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authorcvs2svn <admin@example.com>2015-08-02 21:54:22 +0000
committercvs2svn <admin@example.com>2015-08-02 21:54:22 +0000
commited3760bf4be4a96a89233fb8f8b84a0d44725862 (patch)
tree5609c82060f75c53af0a7641d9b33a88574876cd /src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
parentf8b563fb5ba1524c821d37308f4e6abfc866bc3f (diff)
downloadopenbsd-OPENBSD_5_8_BASE.tar.gz
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This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_5_8_BASE'.OPENBSD_5_8_BASE
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c912
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 912 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,912 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: rsa_eay.c,v 1.39 2015/06/13 08:38:10 doug Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113
114#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
115
116#include <openssl/bn.h>
117#include <openssl/err.h>
118#include <openssl/rsa.h>
119
120static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
122static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
124static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
126static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
128static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
129static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131
132static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = {
133 .name = "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
134 .rsa_pub_enc = RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
135 .rsa_pub_dec = RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
136 .rsa_priv_enc = RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
137 .rsa_priv_dec = RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
138 .rsa_mod_exp = RSA_eay_mod_exp,
139 .bn_mod_exp = BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
140 .init = RSA_eay_init,
141 .finish = RSA_eay_finish,
142};
143
144const RSA_METHOD *
145RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
146{
147 return &rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth;
148}
149
150static int
151RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
152 RSA *rsa, int padding)
153{
154 BIGNUM *f, *ret;
155 int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
156 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
157 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
158
159 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
160 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
161 return -1;
162 }
163
164 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
165 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
166 return -1;
167 }
168
169 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
170 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
171 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
172 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
173 return -1;
174 }
175 }
176
177 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
178 goto err;
179 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
180 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
181 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
182 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
183 buf = malloc(num);
184 if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
185 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
186 goto err;
187 }
188
189 switch (padding) {
190 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
191 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
192 break;
193#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
194 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
195 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
196 break;
197#endif
198 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
199 i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
200 break;
201 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
202 i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
203 break;
204 default:
205 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
206 RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
207 goto err;
208 }
209 if (i <= 0)
210 goto err;
211
212 if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
213 goto err;
214
215 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
216 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
217 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
218 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
219 goto err;
220 }
221
222 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
223 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
224 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
225 goto err;
226
227 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f,rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
228 rsa->_method_mod_n))
229 goto err;
230
231 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
232 * length of the modulus */
233 j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
234 i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
235 for (k = 0; k < num - i; k++)
236 to[k] = 0;
237
238 r = num;
239err:
240 if (ctx != NULL) {
241 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
242 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
243 }
244 if (buf != NULL) {
245 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
246 free(buf);
247 }
248 return r;
249}
250
251static BN_BLINDING *
252rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
253{
254 BN_BLINDING *ret;
255 int got_write_lock = 0;
256 CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
257
258 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
259
260 if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
261 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
262 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
263 got_write_lock = 1;
264
265 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
266 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
267 }
268
269 ret = rsa->blinding;
270 if (ret == NULL)
271 goto err;
272
273 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
274 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
275 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
276 *local = 1;
277 } else {
278 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
279 /*
280 * Instruct rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
281 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
282 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
283 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
284 */
285 *local = 0;
286
287 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
288 if (!got_write_lock) {
289 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
290 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
291 got_write_lock = 1;
292 }
293
294 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
295 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
296 }
297 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
298 }
299
300err:
301 if (got_write_lock)
302 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
303 else
304 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
305 return ret;
306}
307
308static int
309rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx)
310{
311 if (unblind == NULL)
312 /*
313 * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
314 * in BN_BLINDING.
315 */
316 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
317 else {
318 /*
319 * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
320 * outside BN_BLINDING.
321 */
322 int ret;
323 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
324 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
325 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
326 return ret;
327 }
328}
329
330static int
331rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx)
332{
333 /*
334 * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
335 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
336 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
337 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
338 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
339 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
340 */
341 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
342}
343
344/* signing */
345static int
346RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
347 RSA *rsa, int padding)
348{
349 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
350 int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
351 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
352 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
353 int local_blinding = 0;
354 /*
355 * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
356 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
357 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
358 */
359 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
360 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
361
362 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
363 goto err;
364 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
365 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
366 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
367 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
368 buf = malloc(num);
369 if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
370 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
371 goto err;
372 }
373
374 switch (padding) {
375 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
376 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
377 break;
378 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
379 i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
380 break;
381 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
382 i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
383 break;
384 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
385 default:
386 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
387 RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
388 goto err;
389 }
390 if (i <= 0)
391 goto err;
392
393 if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
394 goto err;
395
396 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
397 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
398 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
399 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
400 goto err;
401 }
402
403 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
404 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
405 if (blinding == NULL) {
406 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
408 goto err;
409 }
410 }
411
412 if (blinding != NULL) {
413 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
414 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
415 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
416 goto err;
417 }
418 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
419 goto err;
420 }
421
422 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
423 (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
424 rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL)) {
425 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
426 goto err;
427 } else {
428 BIGNUM local_d;
429 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
430
431 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
432 BN_init(&local_d);
433 d = &local_d;
434 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
435 } else
436 d = rsa->d;
437
438 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
439 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
440 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
441 goto err;
442
443 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
444 rsa->_method_mod_n))
445 goto err;
446 }
447
448 if (blinding)
449 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
450 goto err;
451
452 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
453 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
454 if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
455 res = f;
456 else
457 res = ret;
458 } else
459 res = ret;
460
461 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
462 * length of the modulus */
463 j = BN_num_bytes(res);
464 i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
465 for (k = 0; k < num - i; k++)
466 to[k] = 0;
467
468 r = num;
469err:
470 if (ctx != NULL) {
471 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
472 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
473 }
474 if (buf != NULL) {
475 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
476 free(buf);
477 }
478 return r;
479}
480
481static int
482RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
483 RSA *rsa, int padding)
484{
485 BIGNUM *f, *ret;
486 int j, num = 0, r = -1;
487 unsigned char *p;
488 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
489 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
490 int local_blinding = 0;
491 /*
492 * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
493 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
494 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
495 */
496 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
497 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
498
499 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
500 goto err;
501 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
502 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
503 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
504 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
505 buf = malloc(num);
506 if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
507 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
508 goto err;
509 }
510
511 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
512 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
513 if (flen > num) {
514 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
515 RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
516 goto err;
517 }
518
519 /* make data into a big number */
520 if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
521 goto err;
522
523 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
524 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
525 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
526 goto err;
527 }
528
529 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
530 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
531 if (blinding == NULL) {
532 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
533 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
534 goto err;
535 }
536 }
537
538 if (blinding != NULL) {
539 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
540 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
541 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
542 goto err;
543 }
544 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
545 goto err;
546 }
547
548 /* do the decrypt */
549 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
550 (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
551 rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL)) {
552 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
553 goto err;
554 } else {
555 BIGNUM local_d;
556 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
557
558 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
559 d = &local_d;
560 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
561 } else
562 d = rsa->d;
563
564 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
565 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
566 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
567 goto err;
568 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
569 rsa->_method_mod_n))
570 goto err;
571 }
572
573 if (blinding)
574 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
575 goto err;
576
577 p = buf;
578 j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
579
580 switch (padding) {
581 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
582 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
583 break;
584#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
585 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
586 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
587 break;
588#endif
589 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
590 r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
591 break;
592 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
593 r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
594 break;
595 default:
596 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
597 RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
598 goto err;
599 }
600 if (r < 0)
601 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
602 RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
603
604err:
605 if (ctx != NULL) {
606 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
607 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
608 }
609 if (buf != NULL) {
610 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
611 free(buf);
612 }
613 return r;
614}
615
616/* signature verification */
617static int
618RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
619 RSA *rsa, int padding)
620{
621 BIGNUM *f, *ret;
622 int i, num = 0, r = -1;
623 unsigned char *p;
624 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
625 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
626
627 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
628 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
629 return -1;
630 }
631
632 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
633 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
634 return -1;
635 }
636
637 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
638 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
639 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
640 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
641 return -1;
642 }
643 }
644
645 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
646 goto err;
647 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
648 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
649 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
650 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
651 buf = malloc(num);
652 if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
653 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
654 goto err;
655 }
656
657 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
658 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
659 if (flen > num) {
660 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
661 RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
662 goto err;
663 }
664
665 if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
666 goto err;
667
668 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
669 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
670 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
671 goto err;
672 }
673
674 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
675 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
676 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
677 goto err;
678
679 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
680 rsa->_method_mod_n))
681 goto err;
682
683 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING && (ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)
684 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
685 goto err;
686
687 p = buf;
688 i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
689
690 switch (padding) {
691 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
692 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
693 break;
694 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
695 r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
696 break;
697 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
698 r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
699 break;
700 default:
701 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
702 RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
703 goto err;
704 }
705 if (r < 0)
706 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
707 RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
708
709err:
710 if (ctx != NULL) {
711 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
712 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
713 }
714 if (buf != NULL) {
715 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
716 free(buf);
717 }
718 return r;
719}
720
721static int
722RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
723{
724 BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
725 BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
726 BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
727 int ret = 0;
728
729 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
730 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
731 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
732 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
733 if (r1 == NULL || m1 == NULL || vrfy == NULL) {
734 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_MOD_EXP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
735 goto err;
736 }
737
738 {
739 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
740 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
741
742 /*
743 * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
744 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
745 */
746 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
747 BN_init(&local_p);
748 p = &local_p;
749 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
750
751 BN_init(&local_q);
752 q = &local_q;
753 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
754 } else {
755 p = rsa->p;
756 q = rsa->q;
757 }
758
759 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
760 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p,
761 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
762 goto err;
763 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
764 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
765 goto err;
766 }
767 }
768
769 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
770 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
771 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
772 goto err;
773
774 /* compute I mod q */
775 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
776 c = &local_c;
777 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
778 if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
779 goto err;
780 } else {
781 if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
782 goto err;
783 }
784
785 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
786 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
787 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
788 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
789 } else
790 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
791 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
792 rsa->_method_mod_q))
793 goto err;
794
795 /* compute I mod p */
796 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
797 c = &local_c;
798 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
799 if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
800 goto err;
801 } else {
802 if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
803 goto err;
804 }
805
806 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
807 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
808 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
809 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
810 } else
811 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
812 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
813 rsa->_method_mod_p))
814 goto err;
815
816 if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
817 goto err;
818 /*
819 * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
820 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
821 */
822 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
823 if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
824 goto err;
825
826 if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
827 goto err;
828
829 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
830 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
831 pr1 = &local_r1;
832 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
833 } else
834 pr1 = r1;
835 if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
836 goto err;
837
838 /*
839 * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
840 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
841 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
842 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
843 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
844 * they ensure p > q [steve]
845 */
846 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
847 if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
848 goto err;
849 if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
850 goto err;
851 if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
852 goto err;
853
854 if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
855 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
856 rsa->_method_mod_n))
857 goto err;
858 /*
859 * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
860 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
861 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
862 * for absolute equality, just congruency.
863 */
864 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
865 goto err;
866 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
867 goto err;
868 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
869 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
870 goto err;
871 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
872 /*
873 * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
874 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
875 * mod_exp and return that instead.
876 */
877
878 BIGNUM local_d;
879 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
880
881 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
882 d = &local_d;
883 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
884 } else
885 d = rsa->d;
886 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
887 rsa->_method_mod_n))
888 goto err;
889 }
890 }
891 ret = 1;
892err:
893 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
894 return ret;
895}
896
897static int
898RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
899{
900 rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
901 return 1;
902}
903
904static int
905RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
906{
907 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
908 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
909 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
910
911 return 1;
912}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-09 16:57:25 +0000