+                {
+                /* padding is already verified */
+                rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+                return 1;
+                }
+
+        good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length);
+        /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+         * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+         * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+         * bytes of padding.
+         *
+         * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+         * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+         * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+         * public information so we can use it.) */
+        to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
+        if (to_check > rec->length-1)
+                to_check = rec->length-1;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+                unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
+                /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+                 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+                good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
+                }
+
+        /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+         * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+         * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+         * bits. */
+        good &= good >> 4;
+        good &= good >> 2;
+        good &= good >> 1;
+        good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
+        good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+        padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+        rec->length -= padding_length;
+        rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+
+        return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
+        {
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+        unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+        /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
+        unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+        unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+        /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+         * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+        unsigned scan_start = 0;
+        unsigned i, j;
+        unsigned div_spoiler;
+        unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
+#endif
+
+        /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+        if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+                scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+        /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
+         * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
+         * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
+         *
+         * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
+         * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
+         * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
+        div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
+        div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8;
+        rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+
+        memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+        for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
+                unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+                unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+                rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+                j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
+                }
+
+        /* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+        j = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+                {
+                /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+                ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
+                out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+                }
+#else
+        memset(out, 0, md_size);
+        rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+                {
+                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+                        out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+                rotate_offset++;
+                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+                }
+#endif
+        }
+
+/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+        (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+ * typically does. */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+        u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+        u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+        }
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+        l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+        l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+        }
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+        unsigned i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                {
+                l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+                }
+        }
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+        {
+        SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+        unsigned i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+                {
+                l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+                }
+        }
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+#endif
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+        if (FIPS_mode())
+                return 0;
+#endif
+        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+                {
+                case NID_md5:
+                case NID_sha1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+                case NID_sha224:
+                case NID_sha256:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+                case NID_sha384:
+                case NID_sha512:
+#endif
+                        return 1;
+                default:
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. ) */
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+        const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned char* md_out,
+        size_t* md_out_size,
+        const unsigned char header[13],
+        const unsigned char *data,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+        const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+        unsigned mac_secret_length,
+        char is_sslv3)
+        {
+        union { double align;
+                unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
+        void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+        void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+        unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+        unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+                 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+                 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+        unsigned int bits;      /* at most 18 bits */
+        unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+        /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+        unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+        EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+        /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+        * the hash. */
+        unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+        char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+
+        /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+         * many possible overflows later in this function. */
+        OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
+
+        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+                {
+                case NID_md5:
+                        MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
+                        md_size = 16;
+                        sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+                        length_is_big_endian = 0;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha1:
+                        SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
+                        md_size = 20;
+                        break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+                case NID_sha224:
+                        SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+                        md_size = 224/8;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha256:
+                        SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+                        md_size = 32;
+                        break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+                case NID_sha384:
+                        SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+                        md_size = 384/8;
+                        md_block_size = 128;
+                        md_length_size = 16;
+                        break;
+                case NID_sha512:
+                        SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+                        md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+                        md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+                        md_size = 64;
+                        md_block_size = 128;
+                        md_length_size = 16;
+                        break;
+#endif
+                default:
+                        /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
+                         * called first to check that the hash function is
+                         * supported. */
+                        OPENSSL_assert(0);
+                        if (md_out_size)
+                                *md_out_size = -1;
+                        return;
+                }
+
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+        header_length = 13;
+        if (is_sslv3)
+                {
+                header_length =
+                        mac_secret_length +
+                        sslv3_pad_length +
+                        8 /* sequence number */ +
+                        1 /* record type */ +
+                        2 /* record length */;
+                }
+
+        /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+         * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+         * padding value.
+         *
+         * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
+         * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
+         * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
+         * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
+         * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+         *
+         * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+         * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+         * can vary based on the padding.
+         *
+         * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
+         * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
+        variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+        /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+         * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+         * (SSLv3) */
+        len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+        /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+        * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
+        max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+        /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+        num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+        /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+         * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+         * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
+         * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+         * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+         * they are plaintext. */
+        num_starting_blocks = 0;
+        /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+         * we start processing. */
+        k = 0;
+        /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+         * MACed. */
+        mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+        /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+         * contains application data. */
+        c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+        /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+         * value. */
+        index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+        /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+         * length, in bits. */
+        index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+        /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+         * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
+         * SSLv3. */
+
+        /* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
+         * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
+        if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
+                {
+                num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+                k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
+                }
+
+        bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
+        if (!is_sslv3)
+                {
+                /* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
+                 * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
+                 * than a single block. */
+                bits += 8*md_block_size;
+                memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+                memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+                for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+                        hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+                md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+                }
+
+        if (length_is_big_endian)
+                {
+                memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+                length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+                }
+
+        if (k > 0)
+                {
+                if (is_sslv3)
+                        {
+                        /* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
+                         * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
+                         * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
+                         * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
+                        unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+                        memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+                        memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+                        for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
+                                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+                        memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+                        memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
+                        md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+                        for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
+                                md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
+                        }
+                }
+
+        memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+        /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+         * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+         * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+         * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
+        for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
+                {
+                unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+                unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+                unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+                for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
+                        {
+                        unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+                        if (k < header_length)
+                                b = header[k];
+                        else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+                                b = data[k-header_length];
+                        k++;
+
+                        is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
+                        is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+                        /* If this is the block containing the end of the
+                         * application data, and we are at the offset for the
+                         * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
+                        b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+                        /* If this the the block containing the end of the
+                         * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+                         * just write zero. */
+                        b = b&~is_past_cp1;
+                        /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+                         * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+                         * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+                         * add an extra block of zeros. */
+                        b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+                        /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+                         * length. */
+                        if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
+                                {
+                                /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+                                b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+                                }
+                        block[j] = b;
+                        }
+
+                md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+                md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+                /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+                        mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
+                }
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
+        if (is_sslv3)
+                {
+                /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+                memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+                for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+                        hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+                }
+        EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+        if (md_out_size)
+                *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+        }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases
+ * by digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+        const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+        {
+        size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                return;
+        block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+        /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+         * digests and TLS to deal with.
+         * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+         * otherwise.
+         * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+         * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+         * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+         * So we have:
+         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+         * equivalently:
+         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+         * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+         * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+         * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+         * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+         * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+         * otherwise.
+         */
+        digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+        blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+        blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+        /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original
+         * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a
+         * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to
+         * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum
+         * length TLS buffer. 
+         */
+        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+                                (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+        }
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
index c5df2cb90a..e3cd4f062c 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -466,12 +466,21 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
         s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
         }
 
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occured.
+ */
 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         {
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i;
+        int bs,i,mac_size=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
@@ -522,32 +531,16 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (!send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                                {
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                 return 0;
-                                }
                         /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
                         }
                 
                 EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 
+                if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+                        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                        {
-                        i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
-                        /* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
-                         * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */
-                        if (i > bs)
-                                {
-                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-                                return -1;
-                                }
-                        /* now i <= bs <= rec->length */
-                        rec->length-=i;
-                        }
+                        return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
                 }
         return(1);
         }
@@ -716,7 +709,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
         const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
         unsigned char *p,rec_char;
-        unsigned int md_size;
+        size_t md_size, orig_len;
         int npad;
         int t;
 
@@ -741,28 +734,72 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         md_size=t;
         npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
 
-        /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
-        rec_char=rec->type;
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
-        p=md;
-        s2n(rec->length,p);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size);
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+        /* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+        orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+        rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+        if (!send &&
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+            ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
+                {
+                /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+                 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+                 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+                 * timing-oracle. */
+
+                /* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+                 *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+                 *
+                 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+                 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+                 * total size. */
+                unsigned char header[75];
+                unsigned j = 0;
+                memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
+                j += md_size;
+                memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+                j += npad;
+                memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
+                j += 8;
+                header[j++] = rec->type;
+                header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+                header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+                ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+                        hash,
+                        md, &md_size,
+                        header, rec->input,
+                        rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+                        mac_sec, md_size,
+                        1 /* is SSLv3 */);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                unsigned int md_size_u;
+                /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+                EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+                EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
+                rec_char=rec->type;
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
+                p=md;
+                s2n(rec->length,p);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+                EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
+
+                EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+                EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
+                EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
+                md_size = md_size_u;
+
+                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+        }
 
         ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
         return(md_size);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index adf8c387cc..a7d2defbea 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -290,11 +290,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
         unsigned char *p;
         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         short version;
-        int mac_size;
-        int clear=0;
+        unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
         size_t extra;
-        int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-        unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 
         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
         sess=s->session;
@@ -403,17 +400,15 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
         rr->data=rr->input;
 
         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-        if (enc_err <= 0)
+        /* enc_err is:
+         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+         *    1: if the padding is valid
+         *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+        if (enc_err == 0)
                 {
-                if (enc_err == 0)
-                        /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
-                        goto err;
-
-                /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
-                 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
-                 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
-                 * the MAC computation anyway. */
-                decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+                goto f_err;
                 }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -423,53 +418,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-                (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
-                clear=1;
-
-        if (!clear)
+        if ((sess != NULL) &&
+            (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                 {
-                /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+                unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+                unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+                OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+                /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+                orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+                /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+                 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+                 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+                 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+                 */
+                if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+                    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                     orig_len < mac_size+1))
                         {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-                        al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif                  
                         }
-                /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-                if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                         {
+                        /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+                         * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+                         * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+                         * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+                         * */
+                        mac = mac_tmp;
+                        ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
                         rr->length -= mac_size;
-                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
                 else
                         {
-                        /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
-                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-                        goto f_err;
-#else
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-                        rr->length = 0;
-#endif
-                        }
-                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-                        {
-                        decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                        /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+                         * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+                         * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+                        rr->length -= mac_size;
+                        mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                         }
+
+                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+                if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_bcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                        enc_err = -1;
+                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+                        enc_err = -1;
                 }
 
-        if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+        if (enc_err < 0)
                 {
                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index d87fd51cfa..7fc110df64 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -215,6 +215,15 @@
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
 
+#define l2n8(l,c)       (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
 #define n2l6(c,l)       (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
                          l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
                          l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
@@ -1131,4 +1140,33 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
 
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size);
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size);
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+        const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned char* md_out,
+        size_t* md_out_size,
+        const unsigned char header[13],
+        const unsigned char *data,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+        const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+        unsigned mac_secret_length,
+        char is_sslv3);
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+        const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
index f7bdeb3b9d..448eef274f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -667,12 +667,21 @@ err:
         return(ret);
         }
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         {
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
+        int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
@@ -729,11 +738,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-        if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-                (enc == NULL))
+        if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
                 {
                 memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
                 rec->input=rec->data;
+                ret = 1;
                 }
         else
                 {
@@ -797,13 +806,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 {
-                unsigned long ui;
+                unsigned long ui;
                 printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
                 printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
                 printf("\t\tIV: ");
                 for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
                 printf("\n");
@@ -816,13 +825,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (!send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                                {
-                                if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-                                        return -1;
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                 return 0;
-                                }
                         }
                 
                 i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -839,68 +842,24 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 {
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+                unsigned long i;
+                printf("\trec->data=");
                 for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+                }
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+                ret = 1;
+                if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+                        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                        {
-                        ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-                        i++;
-                        /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-                         * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-                         * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-                         * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-                         * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-                         * [steve]
-                         */
-                        if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                                && !s->expand)
-                                {
-                                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-                                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-                                        "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-                                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-                                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                        i--;
-                                }
-                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                        if (i > (int)rec->length)
-                                {
-                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-                                return -1;
-                                }
-                        for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-                                {
-                                if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-                                        {
-                                        /* Incorrect padding */
-                                        return -1;
-                                        }
-                                }
-                        rec->length -=i;
-                        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-                                && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-                                {
-                                if (bs > (int)rec->length)
-                                        return -1;
-                                rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
-                                rec->input += bs;
-                                rec->length -= bs;
-                                }
-                        }
+                        ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
                 if (pad && !send)
                         rec->length -= pad;
                 }
-        return(1);
+        return ret;
         }
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
         {
         unsigned int ret;
@@ -990,10 +949,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         unsigned char *seq;
         EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-        size_t md_size;
+        size_t md_size, orig_len;
         int i;
         EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-        unsigned char buf[5]; 
+        unsigned char header[13];
         int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
         int t;
 
@@ -1014,12 +973,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
         md_size=t;
 
-        buf[0]=rec->type;
-        buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-        buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-        buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-        buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
         /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
         if (stream_mac) 
                 {
@@ -1038,17 +991,55 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                 s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
                 memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+                memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
                 }
         else
-                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+                memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-        t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+        /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+        orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+        rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+        header[8]=rec->type;
+        header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+        header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+        header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+        header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+        if (!send &&
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+            ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+                {
+                /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+                 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+                 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+                 * timing-oracle. */
+                ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+                        mac_ctx,
+                        md, &md_size,
+                        header, rec->input,
+                        rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+                        0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+                t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+                OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+                if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+                        tls_fips_digest_extra(
+                                        ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+                                        mac_ctx, rec->input,
+                                        rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+                }
                 
-        if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+        if (!stream_mac)
+                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 27c8e3460d..bfd4731365 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
         HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
         HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
         HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-        if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                 return 2;
         /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
         /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile b/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile
index 74e3baa94a..15b761c9a8 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.26 2012/10/13 21:31:56 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.27 2013/02/14 15:11:44 markus Exp $
 
 LIB=    ssl
 
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRCS=\
         ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
         ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
         bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c
+SRCS+=  s3_cbc.c
 
 HDRS=   srtp.h ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h
 
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
index d87fd51cfa..7fc110df64 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -215,6 +215,15 @@
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
 
+#define l2n8(l,c)       (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
 #define n2l6(c,l)       (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
                          l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
                          l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
@@ -1131,4 +1140,33 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
 
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size);
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            unsigned block_size,
+                            unsigned mac_size);
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+        const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+        unsigned char* md_out,
+        size_t* md_out_size,
+        const unsigned char header[13],
+        const unsigned char *data,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+        size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+        const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+        unsigned mac_secret_length,
+        char is_sslv3);
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+        const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
index f7bdeb3b9d..448eef274f 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -667,12 +667,21 @@ err:
         return(ret);
         }
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         {
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
+        int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
@@ -729,11 +738,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-        if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-                (enc == NULL))
+        if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
                 {
                 memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
                 rec->input=rec->data;
+                ret = 1;
                 }
         else
                 {
@@ -797,13 +806,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 {
-                unsigned long ui;
+                unsigned long ui;
                 printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
                 printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
                 printf("\t\tIV: ");
                 for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
                 printf("\n");
@@ -816,13 +825,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (!send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                                {
-                                if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-                                        return -1;
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                 return 0;
-                                }
                         }
                 
                 i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -839,68 +842,24 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 {
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+                unsigned long i;
+                printf("\trec->data=");
                 for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+                }
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+                ret = 1;
+                if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+                        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-                        {
-                        ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-                        i++;
-                        /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-                         * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-                         * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-                         * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-                         * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-                         * [steve]
-                         */
-                        if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-                                && !s->expand)
-                                {
-                                /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-                                if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-                                        "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-                                        s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-                                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                                        i--;
-                                }
-                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                        if (i > (int)rec->length)
-                                {
-                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-                                 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-                                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-                                return -1;
-                                }
-                        for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-                                {
-                                if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-                                        {
-                                        /* Incorrect padding */
-                                        return -1;
-                                        }
-                                }
-                        rec->length -=i;
-                        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-                                && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-                                {
-                                if (bs > (int)rec->length)
-                                        return -1;
-                                rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
-                                rec->input += bs;
-                                rec->length -= bs;
-                                }
-                        }
+                        ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
                 if (pad && !send)
                         rec->length -= pad;
                 }
-        return(1);
+        return ret;
         }
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
         {
         unsigned int ret;
@@ -990,10 +949,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         unsigned char *seq;
         EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-        size_t md_size;
+        size_t md_size, orig_len;
         int i;
         EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-        unsigned char buf[5]; 
+        unsigned char header[13];
         int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
         int t;
 
@@ -1014,12 +973,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
         md_size=t;
 
-        buf[0]=rec->type;
-        buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-        buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-        buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-        buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
         /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
         if (stream_mac) 
                 {
@@ -1038,17 +991,55 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                 s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
                 memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+                memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
                 }
         else
-                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+                memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-        t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+        /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+        orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+        rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+        header[8]=rec->type;
+        header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+        header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+        header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+        header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+        if (!send &&
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+            ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+                {
+                /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+                 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+                 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+                 * timing-oracle. */
+                ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+                        mac_ctx,
+                        md, &md_size,
+                        header, rec->input,
+                        rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+                        0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+                t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+                OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+                if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+                        tls_fips_digest_extra(
+                                        ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+                                        mac_ctx, rec->input,
+                                        rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+                }
                 
-        if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+        if (!stream_mac)
+                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
index 27c8e3460d..bfd4731365 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
         HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
         HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
         HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-        if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+        if (timingsafe_bcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                 return 2;
         /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
         /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */