diff options
author | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
commit | eb8dd9dca1228af0cd132f515509051ecfabf6f6 (patch) | |
tree | edb6da6af7e865d488dc1a29309f1e1ec226e603 /src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | |
parent | 247f0352e0ed72a4f476db9dc91f4d982bc83eb2 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.gz openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.bz2 openbsd-tb_20250414.zip |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'.tb_20250414
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 911 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 911 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c deleted file mode 100644 index 453570cf74..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,911 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.43 2025/01/17 15:39:19 tb Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | ||
3 | * project 2006. | ||
4 | */ | ||
5 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
6 | * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
9 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
10 | * are met: | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
13 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
14 | * | ||
15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
17 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
18 | * distribution. | ||
19 | * | ||
20 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
21 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
22 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
23 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
24 | * | ||
25 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
26 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
27 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
28 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
29 | * | ||
30 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
31 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
32 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
33 | * | ||
34 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
35 | * acknowledgment: | ||
36 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
37 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
38 | * | ||
39 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
40 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
41 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
42 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
43 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
44 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
45 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
46 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
48 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
49 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
50 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
51 | * ==================================================================== | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
54 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
55 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
56 | * | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <limits.h> | ||
60 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
61 | #include <stdlib.h> | ||
62 | #include <string.h> | ||
63 | |||
64 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
65 | |||
66 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
68 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
69 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
70 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
71 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
72 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
73 | |||
74 | #include "bn_local.h" | ||
75 | #include "evp_local.h" | ||
76 | #include "rsa_local.h" | ||
77 | |||
78 | /* RSA pkey context structure */ | ||
79 | |||
80 | typedef struct { | ||
81 | /* Key gen parameters */ | ||
82 | int nbits; | ||
83 | BIGNUM *pub_exp; | ||
84 | /* Keygen callback info */ | ||
85 | int gentmp[2]; | ||
86 | /* RSA padding mode */ | ||
87 | int pad_mode; | ||
88 | /* message digest */ | ||
89 | const EVP_MD *md; | ||
90 | /* message digest for MGF1 */ | ||
91 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md; | ||
92 | /* PSS salt length */ | ||
93 | int saltlen; | ||
94 | /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ | ||
95 | int min_saltlen; | ||
96 | /* Temp buffer */ | ||
97 | unsigned char *tbuf; | ||
98 | /* OAEP label */ | ||
99 | unsigned char *oaep_label; | ||
100 | size_t oaep_labellen; | ||
101 | } RSA_PKEY_CTX; | ||
102 | |||
103 | /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ | ||
104 | #define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1) | ||
105 | |||
106 | static int | ||
107 | pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
108 | { | ||
109 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx; | ||
110 | |||
111 | if ((rctx = calloc(1, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX))) == NULL) | ||
112 | return 0; | ||
113 | |||
114 | rctx->nbits = 2048; | ||
115 | |||
116 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
117 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | ||
118 | else | ||
119 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | ||
120 | |||
121 | /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ | ||
122 | rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | ||
123 | rctx->min_saltlen = -1; | ||
124 | |||
125 | ctx->data = rctx; | ||
126 | ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; | ||
127 | ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; | ||
128 | |||
129 | return 1; | ||
130 | } | ||
131 | |||
132 | static int | ||
133 | pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) | ||
134 | { | ||
135 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; | ||
136 | |||
137 | if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) | ||
138 | return 0; | ||
139 | |||
140 | sctx = src->data; | ||
141 | dctx = dst->data; | ||
142 | dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; | ||
143 | if (sctx->pub_exp != NULL) { | ||
144 | BN_free(dctx->pub_exp); | ||
145 | if ((dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp)) == NULL) | ||
146 | return 0; | ||
147 | } | ||
148 | dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode; | ||
149 | dctx->md = sctx->md; | ||
150 | dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; | ||
151 | if (sctx->oaep_label != NULL) { | ||
152 | free(dctx->oaep_label); | ||
153 | if ((dctx->oaep_label = calloc(1, sctx->oaep_labellen)) == NULL) | ||
154 | return 0; | ||
155 | memcpy(dctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); | ||
156 | dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen; | ||
157 | } | ||
158 | |||
159 | return 1; | ||
160 | } | ||
161 | |||
162 | static int | ||
163 | setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) | ||
164 | { | ||
165 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | ||
166 | return 1; | ||
167 | if ((ctx->tbuf = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) { | ||
168 | RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
169 | return 0; | ||
170 | } | ||
171 | return 1; | ||
172 | } | ||
173 | |||
174 | static void | ||
175 | pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
176 | { | ||
177 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
178 | |||
179 | if (rctx) { | ||
180 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); | ||
181 | free(rctx->tbuf); | ||
182 | free(rctx->oaep_label); | ||
183 | free(rctx); | ||
184 | } | ||
185 | } | ||
186 | |||
187 | static int | ||
188 | pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, | ||
189 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | ||
190 | { | ||
191 | int ret; | ||
192 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
193 | RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
194 | |||
195 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
196 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
197 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
198 | return -1; | ||
199 | } | ||
200 | |||
201 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
202 | if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) { | ||
203 | RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | ||
204 | return -1; | ||
205 | } | ||
206 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { | ||
207 | RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
208 | return -1; | ||
209 | } | ||
210 | memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); | ||
211 | rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = | ||
212 | RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); | ||
213 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig, | ||
214 | rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | ||
215 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | ||
216 | unsigned int sltmp; | ||
217 | |||
218 | ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, | ||
219 | &sltmp, rsa); | ||
220 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
221 | return ret; | ||
222 | ret = sltmp; | ||
223 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
224 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
225 | return -1; | ||
226 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, | ||
227 | tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen)) | ||
228 | return -1; | ||
229 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, | ||
230 | sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
231 | } else { | ||
232 | return -1; | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | } else { | ||
235 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
236 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
237 | } | ||
238 | if (ret < 0) | ||
239 | return ret; | ||
240 | *siglen = ret; | ||
241 | return 1; | ||
242 | } | ||
243 | |||
244 | static int | ||
245 | pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, | ||
246 | const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) | ||
247 | { | ||
248 | int ret; | ||
249 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
250 | |||
251 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
252 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
253 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
254 | return -1; | ||
255 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, | ||
256 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | ||
257 | if (ret < 1) | ||
258 | return 0; | ||
259 | ret--; | ||
260 | if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != | ||
261 | RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) { | ||
262 | RSAerror(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); | ||
263 | return 0; | ||
264 | } | ||
265 | if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
266 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
267 | return 0; | ||
268 | } | ||
269 | if (rout) | ||
270 | memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret); | ||
271 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | ||
272 | size_t sltmp; | ||
273 | |||
274 | ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0, | ||
275 | rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); | ||
276 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
277 | return 0; | ||
278 | ret = sltmp; | ||
279 | } else { | ||
280 | return -1; | ||
281 | } | ||
282 | } else { | ||
283 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
284 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
285 | } | ||
286 | if (ret < 0) | ||
287 | return ret; | ||
288 | *routlen = ret; | ||
289 | return 1; | ||
290 | } | ||
291 | |||
292 | static int | ||
293 | pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, | ||
294 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | ||
295 | { | ||
296 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
297 | RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
298 | size_t rslen; | ||
299 | |||
300 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
301 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) | ||
302 | return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, | ||
303 | sig, siglen, rsa); | ||
304 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
305 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
306 | return -1; | ||
307 | } | ||
308 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
309 | if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, | ||
310 | siglen) <= 0) | ||
311 | return 0; | ||
312 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
313 | int ret; | ||
314 | |||
315 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
316 | return -1; | ||
317 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, | ||
318 | rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
319 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
320 | return 0; | ||
321 | ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, | ||
322 | rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); | ||
323 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
324 | return 0; | ||
325 | return 1; | ||
326 | } else { | ||
327 | return -1; | ||
328 | } | ||
329 | } else { | ||
330 | int ret; | ||
331 | |||
332 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
333 | return -1; | ||
334 | |||
335 | if ((ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, | ||
336 | rctx->pad_mode)) <= 0) | ||
337 | return 0; | ||
338 | |||
339 | rslen = ret; | ||
340 | } | ||
341 | |||
342 | if (rslen != tbslen || timingsafe_bcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen)) | ||
343 | return 0; | ||
344 | |||
345 | return 1; | ||
346 | } | ||
347 | |||
348 | static int | ||
349 | pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, | ||
350 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) | ||
351 | { | ||
352 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
353 | int ret; | ||
354 | |||
355 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
356 | int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); | ||
357 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
358 | return -1; | ||
359 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, | ||
360 | in, inlen, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, | ||
361 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) | ||
362 | return -1; | ||
363 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, | ||
364 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
365 | } else { | ||
366 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
367 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
368 | } | ||
369 | if (ret < 0) | ||
370 | return ret; | ||
371 | *outlen = ret; | ||
372 | return 1; | ||
373 | } | ||
374 | |||
375 | static int | ||
376 | pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, | ||
377 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) | ||
378 | { | ||
379 | int ret; | ||
380 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
381 | |||
382 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
383 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
384 | return -1; | ||
385 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, | ||
386 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
387 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
388 | return ret; | ||
389 | ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, | ||
390 | ret, ret, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, | ||
391 | rctx->mgf1md); | ||
392 | } else { | ||
393 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
394 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
395 | } | ||
396 | if (ret < 0) | ||
397 | return ret; | ||
398 | *outlen = ret; | ||
399 | return 1; | ||
400 | } | ||
401 | |||
402 | static int | ||
403 | check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) | ||
404 | { | ||
405 | if (md == NULL) | ||
406 | return 1; | ||
407 | |||
408 | if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { | ||
409 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
410 | return 0; | ||
411 | } | ||
412 | |||
413 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
414 | if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1) { | ||
415 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); | ||
416 | return 0; | ||
417 | } | ||
418 | } else { | ||
419 | /* List of all supported RSA digests. */ | ||
420 | /* RFC 8017 and NIST CSOR. */ | ||
421 | switch(EVP_MD_type(md)) { | ||
422 | case NID_sha1: | ||
423 | case NID_sha224: | ||
424 | case NID_sha256: | ||
425 | case NID_sha384: | ||
426 | case NID_sha512: | ||
427 | case NID_sha512_224: | ||
428 | case NID_sha512_256: | ||
429 | case NID_sha3_224: | ||
430 | case NID_sha3_256: | ||
431 | case NID_sha3_384: | ||
432 | case NID_sha3_512: | ||
433 | case NID_md5: | ||
434 | case NID_md5_sha1: | ||
435 | case NID_md4: | ||
436 | case NID_ripemd160: | ||
437 | return 1; | ||
438 | |||
439 | default: | ||
440 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); | ||
441 | return 0; | ||
442 | } | ||
443 | } | ||
444 | |||
445 | return 1; | ||
446 | } | ||
447 | |||
448 | static int | ||
449 | pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) | ||
450 | { | ||
451 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
452 | |||
453 | switch (type) { | ||
454 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING: | ||
455 | if (p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
456 | if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1)) | ||
457 | return 0; | ||
458 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
459 | if (!(ctx->operation & | ||
460 | (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) | ||
461 | goto bad_pad; | ||
462 | if (!rctx->md) | ||
463 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); | ||
464 | } else if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | ||
465 | goto bad_pad; | ||
466 | } | ||
467 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
468 | if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT)) | ||
469 | goto bad_pad; | ||
470 | if (!rctx->md) | ||
471 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); | ||
472 | } | ||
473 | rctx->pad_mode = p1; | ||
474 | return 1; | ||
475 | } | ||
476 | bad_pad: | ||
477 | RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); | ||
478 | return -2; | ||
479 | |||
480 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING: | ||
481 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode; | ||
482 | return 1; | ||
483 | |||
484 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: | ||
485 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: | ||
486 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
487 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
488 | return -2; | ||
489 | } | ||
490 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) { | ||
491 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen; | ||
492 | } else { | ||
493 | if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) | ||
494 | return -2; | ||
495 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
496 | if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && | ||
497 | ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { | ||
498 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
499 | return -2; | ||
500 | } | ||
501 | if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST && | ||
502 | rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) || | ||
503 | (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) { | ||
504 | RSAerror(RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | ||
505 | return 0; | ||
506 | } | ||
507 | } | ||
508 | rctx->saltlen = p1; | ||
509 | } | ||
510 | return 1; | ||
511 | |||
512 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS: | ||
513 | if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
514 | RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | ||
515 | return -2; | ||
516 | } | ||
517 | rctx->nbits = p1; | ||
518 | return 1; | ||
519 | |||
520 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP: | ||
521 | if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || | ||
522 | BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) { | ||
523 | RSAerror(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
524 | return -2; | ||
525 | } | ||
526 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); | ||
527 | rctx->pub_exp = p2; | ||
528 | return 1; | ||
529 | |||
530 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD: | ||
531 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD: | ||
532 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
533 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
534 | return -2; | ||
535 | } | ||
536 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) | ||
537 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
538 | else | ||
539 | rctx->md = p2; | ||
540 | return 1; | ||
541 | |||
542 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: | ||
543 | if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) | ||
544 | return 0; | ||
545 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
546 | if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2)) | ||
547 | return 1; | ||
548 | RSAerror(RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | ||
549 | return 0; | ||
550 | } | ||
551 | rctx->md = p2; | ||
552 | return 1; | ||
553 | |||
554 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: | ||
555 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
556 | return 1; | ||
557 | |||
558 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD: | ||
559 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD: | ||
560 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING && | ||
561 | rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
562 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); | ||
563 | return -2; | ||
564 | } | ||
565 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) { | ||
566 | if (rctx->mgf1md) | ||
567 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md; | ||
568 | else | ||
569 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
570 | } else { | ||
571 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
572 | if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2)) | ||
573 | return 1; | ||
574 | RSAerror(RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | ||
575 | return 0; | ||
576 | } | ||
577 | rctx->mgf1md = p2; | ||
578 | } | ||
579 | return 1; | ||
580 | |||
581 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: | ||
582 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
583 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
584 | return -2; | ||
585 | } | ||
586 | free(rctx->oaep_label); | ||
587 | if (p2 != NULL && p1 > 0) { | ||
588 | rctx->oaep_label = p2; | ||
589 | rctx->oaep_labellen = p1; | ||
590 | } else { | ||
591 | rctx->oaep_label = NULL; | ||
592 | rctx->oaep_labellen = 0; | ||
593 | } | ||
594 | return 1; | ||
595 | |||
596 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: | ||
597 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
598 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
599 | return -2; | ||
600 | } | ||
601 | *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; | ||
602 | return rctx->oaep_labellen; | ||
603 | |||
604 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: | ||
605 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: | ||
606 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS | ||
607 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: | ||
608 | #endif | ||
609 | return 1; | ||
610 | |||
611 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: | ||
612 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT: | ||
613 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS | ||
614 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT: | ||
615 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT: | ||
616 | #endif | ||
617 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
618 | return 1; | ||
619 | |||
620 | /* fall through */ | ||
621 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: | ||
622 | RSAerror(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | ||
623 | return -2; | ||
624 | |||
625 | default: | ||
626 | return -2; | ||
627 | |||
628 | } | ||
629 | } | ||
630 | |||
631 | static int | ||
632 | pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) | ||
633 | { | ||
634 | const char *errstr; | ||
635 | |||
636 | if (!value) { | ||
637 | RSAerror(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); | ||
638 | return 0; | ||
639 | } | ||
640 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) { | ||
641 | int pm; | ||
642 | if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) | ||
643 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | ||
644 | else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) | ||
645 | pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; | ||
646 | else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0 || strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) | ||
647 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; | ||
648 | else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) | ||
649 | pm = RSA_X931_PADDING; | ||
650 | else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) | ||
651 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | ||
652 | else { | ||
653 | RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
654 | return -2; | ||
655 | } | ||
656 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm); | ||
657 | } | ||
658 | |||
659 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) { | ||
660 | int saltlen; | ||
661 | |||
662 | if (strcmp(value, "digest") == 0) | ||
663 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; | ||
664 | else if (strcmp(value, "max") == 0) | ||
665 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; | ||
666 | else if (strcmp(value, "auto") == 0) | ||
667 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | ||
668 | else { | ||
669 | /* | ||
670 | * Accept the special values -1, -2, -3 since that's | ||
671 | * what atoi() historically did. Lower values are later | ||
672 | * rejected in EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN anyway. | ||
673 | */ | ||
674 | saltlen = strtonum(value, -3, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
675 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
676 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
677 | return -2; | ||
678 | } | ||
679 | } | ||
680 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); | ||
681 | } | ||
682 | |||
683 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) { | ||
684 | int nbits; | ||
685 | |||
686 | nbits = strtonum(value, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
687 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
688 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS); | ||
689 | return -2; | ||
690 | } | ||
691 | |||
692 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits); | ||
693 | } | ||
694 | |||
695 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) { | ||
696 | BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL; | ||
697 | int ret; | ||
698 | |||
699 | if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) | ||
700 | return 0; | ||
701 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp); | ||
702 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
703 | BN_free(pubexp); | ||
704 | return ret; | ||
705 | } | ||
706 | |||
707 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) | ||
708 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, | ||
709 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | ||
710 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); | ||
711 | |||
712 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | ||
713 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0) | ||
714 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, | ||
715 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); | ||
716 | |||
717 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0) | ||
718 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, | ||
719 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value); | ||
720 | |||
721 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) { | ||
722 | int saltlen; | ||
723 | |||
724 | /* | ||
725 | * Accept the special values -1, -2, -3 since that's | ||
726 | * what atoi() historically did. Lower values are later | ||
727 | * rejected in EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN anyway. | ||
728 | */ | ||
729 | saltlen = strtonum(value, -3, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
730 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
731 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
732 | return -2; | ||
733 | } | ||
734 | |||
735 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); | ||
736 | } | ||
737 | } | ||
738 | |||
739 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) | ||
740 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | ||
741 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value); | ||
742 | |||
743 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) { | ||
744 | unsigned char *lab; | ||
745 | long lablen; | ||
746 | int ret; | ||
747 | |||
748 | if ((lab = string_to_hex(value, &lablen)) == NULL) | ||
749 | return 0; | ||
750 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen); | ||
751 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
752 | free(lab); | ||
753 | |||
754 | return ret; | ||
755 | } | ||
756 | |||
757 | return -2; | ||
758 | } | ||
759 | |||
760 | /* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary. */ | ||
761 | static int | ||
762 | rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
763 | { | ||
764 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
765 | |||
766 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
767 | return 1; | ||
768 | |||
769 | /* If all parameters are default values then do not set PSS. */ | ||
770 | if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && | ||
771 | rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) | ||
772 | return 1; | ||
773 | |||
774 | rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, | ||
775 | rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO ? 0 : rctx->saltlen); | ||
776 | if (rsa->pss == NULL) | ||
777 | return 0; | ||
778 | |||
779 | return 1; | ||
780 | } | ||
781 | |||
782 | static int | ||
783 | pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) | ||
784 | { | ||
785 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | ||
786 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
787 | BN_GENCB *pcb = NULL; | ||
788 | BN_GENCB cb = {0}; | ||
789 | int ret = 0; | ||
790 | |||
791 | if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) { | ||
792 | if ((rctx->pub_exp = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
793 | goto err; | ||
794 | if (!BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) | ||
795 | goto err; | ||
796 | } | ||
797 | |||
798 | if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) | ||
799 | goto err; | ||
800 | if (ctx->pkey_gencb != NULL) { | ||
801 | pcb = &cb; | ||
802 | evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); | ||
803 | } | ||
804 | if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb)) | ||
805 | goto err; | ||
806 | if (!rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) | ||
807 | goto err; | ||
808 | if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa)) | ||
809 | goto err; | ||
810 | rsa = NULL; | ||
811 | |||
812 | ret = 1; | ||
813 | |||
814 | err: | ||
815 | RSA_free(rsa); | ||
816 | |||
817 | return ret; | ||
818 | } | ||
819 | |||
820 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = { | ||
821 | .pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA, | ||
822 | .flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, | ||
823 | |||
824 | .init = pkey_rsa_init, | ||
825 | .copy = pkey_rsa_copy, | ||
826 | .cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup, | ||
827 | |||
828 | .keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen, | ||
829 | |||
830 | .sign = pkey_rsa_sign, | ||
831 | |||
832 | .verify = pkey_rsa_verify, | ||
833 | |||
834 | .verify_recover = pkey_rsa_verifyrecover, | ||
835 | |||
836 | .encrypt = pkey_rsa_encrypt, | ||
837 | |||
838 | .decrypt = pkey_rsa_decrypt, | ||
839 | |||
840 | .ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl, | ||
841 | .ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str | ||
842 | }; | ||
843 | |||
844 | /* | ||
845 | * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter | ||
846 | * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage. | ||
847 | */ | ||
848 | |||
849 | static int | ||
850 | pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
851 | { | ||
852 | RSA *rsa; | ||
853 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
854 | const EVP_MD *md; | ||
855 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md; | ||
856 | int min_saltlen, max_saltlen; | ||
857 | |||
858 | /* Should never happen */ | ||
859 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
860 | return 0; | ||
861 | rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
862 | |||
863 | /* If no restrictions just return */ | ||
864 | if (rsa->pss == NULL) | ||
865 | return 1; | ||
866 | |||
867 | /* Get and check parameters */ | ||
868 | if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen)) | ||
869 | return 0; | ||
870 | |||
871 | /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ | ||
872 | max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
873 | if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1) | ||
874 | max_saltlen--; | ||
875 | if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { | ||
876 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); | ||
877 | return 0; | ||
878 | } | ||
879 | rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; | ||
880 | |||
881 | /* | ||
882 | * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to | ||
883 | * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl | ||
884 | */ | ||
885 | |||
886 | rctx->md = md; | ||
887 | rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md; | ||
888 | rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen; | ||
889 | |||
890 | return 1; | ||
891 | } | ||
892 | |||
893 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = { | ||
894 | .pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, | ||
895 | .flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, | ||
896 | |||
897 | .init = pkey_rsa_init, | ||
898 | .copy = pkey_rsa_copy, | ||
899 | .cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup, | ||
900 | |||
901 | .keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen, | ||
902 | |||
903 | .sign_init = pkey_pss_init, | ||
904 | .sign = pkey_rsa_sign, | ||
905 | |||
906 | .verify_init = pkey_pss_init, | ||
907 | .verify = pkey_rsa_verify, | ||
908 | |||
909 | .ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl, | ||
910 | .ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str | ||
911 | }; | ||