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author | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
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committer | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
commit | eb8dd9dca1228af0cd132f515509051ecfabf6f6 (patch) | |
tree | edb6da6af7e865d488dc1a29309f1e1ec226e603 /src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c | |
parent | 247f0352e0ed72a4f476db9dc91f4d982bc83eb2 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.gz openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.bz2 openbsd-tb_20250414.zip |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'.tb_20250414
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c | 490 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 490 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c deleted file mode 100644 index 86b1ad9e83..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,490 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: cms_kari.c,v 1.17 2024/11/01 18:34:06 tb Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* | ||
3 | * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | ||
4 | * project. | ||
5 | */ | ||
6 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
7 | * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
10 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
11 | * are met: | ||
12 | * | ||
13 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
14 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
17 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
18 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
19 | * distribution. | ||
20 | * | ||
21 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
22 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
23 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
24 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
25 | * | ||
26 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
27 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
28 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
29 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
30 | * | ||
31 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
32 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
33 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
34 | * | ||
35 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
36 | * acknowledgment: | ||
37 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
38 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
39 | * | ||
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
41 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
43 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
44 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
45 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
46 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
47 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
49 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
50 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
51 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * ==================================================================== | ||
53 | */ | ||
54 | |||
55 | #include <stdlib.h> | ||
56 | #include <string.h> | ||
57 | |||
58 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
59 | #include <openssl/cms.h> | ||
60 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
61 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include "cms_local.h" | ||
64 | |||
65 | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ | ||
66 | |||
67 | int | ||
68 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, | ||
69 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) | ||
70 | { | ||
71 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | ||
72 | CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | ||
73 | return 0; | ||
74 | } | ||
75 | if (palg) | ||
76 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; | ||
77 | if (pukm) | ||
78 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; | ||
79 | |||
80 | return 1; | ||
81 | } | ||
82 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg); | ||
83 | |||
84 | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ | ||
85 | |||
86 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) * | ||
87 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | ||
88 | { | ||
89 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | ||
90 | CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | ||
91 | return NULL; | ||
92 | } | ||
93 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; | ||
94 | } | ||
95 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks); | ||
96 | |||
97 | int | ||
98 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **pubalg, | ||
99 | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, | ||
100 | ASN1_INTEGER **sno) | ||
101 | { | ||
102 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; | ||
103 | |||
104 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | ||
105 | CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | ||
106 | return 0; | ||
107 | } | ||
108 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; | ||
109 | if (issuer) | ||
110 | *issuer = NULL; | ||
111 | if (sno) | ||
112 | *sno = NULL; | ||
113 | if (keyid) | ||
114 | *keyid = NULL; | ||
115 | if (pubalg) | ||
116 | *pubalg = NULL; | ||
117 | if (pubkey) | ||
118 | *pubkey = NULL; | ||
119 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { | ||
120 | if (issuer) | ||
121 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; | ||
122 | if (sno) | ||
123 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; | ||
124 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { | ||
125 | if (keyid) | ||
126 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; | ||
127 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { | ||
128 | if (pubalg) | ||
129 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; | ||
130 | if (pubkey) | ||
131 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; | ||
132 | } else | ||
133 | return 0; | ||
134 | |||
135 | return 1; | ||
136 | } | ||
137 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id); | ||
138 | |||
139 | int | ||
140 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) | ||
141 | { | ||
142 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; | ||
143 | |||
144 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | ||
145 | CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | ||
146 | return -2; | ||
147 | } | ||
148 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; | ||
149 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) | ||
150 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); | ||
151 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) | ||
152 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); | ||
153 | |||
154 | return -1; | ||
155 | } | ||
156 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp); | ||
157 | |||
158 | int | ||
159 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, | ||
160 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, | ||
161 | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) | ||
162 | { | ||
163 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; | ||
164 | |||
165 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { | ||
166 | if (issuer) | ||
167 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; | ||
168 | if (sno) | ||
169 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; | ||
170 | if (keyid) | ||
171 | *keyid = NULL; | ||
172 | if (tm) | ||
173 | *tm = NULL; | ||
174 | if (other) | ||
175 | *other = NULL; | ||
176 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { | ||
177 | if (keyid) | ||
178 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; | ||
179 | if (tm) | ||
180 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; | ||
181 | if (other) | ||
182 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; | ||
183 | if (issuer) | ||
184 | *issuer = NULL; | ||
185 | if (sno) | ||
186 | *sno = NULL; | ||
187 | } else | ||
188 | return 0; | ||
189 | |||
190 | return 1; | ||
191 | } | ||
192 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id); | ||
193 | |||
194 | int | ||
195 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, X509 *cert) | ||
196 | { | ||
197 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; | ||
198 | |||
199 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) | ||
200 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); | ||
201 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) | ||
202 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); | ||
203 | else | ||
204 | return -1; | ||
205 | } | ||
206 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp); | ||
207 | |||
208 | int | ||
209 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) | ||
210 | { | ||
211 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; | ||
212 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; | ||
213 | |||
214 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); | ||
215 | kari->pctx = NULL; | ||
216 | if (!pk) | ||
217 | return 1; | ||
218 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | ||
219 | if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx)) | ||
220 | goto err; | ||
221 | kari->pctx = pctx; | ||
222 | return 1; | ||
223 | |||
224 | err: | ||
225 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | ||
226 | return 0; | ||
227 | } | ||
228 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey); | ||
229 | |||
230 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX * | ||
231 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | ||
232 | { | ||
233 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) | ||
234 | return ri->d.kari->ctx; | ||
235 | return NULL; | ||
236 | } | ||
237 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx); | ||
238 | |||
239 | /* | ||
240 | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK | ||
241 | * or the encrypted CEK. | ||
242 | */ | ||
243 | |||
244 | static int | ||
245 | cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in, | ||
246 | size_t inlen, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) | ||
247 | { | ||
248 | /* Key encryption key */ | ||
249 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; | ||
250 | size_t keklen; | ||
251 | int rv = 0; | ||
252 | unsigned char *out = NULL; | ||
253 | int outlen; | ||
254 | |||
255 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx); | ||
256 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) | ||
257 | return 0; | ||
258 | /* Derive KEK */ | ||
259 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) | ||
260 | goto err; | ||
261 | /* Set KEK in context */ | ||
262 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) | ||
263 | goto err; | ||
264 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ | ||
265 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) | ||
266 | goto err; | ||
267 | out = malloc(outlen); | ||
268 | if (out == NULL) | ||
269 | goto err; | ||
270 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) | ||
271 | goto err; | ||
272 | *pout = out; | ||
273 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; | ||
274 | rv = 1; | ||
275 | |||
276 | err: | ||
277 | explicit_bzero(kek, keklen); | ||
278 | if (!rv) | ||
279 | free(out); | ||
280 | (void)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); | ||
281 | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ | ||
282 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); | ||
283 | kari->pctx = NULL; | ||
284 | |||
285 | return rv; | ||
286 | } | ||
287 | |||
288 | int | ||
289 | CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, | ||
290 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) | ||
291 | { | ||
292 | int rv = 0; | ||
293 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; | ||
294 | size_t enckeylen; | ||
295 | size_t ceklen; | ||
296 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; | ||
297 | |||
298 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; | ||
299 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; | ||
300 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ | ||
301 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) | ||
302 | goto err; | ||
303 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ | ||
304 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) | ||
305 | goto err; | ||
306 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; | ||
307 | freezero(ec->key, ec->keylen); | ||
308 | ec->key = cek; | ||
309 | ec->keylen = ceklen; | ||
310 | cek = NULL; | ||
311 | rv = 1; | ||
312 | |||
313 | err: | ||
314 | free(cek); | ||
315 | |||
316 | return rv; | ||
317 | } | ||
318 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt); | ||
319 | |||
320 | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ | ||
321 | static int | ||
322 | cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, EVP_PKEY *pk) | ||
323 | { | ||
324 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | ||
325 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; | ||
326 | int rv = 0; | ||
327 | |||
328 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | ||
329 | if (!pctx) | ||
330 | goto err; | ||
331 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) | ||
332 | goto err; | ||
333 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) | ||
334 | goto err; | ||
335 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | ||
336 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); | ||
337 | if (!pctx) | ||
338 | goto err; | ||
339 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) | ||
340 | goto err; | ||
341 | kari->pctx = pctx; | ||
342 | rv = 1; | ||
343 | |||
344 | err: | ||
345 | if (!rv) | ||
346 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | ||
347 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); | ||
348 | |||
349 | return rv; | ||
350 | } | ||
351 | |||
352 | /* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */ | ||
353 | |||
354 | int | ||
355 | cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, | ||
356 | unsigned int flags) | ||
357 | { | ||
358 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; | ||
359 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; | ||
360 | |||
361 | ri->d.kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_it); | ||
362 | if (!ri->d.kari) | ||
363 | return 0; | ||
364 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; | ||
365 | |||
366 | kari = ri->d.kari; | ||
367 | kari->version = 3; | ||
368 | |||
369 | rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it); | ||
370 | if (rek == NULL) | ||
371 | return 0; | ||
372 | |||
373 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { | ||
374 | ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)rek, &CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it); | ||
375 | return 0; | ||
376 | } | ||
377 | |||
378 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { | ||
379 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; | ||
380 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = (CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_it); | ||
381 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) | ||
382 | return 0; | ||
383 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) | ||
384 | return 0; | ||
385 | } else { | ||
386 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; | ||
387 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) | ||
388 | return 0; | ||
389 | } | ||
390 | |||
391 | /* Create ephemeral key */ | ||
392 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) | ||
393 | return 0; | ||
394 | |||
395 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); | ||
396 | rek->pkey = pk; | ||
397 | |||
398 | return 1; | ||
399 | } | ||
400 | |||
401 | static int | ||
402 | cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) | ||
403 | { | ||
404 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; | ||
405 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; | ||
406 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); | ||
407 | |||
408 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ | ||
409 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); | ||
410 | |||
411 | if (kekcipher) { | ||
412 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) | ||
413 | return 0; | ||
414 | return 1; | ||
415 | } | ||
416 | /* | ||
417 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use | ||
418 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. | ||
419 | */ | ||
420 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES | ||
421 | #if 0 | ||
422 | /* | ||
423 | * XXX - we do not currently support DES3 wrap and probably should just | ||
424 | * drop this code. | ||
425 | */ | ||
426 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) | ||
427 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); | ||
428 | else | ||
429 | #endif | ||
430 | #endif | ||
431 | if (keylen <= 16) | ||
432 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); | ||
433 | else if (keylen <= 24) | ||
434 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); | ||
435 | else | ||
436 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); | ||
437 | |||
438 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); | ||
439 | } | ||
440 | |||
441 | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ | ||
442 | |||
443 | int | ||
444 | cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | ||
445 | { | ||
446 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; | ||
447 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; | ||
448 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; | ||
449 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; | ||
450 | int i; | ||
451 | |||
452 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | ||
453 | CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | ||
454 | return 0; | ||
455 | } | ||
456 | kari = ri->d.kari; | ||
457 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; | ||
458 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; | ||
459 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ | ||
460 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) | ||
461 | return 0; | ||
462 | /* | ||
463 | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key | ||
464 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. | ||
465 | */ | ||
466 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) { | ||
467 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; | ||
468 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; | ||
469 | oik->d.originatorKey = (CMS_OriginatorPublicKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_it); | ||
470 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey) | ||
471 | return 0; | ||
472 | } | ||
473 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ | ||
474 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) | ||
475 | return 0; | ||
476 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ | ||
477 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { | ||
478 | unsigned char *enckey; | ||
479 | size_t enckeylen; | ||
480 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); | ||
481 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) | ||
482 | return 0; | ||
483 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, | ||
484 | kari, 1)) | ||
485 | return 0; | ||
486 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); | ||
487 | } | ||
488 | |||
489 | return 1; | ||
490 | } | ||