Stricter checks of ASN1_INTEGER to reject ASN1_NEG_INTEGER in places when

they don't make sense.

ok beck@

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
index 0f215d2fe2..f2d635fc62 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: p12_crpt.c,v 1.12 2015/09/10 15:56:25 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: p12_crpt.c,v 1.13 2016/11/08 20:01:06 miod Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 1999.
  */
@@ -94,8 +94,11 @@ PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 
         if (!pbe->iter)
                 iter = 1;
-        else
-                iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get (pbe->iter);
+        else if ((iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter)) <= 0) {
+                PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+                PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+                return 0;
+        }
         salt = pbe->salt->data;
         saltlen = pbe->salt->length;
         if (!PKCS12_key_gen (pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID,