Mechanical KNF in preparation for changing

1 files changed, 315 insertions, 288 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c
index 4ff36e2fbd..ca915b763e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ct/ct_sct.c
@@ -19,378 +19,405 @@
 
 #include "ct_local.h"
 
-SCT *SCT_new(void)
+SCT *
+SCT_new(void)
 {
-    SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
+        SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
 
-    if (sct == NULL) {
-        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
+        if (sct == NULL) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return NULL;
+        }
 
-    sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
-    sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
-    return sct;
+        sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
+        sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
+        return sct;
 }
 
-void SCT_free(SCT *sct)
+void
+SCT_free(SCT *sct)
 {
-    if (sct == NULL)
-        return;
-
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->sct);
-    OPENSSL_free(sct);
+        if (sct == NULL)
+                return;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->sct);
+        OPENSSL_free(sct);
 }
 
-void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a)
+void
+SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a)
 {
-    sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free);
+        sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free);
 }
 
-int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
+int
+SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
 {
-    if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
-        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    sct->version = version;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-    return 1;
+        if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        sct->version = version;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        return 1;
 }
 
-int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
+int
+SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
 {
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-
-    switch (entry_type) {
-    case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
-    case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
-        sct->entry_type = entry_type;
-        return 1;
-    case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET:
-        break;
-    }
-    CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
-    return 0;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+        switch (entry_type) {
+        case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
+        case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
+                sct->entry_type = entry_type;
+                return 1;
+        case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET:
+                break;
+        }
+        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
+        return 0;
 }
 
-int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
+int
+SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
 {
-    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
-        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
-    sct->log_id = log_id;
-    sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-    return 1;
+        if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+        sct->log_id = log_id;
+        sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        return 1;
 }
 
-int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
+int
+SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
 {
-    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
-        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
-    sct->log_id = NULL;
-    sct->log_id_len = 0;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-
-    if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
-        sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
-        if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
-            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
-    }
-    return 1;
+        if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
+                CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
+        sct->log_id = NULL;
+        sct->log_id_len = 0;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+        if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
+                sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
+                if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
+                        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
+        }
+        return 1;
 }
 
 
-void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
+void
+SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
 {
-    sct->timestamp = timestamp;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        sct->timestamp = timestamp;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
 }
 
-int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
+int
+SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
 {
-    switch (nid) {
-    case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
-        sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
-        sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-        return 1;
-    case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
-        sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
-        sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-        return 1;
-    default:
-        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
-        return 0;
-    }
+        switch (nid) {
+        case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
+                sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
+                sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+                return 1;
+        case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
+                sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
+                sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+                return 1;
+        default:
+                CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
+                return 0;
+        }
 }
 
-void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
+void
+SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
-    sct->ext = ext;
-    sct->ext_len = ext_len;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+        sct->ext = ext;
+        sct->ext_len = ext_len;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
 }
 
-int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
+int
+SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
-    sct->ext = NULL;
-    sct->ext_len = 0;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-
-    if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
-        sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
-        if (sct->ext == NULL) {
-            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        sct->ext_len = ext_len;
-    }
-    return 1;
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
+        sct->ext = NULL;
+        sct->ext_len = 0;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+        if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
+                sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
+                if (sct->ext == NULL) {
+                        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                sct->ext_len = ext_len;
+        }
+        return 1;
 }
 
-void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+void
+SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
-    sct->sig = sig;
-    sct->sig_len = sig_len;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+        sct->sig = sig;
+        sct->sig_len = sig_len;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
 }
 
-int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+int
+SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
-    sct->sig = NULL;
-    sct->sig_len = 0;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-
-    if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
-        sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
-        if (sct->sig == NULL) {
-            CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        sct->sig_len = sig_len;
-    }
-    return 1;
+        OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
+        sct->sig = NULL;
+        sct->sig_len = 0;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
+        if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
+                sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
+                if (sct->sig == NULL) {
+                        CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                sct->sig_len = sig_len;
+        }
+        return 1;
 }
 
-sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct)
+sct_version_t
+SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return sct->version;
+        return sct->version;
 }
 
-ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct)
+ct_log_entry_type_t
+SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return sct->entry_type;
+        return sct->entry_type;
 }
 
-size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
+size_t
+SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
 {
-    *log_id = sct->log_id;
-    return sct->log_id_len;
+        *log_id = sct->log_id;
+        return sct->log_id_len;
 }
 
-uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
+uint64_t
+SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return sct->timestamp;
+        return sct->timestamp;
 }
 
-int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct)
+int
+SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
-        if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
-            switch (sct->sig_alg) {
-            case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-                return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
-            case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-                return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
-            default:
-                return NID_undef;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return NID_undef;
+        if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+                if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+                        switch (sct->sig_alg) {
+                        case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                                return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+                        case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                                return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
+                        default:
+                                return NID_undef;
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+        return NID_undef;
 }
 
-size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext)
+size_t
+SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext)
 {
-    *ext = sct->ext;
-    return sct->ext_len;
+        *ext = sct->ext;
+        return sct->ext_len;
 }
 
-size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig)
+size_t
+SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig)
 {
-    *sig = sct->sig;
-    return sct->sig_len;
+        *sig = sct->sig;
+        return sct->sig_len;
 }
 
-int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
+int
+SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    switch (sct->version) {
-    case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET:
-        return 0;
-    case SCT_VERSION_V1:
-        return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct);
-    default:
-        return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */
-    }
+        switch (sct->version) {
+        case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET:
+                return 0;
+        case SCT_VERSION_V1:
+                return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct);
+        default:
+                return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */
+        }
 }
 
-int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
+int
+SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef &&
-        sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0;
+        return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef && sct->sig != NULL &&
+            sct->sig_len > 0;
 }
 
-sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
+sct_source_t
+SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return sct->source;
+        return sct->source;
 }
 
-int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
+int
+SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
 {
-    sct->source = source;
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
-    switch (source) {
-    case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
-    case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
-        return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
-    case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
-        return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
-    case SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN:
-        break;
-    }
-    /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
-    return 1;
+        sct->source = source;
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+        switch (source) {
+        case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
+        case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
+                return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
+        case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
+                return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
+        case SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN:
+                break;
+        }
+        /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
+        return 1;
 }
 
-sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
+sct_validation_status_t
+SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
 {
-    return sct->validation_status;
+        return sct->validation_status;
 }
 
-int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+int
+SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    int is_sct_valid = -1;
-    SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
-    X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
-    const CTLOG *log;
-
-    /*
-     * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
-     * let alone validate one.  So we return validation failure (0).
-     */
-    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
-                                     sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
-
-    /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
-    if (log == NULL) {
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
-    if (sctx == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
-        goto err;
-    if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
-        EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
-
-        if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
-            sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
-            goto end;
-        }
-
-        issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
-
-        if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
-            goto err;
-        if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
-
-    /*
-     * XXX: Potential for optimization.  This repeats some idempotent heavy
-     * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
-     * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
-     * processed.  So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
-     * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
-     *
-     * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
-     * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
-     * memory condition.  When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
-     * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
-     * validation status.  That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
-     * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
-     * errors.  Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
-     * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
-     * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
-     * application decide what to do.
-     */
-    if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
-    else
-        sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
-            SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
-
-end:
-    is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
-err:
-    X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
-    X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
-    SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
-
-    return is_sct_valid;
+        int is_sct_valid = -1;
+        SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+        X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
+        const CTLOG *log;
+
+        /*
+         * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+         * let alone validate one.  So we return validation failure (0).
+         */
+        if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, sct->log_id,
+            sct->log_id_len);
+
+        /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
+        if (log == NULL) {
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
+        if (sctx == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+        if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
+                goto err;
+        if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
+                goto err;
+
+        if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
+                EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
+
+                if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
+                        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+                        goto end;
+                }
+
+                issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
+
+                if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
+                        goto err;
+                if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
+                        goto err;
+        }
+
+        SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
+
+        /*
+         * XXX: Potential for optimization.  This repeats some idempotent heavy
+         * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+         * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+         * processed.  So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
+         * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+         *
+         * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+         * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+         * memory condition.  When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+         * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+         * validation status.  That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+         * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+         * errors.  Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+         * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+         * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+         * application decide what to do.
+         */
+        if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+        else
+                sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+                    SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
+
+ end:
+        is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
+ err:
+        X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
+        X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
+        SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
+
+        return is_sct_valid;
 }
 
-int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+int
+SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    int are_scts_valid = 1;
-    int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
-    int i;
+        int are_scts_valid = 1;
+        int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+        int i;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
-        int is_sct_valid = -1;
-        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+        for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
+                int is_sct_valid = -1;
+                SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
 
-        if (sct == NULL)
-            continue;
+                if (sct == NULL)
+                        continue;
 
-        is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
-        if (is_sct_valid < 0)
-            return is_sct_valid;
-        are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
-    }
+                is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
+                if (is_sct_valid < 0)
+                        return is_sct_valid;
+                are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
+        }
 
-    return are_scts_valid;
+        return are_scts_valid;
 }