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author | tb <> | 2020-12-04 08:55:30 +0000 |
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committer | tb <> | 2020-12-04 08:55:30 +0000 |
commit | eba5b622a3ad6c48a28a09d15ca32cdfac91f91b (patch) | |
tree | ca443fbe605894704c5097fc9a5a6d9acc5a1b63 /src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c | |
parent | 4dd2176959a6cdcb7f7ea0d8e3883f1ea62b1e55 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-eba5b622a3ad6c48a28a09d15ca32cdfac91f91b.tar.gz openbsd-eba5b622a3ad6c48a28a09d15ca32cdfac91f91b.tar.bz2 openbsd-eba5b622a3ad6c48a28a09d15ca32cdfac91f91b.zip |
Move point-on-curve check to set_affine_coordinates
Bad API design makes it possible to set an EC_KEY public key to
a point not on the curve. As a consequence, it was possible to
have bogus ECDSA signatures validated. In practice, all software
uses either EC_POINT_oct2point*() to unmarshal public keys or
issues a call to EC_KEY_check_key() after setting it. This way,
a point on curve check is performed and the problem is mitigated.
In OpenSSL commit 1e2012b7ff4a5f12273446b281775faa5c8a1858, Emilia
Kasper moved the point-on-curve check from EC_POINT_oct2point to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_*, which results in more checking.
In addition to this commit, we also check in the currently unused
codepath of a user set callback for setting compressed coordinates,
just in case this will be used at some point in the future.
The documentation of EC_KEY_check_key() is very vague on what it
checks and when checks are needed. It could certainly be improved
a lot. It's also strange that EC_KEY_set_key() performs no checks,
while EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() implicitly calls
EC_KEY_check_key().
It's a mess.
Issue found and reported by Guido Vranken who also tested an earlier
version of this fix.
ok jsing
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c index 90c5ca2e4e..29d9990546 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ec/ecp_oct.c | |||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: ecp_oct.c,v 1.11 2018/07/15 16:27:39 tb Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: ecp_oct.c,v 1.12 2020/12/04 08:55:30 tb Exp $ */ |
2 | /* Includes code written by Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de> | 2 | /* Includes code written by Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de> |
3 | * for the OpenSSL project. | 3 | * for the OpenSSL project. |
4 | * Includes code written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. | 4 | * Includes code written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. |
@@ -362,6 +362,10 @@ ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP * group, EC_POINT * point, | |||
362 | goto err; | 362 | goto err; |
363 | } | 363 | } |
364 | if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { | 364 | if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { |
365 | /* | ||
366 | * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp checks that the point | ||
367 | * is on the curve as required by X9.62. | ||
368 | */ | ||
365 | if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx)) | 369 | if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx)) |
366 | goto err; | 370 | goto err; |
367 | } else { | 371 | } else { |
@@ -377,15 +381,14 @@ ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP * group, EC_POINT * point, | |||
377 | goto err; | 381 | goto err; |
378 | } | 382 | } |
379 | } | 383 | } |
384 | /* | ||
385 | * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp checks that the point is | ||
386 | * on the curve as required by X9.62. | ||
387 | */ | ||
380 | if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) | 388 | if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) |
381 | goto err; | 389 | goto err; |
382 | } | 390 | } |
383 | 391 | ||
384 | /* test required by X9.62 */ | ||
385 | if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) { | ||
386 | ECerror(EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); | ||
387 | goto err; | ||
388 | } | ||
389 | ret = 1; | 392 | ret = 1; |
390 | 393 | ||
391 | err: | 394 | err: |