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author | tb <> | 2021-12-26 15:16:50 +0000 |
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committer | tb <> | 2021-12-26 15:16:50 +0000 |
commit | c8d92e7494cde45554fdc18c66728a2adbe1bb71 (patch) | |
tree | 6a671dbeeec853ee17f157f9b538e98cd605b1c5 /src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | |
parent | 9656351e09b56a51fb7279fc55f9ec06f3459223 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-c8d92e7494cde45554fdc18c66728a2adbe1bb71.tar.gz openbsd-c8d92e7494cde45554fdc18c66728a2adbe1bb71.tar.bz2 openbsd-c8d92e7494cde45554fdc18c66728a2adbe1bb71.zip |
Consistently call BN_init() before BN_with_flags()
BN_with_flags() preserves the BN_FLG_MALLOCED flag of the destination
which results in a potential use of an uninitialized bit. In practice
this doesn't matter since we don't free the cloned BIGNUMs anyway.
As jsing points out, these are mostly pointless noise and should be
garbage collected. I'll leave that for another rainy day.
Coverity flagged one instance BN_gcd_no_branch(), the rest was found by
the ever so helpful grep(1).
CID 345122
ok jsing
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index 596eb8eb78..1c37d8ef21 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | |||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: rsa_gen.c,v 1.22 2017/01/29 17:49:23 beck Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: rsa_gen.c,v 1.23 2021/12/26 15:16:50 tb Exp $ */ |
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
3 | * All rights reserved. | 3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | 4 | * |
@@ -194,12 +194,14 @@ rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) | |||
194 | if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) /* (p-1)(q-1) */ | 194 | if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) /* (p-1)(q-1) */ |
195 | goto err; | 195 | goto err; |
196 | 196 | ||
197 | BN_init(&pr0); | ||
197 | BN_with_flags(&pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | 198 | BN_with_flags(&pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
198 | 199 | ||
199 | if (!BN_mod_inverse_ct(rsa->d, rsa->e, &pr0, ctx)) /* d */ | 200 | if (!BN_mod_inverse_ct(rsa->d, rsa->e, &pr0, ctx)) /* d */ |
200 | goto err; | 201 | goto err; |
201 | 202 | ||
202 | /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ | 203 | /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ |
204 | BN_init(&d); | ||
203 | BN_with_flags(&d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | 205 | BN_with_flags(&d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
204 | 206 | ||
205 | /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ | 207 | /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ |
@@ -211,6 +213,7 @@ rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) | |||
211 | goto err; | 213 | goto err; |
212 | 214 | ||
213 | /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ | 215 | /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ |
216 | BN_init(&p); | ||
214 | BN_with_flags(&p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | 217 | BN_with_flags(&p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
215 | if (!BN_mod_inverse_ct(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, &p, ctx)) | 218 | if (!BN_mod_inverse_ct(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, &p, ctx)) |
216 | goto err; | 219 | goto err; |