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authortb <>2020-12-04 08:55:30 +0000
committertb <>2020-12-04 08:55:30 +0000
commiteba5b622a3ad6c48a28a09d15ca32cdfac91f91b (patch)
treeca443fbe605894704c5097fc9a5a6d9acc5a1b63 /src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
parent4dd2176959a6cdcb7f7ea0d8e3883f1ea62b1e55 (diff)
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Move point-on-curve check to set_affine_coordinates
Bad API design makes it possible to set an EC_KEY public key to a point not on the curve. As a consequence, it was possible to have bogus ECDSA signatures validated. In practice, all software uses either EC_POINT_oct2point*() to unmarshal public keys or issues a call to EC_KEY_check_key() after setting it. This way, a point on curve check is performed and the problem is mitigated. In OpenSSL commit 1e2012b7ff4a5f12273446b281775faa5c8a1858, Emilia Kasper moved the point-on-curve check from EC_POINT_oct2point to EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_*, which results in more checking. In addition to this commit, we also check in the currently unused codepath of a user set callback for setting compressed coordinates, just in case this will be used at some point in the future. The documentation of EC_KEY_check_key() is very vague on what it checks and when checks are needed. It could certainly be improved a lot. It's also strange that EC_KEY_set_key() performs no checks, while EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() implicitly calls EC_KEY_check_key(). It's a mess. Issue found and reported by Guido Vranken who also tested an earlier version of this fix. ok jsing
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c18
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index df9061627e..3442c7a324 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.32 2019/09/29 10:09:09 tb Exp $ */ 1/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.33 2020/12/04 08:55:30 tb Exp $ */
2/* 2/*
3 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. 3 * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
4 */ 4 */
@@ -964,7 +964,13 @@ EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
964 ECerror(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); 964 ECerror(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
965 return 0; 965 return 0;
966 } 966 }
967 return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); 967 if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
968 return 0;
969 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
970 ECerror(EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
971 return 0;
972 }
973 return 1;
968} 974}
969 975
970#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 976#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -980,7 +986,13 @@ EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
980 ECerror(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); 986 ECerror(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
981 return 0; 987 return 0;
982 } 988 }
983 return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); 989 if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
990 return 0;
991 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
992 ECerror(EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
993 return 0;
994 }
995 return 1;
984} 996}
985#endif 997#endif
986 998