patch from openssl for multiple issues:

missing padding check in aesni functions
overflow in evp encode functions
use of invalid negative asn.1 types
ok beck

4 files changed, 40 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
index c0fb0a3802..d12890ec15 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: a_d2i_fp.c,v 1.11 2014/07/13 11:10:20 miod Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: a_d2i_fp.c,v 1.12 2016/05/03 12:38:53 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
 }
 
 #define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
 static int
 asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 {
@@ -167,18 +168,22 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                 if (want >= (len - off)) {
                         want -= (len - off);
 
-                        if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        if (len + want < len ||
+                            !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
                         if ((i < 0) && ((len - off) == 0)) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         if (i > 0) {
                                 if (len + i < len) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
                                 len += i;
@@ -206,7 +211,8 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                         /* no data body so go round again */
                         eos++;
                         if (eos < 0) {
-                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+                                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                         want = HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -221,28 +227,45 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                         /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
                         want = c.slen;
                         if (want > (len - off)) {
+                                size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
                                 want -= (len - off);
                                 if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
                                     len+want < len) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
-                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                /*
+                                 * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+                                 * so we can return an error for EOF without
+                                 * having to allocate the entire content length
+                                 * in one go.
+                                 */
+                                size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+                                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+                                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                            ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                         goto err;
                                 }
-                                while (want > 0) {
-                                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
+                                want -= chunk;
+                                while (chunk > 0) {
+                                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
                                         if (i <= 0) {
                                                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
                                                     ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                                                 goto err;
                                         }
-                                        /* This can't overflow because
-                                         * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
+                                        /*
+                                         * This can't overflow because |len+want|
+                                         * didn't overflow.
+                                         */
                                         len += i;
-                                        want -= i;
+                                        chunk -= i;
                                 }
+                                if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+                                        chunk_max *= 2;
                         }
                         if (off + c.slen < off) {
                                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_type.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_type.c
index 38b3c65beb..24f8756e73 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_type.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: a_type.c,v 1.16 2015/03/19 14:00:22 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: a_type.c,v 1.17 2016/05/03 12:38:53 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -127,9 +127,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
         case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
         case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
         case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 23a6740115..55809babb8 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tasn_dec.c,v 1.29 2015/12/12 21:05:11 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tasn_dec.c,v 1.30 2016/05/03 12:38:53 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2000.
  */
@@ -861,9 +861,7 @@ asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype,
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
                 tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
                 if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
                         goto err;
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
index 0a6426a95e..f4b8b300ca 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tasn_enc.c,v 1.17 2015/12/22 08:44:44 mmcc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tasn_enc.c,v 1.18 2016/05/03 12:38:53 tedu Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2000.
  */
@@ -603,9 +603,7 @@ asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
                 break;
 
         case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
         case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-        case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
                 /* These are all have the same content format
                  * as ASN1_INTEGER
                  */