Fix a small timing side channel in ecdsa_sign_setup(). Up to whitespace

this is OpennSSL commit 4a089bbdf11f9e231cc68f42bba934c954d81a49.

ok beck, jsing

Original commit message:

commit 4a089bbdf11f9e231cc68f42bba934c954d81a49
Author: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Date:   Wed Nov 1 06:58:39 2017 +1000

    Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to determine some
    information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
    from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

    This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

    * For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
      more information.

    * For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
      to leak a small amount of information.

    Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
    reporting this issue.

    Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)]

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions