Remove EVP_PKEY_*check again

This API turned out to be a really bad idea. OpenSSL 3 extended it, with
the result that basically every key type had its own DoS issues fixed in
a recent security release. We eschewed these by having some upper bounds
that kick in when keys get insanely large.

Initially added on tobhe's request who fortunately never used it in iked,
this was picked up only by ruby/openssl (one of the rare projects doing
proper configure checks rather than branching on VERSION defines) and of
course xca, since it uses everything it can. So it was easy to get rid of
this again.

ok beck jsing

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp.h
index 2db8acfa01..7c767758da 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: evp.h,v 1.135 2024/07/09 16:15:37 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: evp.h,v 1.136 2024/08/31 09:14:21 tb Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -985,9 +985,6 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
 int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
 int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
 int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
-int EVP_PKEY_check(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_PKEY_public_check(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
-int EVP_PKEY_param_check(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
 
 void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb);
 EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);