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| author | tb <> | 2023-07-20 06:26:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tb <> | 2023-07-20 06:26:27 +0000 |
| commit | 02b32b9db0a60f8a55706e1f30f429f143a59432 (patch) | |
| tree | 55cccc1b683393b47b9d3306e4fd44c422e35238 /src/lib/libcrypto/man/ECDSA_SIG_new.3 | |
| parent | 54c50b85497b7c540a373873d75748084937f062 (diff) | |
| download | openbsd-02b32b9db0a60f8a55706e1f30f429f143a59432.tar.gz openbsd-02b32b9db0a60f8a55706e1f30f429f143a59432.tar.bz2 openbsd-02b32b9db0a60f8a55706e1f30f429f143a59432.zip | |
Cap the size of numbers we check for primality
We refuse to generate RSA keys larger than 16k and DH keys larger than 10k.
Primality checking with adversarial input is a DoS vector, so simply don't
do this. Introduce a cap of 32k for numbers we try to test for primality,
which should be more than large enough for use withing a non-toolkit crypto
library. This is one way of mitigating the DH_check()/EVP_PKEY_param_check()
issue.
ok jsing miod
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/man/ECDSA_SIG_new.3')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions