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author | tb <> | 2022-08-31 13:01:01 +0000 |
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committer | tb <> | 2022-08-31 13:01:01 +0000 |
commit | d1472daedc6c1d5786dbc4b552ac0f1ad19c65d2 (patch) | |
tree | 8991ebe0360b3e90f90f196c1565ac3ed01531ab /src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c | |
parent | 15eca26842e04912050d30a972fcce04e046da8a (diff) | |
download | openbsd-d1472daedc6c1d5786dbc4b552ac0f1ad19c65d2.tar.gz openbsd-d1472daedc6c1d5786dbc4b552ac0f1ad19c65d2.tar.bz2 openbsd-d1472daedc6c1d5786dbc4b552ac0f1ad19c65d2.zip |
Rework DSA_size() and ECDSA_size()
DSA_size() and ECDSA_size() have a very special hack. They fudge up an
ASN1_INTEGER with a size which is typically > 100 bytes, backed by a
buffer of size 4. This was "fine", however, since they set buf[0] = 0xff,
where the craziness that was i2c_ASN1_INTEGER() only looks at the first
octet (one may then ask why a buffer of size 4 was necessary...).
This changed with the rewrite of i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(), which doesn't
respect this particular hack and rightly assumes that it is fed an
actual ASN1_INTEGER...
Instead, create an appropriate signature and use i2d to determine its
size.
Fixes an out-of-bounds read flagged by ASAN and oss-fuzz.
ok jsing
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions