KNF

1 files changed, 79 insertions, 76 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 695df4e0a0..f8f9935fac 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_oaep.c,v 1.16 2014/06/12 15:49:30 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_oaep.c,v 1.17 2014/07/09 08:20:08 miod Exp $ */
 /* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
    basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
 
@@ -28,29 +28,28 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-        const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+            long seedlen);
 
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-        const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-        {
+int
+RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
         int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
         unsigned char *db, *seed;
         unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 
-        if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
-                {
+        if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) {
                 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
-                   RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+                    RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
                 return 0;
-                }
+        }
 
-        if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-                {
-                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+                    RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
                 return 0;
-                }
+        }
 
         to[0] = 0;
         seed = to + 1;
@@ -59,9 +58,9 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
                 return 0;
         memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
-                emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
+            emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
         db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
-        memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
+        memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int)flen);
         if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
                 return 0;
 #ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
@@ -71,65 +70,73 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 #endif
 
         dbmask = malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-        if (dbmask == NULL)
-                {
+        if (dbmask == NULL) {
                 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 return 0;
-                }
+        }
 
-        if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+        if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed,
+            SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
                 return 0;
         for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
                 db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
 
-        if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+        if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db,
+            emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
                 return 0;
         for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
                 seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
 
         free(dbmask);
         return 1;
-        }
+}
 
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-        const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
-        const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-        {
+int
+RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+    const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param,
+    int plen)
+{
         int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
         const unsigned char *maskeddb;
         int lzero;
-        unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        unsigned char *db = NULL;
+        unsigned char seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
         unsigned char *padded_from;
         int bad = 0;
 
         if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-                /* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
-                 * particular ciphertext. */
+                /*
+                 * 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend
+                 * on the particular ciphertext.
+                 */
                 goto decoding_err;
 
         lzero = num - flen;
-        if (lzero < 0)
-                {
-                /* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
+        if (lzero < 0) {
+                /*
+                 * signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
                  * for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
-                 * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
-                 * Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001),
-                 * so we use a 'bad' flag */
+                 * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
+                 * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]",
+                 * CRYPTO 2001), so we use a 'bad' flag
+                 */
                 bad = 1;
                 lzero = 0;
                 flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
-                }
+        }
 
         dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
         db = malloc(dblen + num);
-        if (db == NULL)
-                {
-                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        if (db == NULL) {
+                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP,
+                    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 return -1;
-                }
+        }
 
-        /* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0)
-         * to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero. */
+        /*
+         * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0)
+         * to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero.
+         */
         padded_from = db + dblen;
         memset(padded_from, 0, lzero);
         memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen);
@@ -151,41 +158,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
         if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
                 goto decoding_err;
-        else
-                {
+        else {
                 for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
                         if (db[i] != 0x00)
                                 break;
                 if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01)
                         goto decoding_err;
-                else
-                        {
+                else {
                         /* everything looks OK */
 
                         mlen = dblen - ++i;
-                        if (tlen < mlen)
-                                {
-                                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+                        if (tlen < mlen) {
+                                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP,
+                                    RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
                                 mlen = -1;
-                                }
-                        else
+                        } else
                                 memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
-                        }
                 }
+        }
         free(db);
         return mlen;
 
 decoding_err:
-        /* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
-         * which kind of decoding error happened */
+        /*
+         * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
+         * reveal which kind of decoding error happened
+         */
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
         free(db);
         return -1;
-        }
+}
 
-int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-        const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
-        {
+int
+PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+    long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
         long i, outlen = 0;
         unsigned char cnt[4];
         EVP_MD_CTX c;
@@ -197,39 +204,35 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
         mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
         if (mdlen < 0)
                 goto err;
-        for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
-                {
+        for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
                 cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
                 cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
                 cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
                 cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
-                if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL)
-                        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
-                        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
+                if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL) ||
+                    !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen) ||
+                    !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
                         goto err;
-                if (outlen + mdlen <= len)
-                        {
+                if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
                         if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
                                 goto err;
                         outlen += mdlen;
-                        }
-                else
-                        {
+                } else {
                         if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
                                 goto err;
                         memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
                         outlen = len;
-                        }
                 }
+        }
         rv = 0;
-        err:
+err:
         EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
         return rv;
-        }
+}
 
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
-                 long seedlen)
-        {
+static int
+MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
+{
         return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
-        }
+}
 #endif