Do not feed RSA private key information to the random subsystem as

entropy.  It might be fed to a pluggable random subsystem....

What were they thinking?!

ok guenther

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
index 7750366613..2e100ca457 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
         else
                 e = rsa->e;
 
-        
-        if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
-                {
-                /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
-                 * exponent as unpredictable seed */
-                RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
-                }
-
         if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                 {
                 /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */