Merge ECDSA code that will stay into ecdsa.c

discussed with jsing

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 732 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9886852e0f..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,732 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.73 2023/07/05 11:37:46 tb Exp $ */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-#include "bn_local.h"
-#include "ec_local.h"
-#include "ecdsa_local.h"
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 2: convert hashed message into an integer.
- * Use the order_bits leftmost bits if it exceeds the group order.
- */
-static int
-ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *e)
-{
-        const EC_GROUP *group;
-        int digest_bits, order_bits;
-
-        if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, e)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL)
-                return 0;
-        order_bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
-
-        digest_bits = 8 * digest_len;
-        if (digest_bits <= order_bits)
-                return 1;
-
-        return BN_rshift(e, e, digest_bits - order_bits);
-}
-
-int
-ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
-    const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        ECDSA_SIG *sig;
-        int out_len = 0;
-        int ret = 0;
-
-        if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, key)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((out_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &signature)) < 0) {
-                out_len = 0;
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-
- err:
-        *signature_len = out_len;
-        ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, steps 3-8 and 11: Generate k, calculate r and
- * kinv, and clear it. If r == 0, try again with a new random k.
- */
-
-int
-ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, BIGNUM **out_r)
-{
-        const EC_GROUP *group;
-        EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-        BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-        BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL;
-        const BIGNUM *order;
-        BIGNUM *x;
-        int order_bits;
-        int ret = 0;
-
-        BN_free(*out_kinv);
-        *out_kinv = NULL;
-
-        BN_free(*out_r);
-        *out_r = NULL;
-
-        if (key == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if ((k = BN_new()) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((ctx = in_ctx) == NULL)
-                ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-        if (ctx == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-        if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if (BN_cmp(order, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
-                ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Reject curves with an order that is smaller than 80 bits. */
-        if ((order_bits = BN_num_bits(order)) < 80) {
-                ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Preallocate space. */
-        if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
-            !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
-            !BN_set_bit(x, order_bits))
-                goto err;
-
-        /* Step 11: repeat until r != 0. */
-        do {
-                /* Step 3: generate random k. */
-                if (!bn_rand_interval(k, BN_value_one(), order)) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-
-                /*
-                 * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
-                 * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
-                 * bit-length.
-                 *
-                 * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
-                 * a small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum
-                 * that is one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the
-                 * code path used in the constant time implementations
-                 * elsewhere.
-                 *
-                 * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
-                 * conditional copy.
-                 */
-                if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
-                    !BN_add(x, r, order) ||
-                    !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : x))
-                        goto err;
-
-                BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-                /* Step 5: P = k * G. */
-                if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-                /* Steps 6 (and 7): from P = (x, y) retain the x-coordinate. */
-                if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL,
-                    ctx)) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-                /* Step 8: r = x (mod order). */
-                if (!BN_nnmod(r, x, order, ctx)) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-        } while (BN_is_zero(r));
-
-        /* Step 4: calculate kinv. */
-        if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(k, k, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        *out_kinv = k;
-        k = NULL;
-
-        *out_r = r;
-        r = NULL;
-
-        ret = 1;
-
- err:
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-        if (ctx != in_ctx)
-                BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        BN_free(k);
-        BN_free(r);
-        EC_POINT_free(point);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 9: compute s = inv(k)(e + xr) mod order.
- * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the following
- * is calculated using a random blinding value b in [1, order):
- * s = inv(b)(be + bxr)inv(k) mod order.
- */
-
-static int
-ecdsa_compute_s(BIGNUM **out_s, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *kinv,
-    const BIGNUM *r, const EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-        const EC_GROUP *group;
-        const BIGNUM *order, *priv_key;
-        BIGNUM *b, *binv, *be, *bxr;
-        BIGNUM *s = NULL;
-        int ret = 0;
-
-        *out_s = NULL;
-
-        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-        if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((be = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        /*
-         * In a valid ECDSA signature, r must be in [1, order). Since r can be
-         * caller provided - either directly or by replacing sign_setup() - we
-         * can't rely on this being the case.
-         */
-        if (BN_cmp(r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(r, order) >= 0) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if (!bn_rand_interval(b, BN_value_one(), order)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(be, b, e, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!BN_mod_add(s, be, bxr, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        /* s = b(e + xr)k^-1 */
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        /* s = (e + xr)k^-1 */
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Step 11: if s == 0 start over. */
-        if (!BN_is_zero(s)) {
-                *out_s = s;
-                s = NULL;
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-
- err:
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-        BN_free(s);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * It is too expensive to check curve parameters on every sign operation.
- * Instead, cap the number of retries. A single retry is very unlikely, so
- * allowing 32 retries is amply enough.
- */
-#define ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS               32
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5: Section 6.4.1: ECDSA signature generation, steps 2-12.
- * The caller provides the hash of the message, thus performs step 1.
- * Step 10, zeroing k and kinv, is done by BN_free().
- */
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-        BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-        BIGNUM *e;
-        int caller_supplied_values = 0;
-        int attempts = 0;
-        ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-
-        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-        if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        /* Step 2: convert hash into an integer. */
-        if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
-                goto err;
-
-        if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
-                /*
-                 * Use the caller's kinv and r. Don't call ECDSA_sign_setup().
-                 * If we're unable to compute a valid signature, the caller
-                 * must provide new values.
-                 */
-                caller_supplied_values = 1;
-
-                if ((kinv = BN_dup(in_kinv)) == NULL) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-                if ((r = BN_dup(in_r)) == NULL) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-        }
-
-        do {
-                /* Steps 3-8: calculate kinv and r. */
-                if (!caller_supplied_values) {
-                        if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
-                                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
-                                goto err;
-                        }
-                }
-
-                /*
-                 * Steps 9 and 11: if s is non-NULL, we have a valid signature.
-                 */
-                if (!ecdsa_compute_s(&s, e, kinv, r, key, ctx))
-                        goto err;
-                if (s != NULL)
-                        break;
-
-                if (caller_supplied_values) {
-                        ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-
-                if (++attempts > ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) {
-                        ECDSAerror(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
-                        goto err;
-                }
-        } while (1);
-
-        /* Step 12: output (r, s). */
-        if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s)) {
-                ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        r = NULL;
-        s = NULL;
-
- err:
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        BN_free(kinv);
-        BN_free(r);
-        BN_free(s);
-
-        return sig;
-}
-
-int
-ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        ECDSA_SIG *s;
-        unsigned char *der = NULL;
-        const unsigned char *p;
-        int der_len = 0;
-        int ret = -1;
-
-        if ((s = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        p = sigbuf;
-        if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
-        if ((der_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der)) != sig_len)
-                goto err;
-        if (timingsafe_memcmp(sigbuf, der, der_len))
-                goto err;
-
-        ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, key);
-
- err:
-        freezero(der, der_len);
-        ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.2: ECDSA signature verification.
- * The caller provides us with the hash of the message, so has performed step 2.
- */
-
-int
-ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        const EC_GROUP *group;
-        const EC_POINT *pub_key;
-        EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-        const BIGNUM *order;
-        BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-        BIGNUM *e, *sinv, *u, *v, *x;
-        int ret = -1;
-
-        if (key == NULL || sig == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if ((pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-        if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((sinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Step 1: verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */
-        if (BN_cmp(sig->r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-                ret = 0;
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (BN_cmp(sig->s, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
-                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-                ret = 0;
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Step 3: convert the hash into an integer. */
-        if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
-                goto err;
-
-        /* Step 4: compute the inverse of s modulo order. */
-        if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(sinv, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        /* Step 5: compute u = s^-1 * e and v = s^-1 * r (modulo order). */
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(u, e, sinv, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!BN_mod_mul(v, sig->r, sinv, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Steps 6 and 7: compute R = G * u + pub_key * v = (x, y). Reject if
-         * it's the point at infinity - getting affine coordinates fails. Keep
-         * the x coordinate.
-         */
-        if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u, pub_key, v, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-        /* Step 8: convert x to a number in [0, order). */
-        if (!BN_nnmod(x, x, order, ctx)) {
-                ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Step 9: the signature is valid iff the x-coordinate is equal to r. */
-        ret = (BN_cmp(x, sig->r) == 0);
-
- err:
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-        EC_POINT_free(point);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *out_r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        if (key->meth->sign_sig == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return key->meth->sign_sig(digest, digest_len, kinv, out_r, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, signature, signature_len,
-            NULL, NULL, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
-    const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        if (key->meth->sign == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return key->meth->sign(type, digest, digest_len, signature,
-            signature_len, kinv, r, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
-    BIGNUM **out_r)
-{
-        if (key->meth->sign_setup == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return key->meth->sign_setup(key, in_ctx, out_kinv, out_r);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        if (key->meth->verify_sig == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return key->meth->verify_sig(digest, digest_len, sig, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
-    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
-{
-        if (key->meth->verify == NULL) {
-                ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return key->meth->verify(type, digest, digest_len, sigbuf, sig_len, key);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
-{
-        const EC_GROUP *group;
-        const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
-        ECDSA_SIG sig;
-        int ret = 0;
-
-        if (r == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-        sig.r = (BIGNUM *)order;
-        sig.s = (BIGNUM *)order;
-
-        if ((ret = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(&sig, NULL)) < 0)
-                ret = 0;
-
- err:
-        return ret;
-}